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“Unlike Marxian analysis, the economic approach [...] does not assume that individuals
are motivated solely by selfishness or gain. It is a method of analysis, not an
assumption about particular motivations.”
Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture
December 9, 1992
General Introduction
Whom to marry and where to work are probably the most far-reaching decisions
humans make during their lifetime. Besides manifold implications on the individual
level, these decisions also shape economies and societies at the macro level. As a result of
vast individual heterogeneity, the choice of marital partners and the allocation of workers
to jobs may have profound implications for income inequality, productivity, and welfare.
The overarching theme of this thesis is the study of these allocations, their determinants
and repercussions, with a particular focus on assortative matching.
Gary Becker has shown in his seminal work on marriage markets how and why het-
erogeneous men and women sort in a frictionless Walrasian environment (Becker, 1973,
1974). The key assumption in Becker’s model is a common ordinal preference ranking
of potential partners.1 The empirical literature indeed found that individuals with high
income and high educational attainment tend to marry each other.2 Essentially, positive
assortative matching is an outcome of homophily, the love of the same. It has the po-
tential to shape the distribution of income in a society. Many authors have argued that
marriage market sorting may increase income inequality and lead to segregation.3
1The sorting pattern then depends on the production structure of the economy. With a supermodular
(submodular) production function, sorting will be positive (negative) because the agents’ types act as
complements (substitutes) for the joint output.
2The same is true along many other dimensions such as age, ethnicity, health, and physical charac-
teristics, see Fisman et al. (2006) and Hitsch et al. (2010).
3Early studies on this question are Kremer (1997), Fernández and Rogerson (2001), Fernández et al.
(2005), and Choo and Siow (2006). Burdett and Coles (1997) offer a theoretical analysis. More recently,
Eika et al. (2014) find that marital sorting has only a limited effect on income inequality. In this debate,
it is also important to distinguish within and between household inequality.
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Two-sided assignment models are applicable to a wide range of problems. Today,
frictional versions of the Beckerian model with sorting are an established tool for the
analysis of labor markets, marriage markets, housing markets, CEO compensation, etc.4
Frictions and decentralized trade have been introduced to the framework by Shimer and
Smith (2000). Now, agents are unable to instantaneously locate their preferred part-
ner. In models with random search, agents have to wait for the arrival of a potential
partner and then weigh up the option values of forming the match or continuing search.
Matching sets of acceptable and unacceptable types are formed. Unsuitable partners
are rejected and, naturally, this lead to the existence of unmatched individuals in equi-
librium. This is a common feature of frictional sorting models with the broader class
of Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and matching models with equilibrium
unemployment, which typically rely on a representative agent.
The first Chapter of this thesis attempts to work out a connection between the notion
of sorting and the broader DMP literature on unemployment dynamics. It develops a
sorting model of the labor market with ex-ante worker and firm heterogeneity, wage dis-
persion, and aggregate uncertainty. We then revisit one of the most prominent questions
in the macro-labor literature in recent years, Shimer’s unemployment volatility puzzle
(Shimer, 2005). We shall see that sorting can improve our understanding of the cycli-
cal dynamics of the labor market. The model is capable of explaining the full extent
of unemployment fluctuations in the data. We also make a technical contribution by
proposing a perturbation-based method that tackles the main computational burden of
dynamic sorting models: infinite-dimensional endogenous distribution functions in the
state space. This method allows us to analyze sorting models out of steady state.
Sorting is also an important topic in the broader empirical literature on wage disper-
sion. Abowd et al. (1999), using by now widely available matched employer-employee
data, were the first to emphasize the huge importance of unobserved heterogeneity at the
worker and firm level for wage dispersion. Card et al. (2013), a prominent paper building
on Abowd et al. (1999), show that increasing wage dispersion in Germany is driven by ris-
4Chade et al. (2017) provide a comprehensive overview of the development and the relevant literature.
Some recent examples of exciting new papers are Lise and Robin (2017), Lise et al. (2016), Bagger and
Lentz (2016), Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2016), and Eeckhout and Kircher (2017) for the labor market
and Goussé et al. (2017) for the marriage market.
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ing worker heterogeneity, rising firm heterogeneity, and increasing sorting.5 The so-called
AKM approach relies on strong assumptions of additive separability and monotonicity
in order to identify the worker and firm components of wages from worker mobility pat-
terns. This assumption is at odds with the basic assumption of sorting models, namely
that worker and firm types interact and jointly determine output.6
The second Chapter of this thesis contributes to the debate about the incompatibility
of the assumptions underlying AKM with sorting theory. It analyzes German matched
employer-employee data through the lens of a structural sorting model in the spirit of
Hagedorn et al. (2017) and studies how the allocation of workers to jobs changed during
a period of profound institutional change.7 We are able to reconcile AKM and sorting
theory. The key finding is that empirical fixed effect models provide a valid approximation
of observed wages and matching patterns for a large part of the data. For low-type
workers, however, wages are decreasing in the type of the firm a worker is matched with.
This is a prediction of sorting models which is at odds with the monotonicity assumption
of AKM. After ranking both workers and firms, we show that low-type workers have
become increasingly sorted into low-type firms over time, especially out of unemployment.
This increase is driven by the sorting of low-type workers into their wage-maximizing
matches at the bottom of the firm type distribution.
The last Chapter returns to the marriage market. Due to the similarity of assign-
ment problems in labor and marriage markets, many empirical and theoretical tools can
be used in both contexts. We study match formation and dissolution in frictional mar-
riage markets under labor market uncertainty. The analysis makes use of a search model
with transferable utility in which ex-ante heterogeneous men and women simultaneously
search for partners in the marriage market and switch between employment and unem-
ployment in the labor market. In the marriage market, individuals match assortatively
on education and draw a match-specific shock component representing mutual affection.
Divorces can happen due to both match-specific reasons and labor market transitions,
e.g. job loss of one spouse. We structurally estimate our model using German micro
5Measured by the correlation of worker and firm-fixed effects.
6On this point see Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), Lopes de Melo (2016), Bonhomme et al. (2016),
Lise et al. (2016), and Hagedorn et al. (2017) among many others.
7See Dustmann et al. (2014) for an overview.
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data and decompose the observed flow of divorces into so-called “labor market divorces”
and match-specific divorces. While more than 90% of divorces happen for reasons of
changing mutual affection, the share of labor market divorces has increased significantly
in Germany since the mid 2000s. Interestingly, most of this increase is driven by couples
in which a previously unemployed woman starts working, more so for highly-educated
women. These women also have the highest job-finding rates in our sample. As a conse-
quence, the correlation between spouses’ education has stopped increasing in Germany
around 1999. It appears that the sorting trend has been mitigated by labor market effects
in recent years, which is an interesting new contribution to the debate about marriage
market sorting and inequality.
Each Chapter of this thesis has a separate introduction that includes a literature
review. The notation in each chapter is self-contained. Selected additional results can be
found in an Appendix at the end of each Chapter.
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Chapter 1
Labor Market Dynamics with
Sorting∗
∗This research is a revised version of a paper that previously circulated under the title “Wage Rigidity
and Labor Market Dynamics with Sorting”. Special thanks go to Robert Shimer for supporting this
project and hosting me at the University of Chicago. Discussions with Matthias Doepke, Jan Eeckhout,
Wouter den Haan, Leo Kaas, Philipp Kircher, Thibaut Lamadon, Rasmus Lentz, Christian Merkl, Jean-
Marc Robin, Uwe Sunde, and many others have greatly improved this research. I also thank seminar and
conference participants at Aarhus, Chicago, Essex, Halle, Konstanz, Munich, Northwestern, Nuremberg,
SMYE 2014, ES European Winter Meeting 2014, AEA/ASSA 2015, T2M 2015, RES 2015, SaM 2015,
Barcelona GSE Summer Forum 2015, ES World Conference 2015, CESifo Conference on Employment
and Social Protection 2016, and EALE 2016 for many useful suggestions.
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1.1 Introduction
To form a match in the labor market, both workers and firms have to expend time and
resources in order to find a suitable partner. This coordination friction is the essence of
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) search and matching framework and explains
the coexistence of unemployed workers and vacant jobs in the labor market.8 Intuitively,
frictions can be understood as an outcome of heterogeneity: workers and firms differ in
terms of skills and productivities. This makes finding a suitable match costly.
A big advantage of the standard DMP model is that it elegantly incorporates the co-
ordination friction without making heterogeneity across workers and firms explicit. With
the representative agent model, many interesting problems can be solved and studied
analytically. Recently, however, the empirical literature on wage dispersion has made
big advantages in identifying the importance of worker and firm heterogeneity.9 There
is positive sorting in the labor market, that is, a tendency of low (high) skill workers to
work at low (high) productivity firms. We see an abundance of evidence in the literature
that this is a prevalent feature of labor markets in many developed economies.10
This thesis chapter seeks to connect these new facts to a prominent class of search
and matching models which is used to study unemployment and wage dynamics. Shimer
(2005) points out that a simple dynamic DMP model fails to generate sufficient volatility
in response to aggregate shocks, mainly because wages are fully flexible. Hornstein et al.
(2011) add that standard search models do not generate as much wage dispersion as we
observe in the data. We find that explicitly considering worker and firm heterogeneity and
allowing for positive sorting enables search and matching models to match unemployment
and wage dynamics.
We develop a dynamic DMP model with two-sided heterogeneity, labor market sort-
ing, and aggregate shocks. The model features equilibrium wage dispersion, an endoge-
nous wage rigidity, and sufficient amplification in response to shocks. At its core, the
8The main references for this class of models are Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissarides
(1985), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Pissarides (2000) provides an excellent textbook treatment.
9The first paper in this spirit is Abowd et al. (1999), a seminal empirical contribution among the
first using matched employer-employee data.
10There is evidence of PAM in Germany, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, and the United States; see Andrews
et al. (2008, 2012), Card et al. (2013), Hagedorn et al. (2017), Lopes de Melo (2016), Bonhomme et al.
(2016), Bartolucci et al. (2015), Lise et al. (2016), Bagger and Lentz (2016), and Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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model is a Shimer and Smith (2000) economy. Sorting—generated by assuming a pro-
duction complementarity between heterogeneous worker skills and firm productivities—
implies that agents are not willing to match with every possible partner they meet when
searching randomly. The standard coordination friction is thus enhanced because only a
subset of all meetings generates new matches: endogenous matching sets contain the ac-
ceptable partner types for all worker and firm types. They are determined by the match
surplus, which depends on the underlying production complementarity. In response to
shocks, the surplus, the matching sets, and the distribution of worker and firm types
adapt, generating rich dynamics and an amplification, in line with the data. Two new
transmission channels are quantitatively important for the model’s dynamics.
First, the model endogenously generates a wage rigidity of an empirically reasonable
magnitude.11 Shimer (2005) convincingly shows that the well-known lack of amplification
in the standard model is due to the fully flexible wage with Nash bargaining, which re-
duces firms’ incentive to create new jobs and limits the model’s responsiveness to shocks.
Adding labor market sorting to the picture leads to rigid wages, even with Nash bar-
gaining. With sorting, wages depend on the relative labor market tightness, that is, the
scarcity or abundance of other types in the bargaining worker-firm couple’s matching
sets. This property shields wages from fluctuations in aggregate labor market tightness
and creates an endogenous rigidity.
Second, firms solve a type-specific dynamic job-creation problem: with free entry, they
form an expectation about the future match surplus and the state-dependent distribution
of unemployed worker types when deciding how many vacancies to post. We let the
strength of the production complementarity be proportionate to labor productivity. This
implies that the option value of being in a good match, measured by the surplus function,
adjusts over-proportionately in response to shocks. This increases the firms’ incentive to
post vacancies and leads to amplification. Together, the endogenous wage rigidity and
the dynamic job-creation problem propagate the model’s response to shocks to a degree
that brings it on par with empirical moments of labor market data.12
11We find a moderate elasticity of wages with respect to labor productivity of 0.75. This elasticity is
close to benchmark estimates for the U.S. labor market reported by Haefke et al. (2013), who find an
elasticity of 0.8 with a standard error of 0.4.
12Pries (2008) also analyzes how worker heterogeneity impacts the dynamics of a search and matching
model. He introduces heterogeneity in a simple way—two types of workers and homogeneous firms—and
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The state space of the model includes endogenous distribution functions which are
infinite-dimensional. A technical contribution we make is a numerical procedure that
allows keeping track of the model’s complex state space. In order to compute the model’s
response to aggregate shocks, it is necessary to compute the adjustment path of the
match surplus, the matching sets, and the endogenous type distributions. The key idea
to approach this challenge is to define auxiliary state variables for the integral terms
determining the state variables. This allows us to linearize the model around its steady
state and use a perturbation technique to solve for the policy functions. To judge the
accuracy of the computational approach, we plug the simulated data back into the model’s
Bellman equations and find that the errors due to discretization and approximation are
on average no bigger than those made when solving standard search and matching models
via perturbation.13
This distribution function in the state space is the main technical difference between
the model developed in this chapter and Lise and Robin (2017), who show that search
on the job with sequential auctions (building on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and
Robin (2011)) considerably simplifies the state space. They also find that a model with
sorting and aggregate shocks fits many data moments well. The entry decision in their
model, however, is static. Vacancy postings immediately adjust in response to shocks
and, therefore, the model fails to match empirical vacancy dynamics. The dynamic
entry decision proposed here overcomes this problem and generates persistent vacancy
dynamics. To focus on the complexity that arises from the endogenous distributions
in the state space, we abstract from search on the job. Studying the dynamic entry
problem is an important complement to Lise and Robin (2017). The logical next step
in this literature will be to develop a model with both search on the job and a dynamic
entry, which is a fascinating avenue for future research.
The most prominent existing approaches to solve Shimer’s unemployment-volatility
puzzle in the literature rely on making wages less responsive to shocks, either by assuming
that wages are completely rigid (Hall, 2005), by modifying the calibration in order to
finds some amplification related to a changing composition of the pool of unemployed workers over the
business cycle, which does not, however, sufficiently amplify the model.
13Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2017) show that solving the representative agent search and match-
ing model in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) via log-linearization and perturbation creates a mean
computational error of 3.75%. We find a mean error of 3.84% with slightly more dispersion.
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increase the worker’s outside option in the bargaining solution (Hagedorn and Manovskii,
2008), or by replacing Nash bargaining with an alternating offer bargaining game (Hall
and Milgrom, 2008).14,15 A counterpoint to these popular papers is Pissarides (2009), who
modifies the firm entry problem, what is similar in spirit to this chapter. This chapter
suggests that labor market sorting might provide an appealing alternative modification
of the firm’s problem in a broad class of models.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the
setup and derives the stationary equilibrium of a hierarchical sorting model. Section 1.3
analyzes the comparative statics of the model to shed some light on the sources of am-
plification. Section 1.4 adds aggregate uncertainty and analyzes wage determination and
firm entry in the fully dynamic model. Section 1.5 discusses the computational strategy
and presents results from numerical simulations of the sorting model in comparison to a
baseline search and matching model and U.S. labor market data. Section 1.6 concludes
by discussing the findings in light of the related theoretical and empirical literature.
1.2 The Model
We construct a dynamic DMP model of the labor market with search frictions, sort-
ing between heterogeneous workers and firms, and aggregate uncertainty. This Section
presents the model’s general setup and derives the stationary equilibrium of the model
with a hierarchical production function. Section 1.4 introduces aggregate uncertainty in
the form of a stochastic labor productivity process z. To simplify notation, this channel
is neglected in deriving the stationary equilibrium.
14Hall (2005) shows that the volatility puzzle vanishes once wages are made fully inflexible, implying
a counter-factual wage volatility of zero. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) show that the dynamics can
be amplified by increasing the value of the workers’ outside option of non-market activity. A higher
calibrated value of the respective model parameter leads to lower wage outcomes in the Nash bargaining
game, however, with the unrealistic consequence that a 15% increase in the value of non-market activity
implies that the equilibrium unemployment rate doubles, see Hornstein et al. (2005) and Costain and
Reiter (2008).
15These mechanisms are widely used to generate wage stickiness in DSGE models, for instance, to
study the transmission of monetary policy shocks. A recent example is Christiano et al. (2016), who
use the alternating offer bargaining game of Hall and Milgrom (2008) to induce wage inertia in a New
Keynesian model.
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Table 1.1: Distributions of Matched and Unmatched Worker and Firm Types
Distribution of Relation Aggregate Stock
Active matches gm(x, y) M =
∫∫
gm(x, y) dxdy
Employed workers ge(x) =
∫
gm(x, y) dy E =
∫
ge(x) dx
Unemployed workers gu(x) = gw(x)− ge(x) U =
∫
gu(x) dx
Producing firms gp(y) =
∫
gm(x, y) dx P =
∫
gp(y) dy
Vacant firms gv(y)→ free entry V =
∫
gv(y) dy
1.2.1 General Setup
A continuum of workers is endowed with heterogeneous skills x ∈ [0, 1] with a probability
density function (pdf) gw(x). The measure of workers is exogenous and normalized to 1.
A continuum of firms is heterogeneous in terms of productivity y ∈ [0, 1] with pdf gf (y).
Denote by gm(x, y) the two-dimensional joint distribution of active (i.e. producing) (x, y)
matches. The distributions of employed workers, ge(x), and producing firms, gp(y), can
be obtained by integrating out the respective dimension of gm(x, y). The distribution
of unemployed worker types, gu(x), is obtained by subtracting the distribution of em-
ployed workers from gw(x), which is exogenous and fixed. The distribution of vacant
firm types gv(y) is determined by free entry. The distributions of active matches, em-
ployed/unemployed workers, and producing/vacant firms are equilibrium objects. They
integrate to the stocks of employed workers, E, producing firms, P , unemployed work-
ers, U , and vacancies, V . M is the stock of active matches, which must equal E and
P . Table 1.1 summarizes the relations between the underlying density functions, the
distributions of matched and unmatched workers and firms, and the aggregate variables.
The heterogeneity of workers and firms is assumed to be one-dimensional.16 The
model does not allow for imperfect information with respect to worker and firm types.
All agents know their own type and the types of all potential partners they meet.
Time is discrete. Agents are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and they maximize their
future discounted income streams. The common discount factor is β. A production
complementarity between worker skills and firm productivities (detailed below) induces
16Both x and y can be viewed as a one-dimensional representation of a larger, multi-dimensional set
of worker and firm characteristics. For a recent exploration of a multi-dimensional sorting model with
random search, see Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2016).
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labor market sorting, that is, for every worker (firm) an optimal firm (worker) exists and
matching with this optimal partner would maximize output.17 Search frictions, however,
prevent the formation of these optimal matches, as in Shimer and Smith (2000). In
a setting with random search, heterogeneity, and sorting, not all meetings necessarily
result in an employment relationship. The agents optimally choose partners by forming
a matching set that comprises all acceptable types on the other side of the market.
The decision as to whether a partner is acceptable or not is determined by the match
surplus, S(x, y), which can be negative when the value of joint production falls short of
the workers’ and firms’ outside options.
Labor is assumed to be the only production input hence capital is ignored. To focus on
labor market sorting and the production complementarity between worker and firm types,
we do not consider firm size and possible additional complementarities between workers
within the same firm. This is equivalent to assuming that the firms’ production function
has constant returns to scale at the match level. Thus, firms’ aggregate output is equal
to the sum of what is produced by every individual worker at the firm. In other words,
matches can be viewed as one-worker-one-machine relationships. The measure of active
firms in the labor market is governed by free entry. Firms with a vacancy incur a per-
period cost for keeping it open, representing expenses for posting the vacancy, screening
applications, and the like. This cost is convex in the measure of type y vacancies posted.
In the hierarchical sorting model considered below, the propensity to post vacancies will
hence depend on firm type. The convex function c thus takes the measure of vacant firms
gv(y) of type y as its argument. Firms enter the labor market by posting vacancies as
long as the expected discounted value of production is at least as big as c(gv(y)). In the
hierarchical model, the convexity of c(.) is critical to ensure a non-degenerate distribution
of vacancies.
Only unemployed workers engage in random search.18 We assume that meetings are
governed by a standard Cobb-Douglas type matching function with constant returns to
17The case where all workers and firms are matched to their optimal partner corresponds to the
Walrasian first-best allocation in Becker (1973).
18We abstract from search on the job to study a dynamic firm entry problem. In Lise and Robin
(2017), search on the job with sequential auctions (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) leads to a static entry
problem, which has counter-factual implications for vacancy dynamics. Combining search on the job
with dynamic firm entry in a sorting model would be an interesting future project.
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scale, M(U, V ) = ϑU ξV 1−ξ, where ξ (1 − ξ) is the elasticity of new matches with re-
spect to unemployment (vacancies).19 ϑ is a scaling parameter representing matching
efficiency. The arrival rates are functions of aggregate labor market tightness θ = V/U.
qv(θ) = M(U,V )/V is the rate at which vacant firms meet unemployed workers and, cor-
respondingly, qu(θ) = M(U,V )/U is the rate at which unemployed workers meet vacancies.
qv(θ) is decreasing and qu(θ) is increasing in θ. Productive activity commences whenever
a firm and a worker meet and find that they are jointly able to produce a non-negative sur-
plus given their types. S(x, y) is then shared according to the standard Nash bargaining
solution with worker bargaining power α.
Matches between firms and workers can be terminated for two reasons. They are
subject to idiosyncratic separation shocks, which lead to immediate dissolution of the
employment relationship. A match is subject to these shocks with an exogenous per-
period probability δ. Additionally, in the presence of aggregate shocks (see Section 1.4),
endogenous separations can occur at the margins of the agents’ matching sets. When
a negative productivity shock hits the economy, the surplus of previously marginally
profitable matches may become negative. Since a negative surplus is always less than
both parties’ outside option, they prefer to separate.20 In case of unemployment, workers
receive flow benefits b(x) every period, which represent the type-dependent value of home
production or non-market activity.
The timing of the model is as follows: a period begins when the state of aggregate
labor productivity z is revealed (z = 1 in steady state and thus muted in the following).
Workers and firms form their optimal acceptance strategies based on the exogenous state
z and the primitives of the model. Both endogenous and exogenous separations take
place, following which new matches are formed. Workers and firms separated in the same
period do not start their search until the next period. Finally, production commences
and wages are paid.
19Note that using a linear search technology with heterogeneous workers and firms implies congestion
effects between different worker and job types. Here, we stick to the Cobb-Douglas matching function
for simplicity and comparability to other studies. A quadratic search technology, as used in Shimer
and Smith (2000), eliminates the congestion externality. Nöldeke and Tröger (2009) extend Shimer and
Smith (2000) to models with linear search technologies.
20This mechanism is similar to Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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1.2.2 Production Functions
Let the output of a producing (x, y) match be denoted F (x, y). The production function
is non-negative and twice continuously differentiable. Labor market sorting in the model
economy is induced by a complementarity between worker and firm types in produc-
tion. We focus on positive assortative matching (PAM), which requires a supermodular
production function, that is, positive cross-derivatives, Fxy > 0.21
More specifically, we rely on the equilibrium existence conditions in an optimal assign-
ment economy with search frictions provided by Shimer and Smith (2000). Supermod-
ularity of F (x, y) alone is not sufficient in this setting. To ensure existence of a search
equilibrium, F (x, y), Fx(x, y), and Fxy(x, y) need to be log-supermodular.22 These con-
ditions also imply that the matching sets are nonempty, closed, and convex. Uniqueness
cannot be established in this class of models in general. When solving the model numer-
ically, we need to ensure that the mapping derived below is contracting in the respective
parameter space by repeatedly solving the model for different initial conditions.
Depending on the functional form of the production function, labor market sorting
arises from a comparative advantage (circular model) or an absolute advantage (hierar-
chical model) argument. In sorting models with absolute advantage, for example Shimer
and Smith (2000), high type workers (firms) will always produce more than low types, no
matter what type of firm (worker) they are matched with. In other words, the production
function implies an unambiguous hierarchy, or ranking, of workers and firms because it
is strictly increasing in both dimensions, Fx(x, y) > 0, Fy(x, y) > 0.
In the comparative advantage sorting model, the worker/firm type does not matter
by itself; only the interaction of x and y determines output. Examples of sorting models
with comparative advantage include the circular models in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999),
Gautier et al. (2010), and Gautier and Teulings (2015). The circular production function
takes as input only the distance d(x, y) between x and y, measured along the circum-
ference of a circle. Output is maximized for d = 0. As argued by Gautier and Teulings
21This implies, for any x′ > x and y′ > y, F (x′, y′) +F (x, y) ≥ F (x′, y) +F (x, y′). See Topkis (1998)
for an excellent treatment of supermodularity and complementarity in the context of lattice theory.
22This implies, for any x′ > x and y′ > y, F (x′, y′)F (x, y) ≥ F (x′, y)F (x, y′), Fx(x′, y′)Fx(x, y) ≥
Fx(x′, y)Fx(x, y′), and Fxy(x′, y′)Fxy(x, y) ≥ Fxy(x′, y)Fxy(x, y′).
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(2015), the circular model can be understood as a second-order Taylor approximation of
a more general production technology.23
In this chapter, we work with the hierarchical sorting model because it is empirically
more appealing: absolute advantage implies a ranking of workers and firms and most
data used for constructing such rankings empirically and bring sorting models to the
data, for instance, education, job tenure, firms size, or value added, are inherently hier-
archical. In the sorting model with absolute advantage, high type workers (firms) always
produce more, no matter with which type of firm (worker) they are matched. Following
Shimer and Smith (2000), we use a simple functional form assumption that features log-
supermodularity of the function itself, its first derivatives, and cross-derivatives to ensure
the existence of a search equilibrium.24
F (x, y) = exp(x× y). (1.1)
Recall that x and y are bounded on [0, 1], so min(F (x, y)) = 1 and max(F (x, y)) = e.25
Let us define the surplus function
S(x, y) = P(x, y)− V(y) + E(x, y)− U(x), (1.2)
which depends on the four option value equations (see below) for a producing firm, a
vacant job, an employed worker, and an unemployed worker for all (x, y) combinations.
To capture the logic behind the matching sets in a way that is algebraically convenient,
define a simple match indicator function:
µ(x, y) =

1 if S(x, y) > 0
0 if S(x, y) < 0
(1.3)
µ(x, y) equals 1 whenever a firm of type y is willing to match with a worker of type x
and vice versa. Whenever necessary, we will indicate that µ(x, y) = 1 (µ(x, y) = 0) by
23Earlier versions of this work have made use of circular production functions to induce sorting. Since
it is not central to this version, we relegate the further discussion of circular models to Appendix A.2.
24That is, for any x′ > x and y′ > y, F (x′, y′)F (x, y) ≥ F (x′, y)F (x, y′), Fx(x′, y′)Fx(x, y) ≥
Fx(x′, y)Fx(x, y′), and Fxy(x′, y′)Fxy(x, y) ≥ Fxy(x′, y)Fxy(x, y′).
25This functional form is also used in Teulings and Gautier (2004).
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writing µ+(x, y) (µ−(x, y)). The choice of with whom to match is determined solely by
the surplus value function S(x, y). In case the surplus is positive, both parties will agree
to form a match, so the decision is mutually consistent.26 When the surplus turns out
to be negative after a meeting, both parties prefer to continue their search due to their
higher outside options.
E(x, y) = W (x, y) + βδU(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
separation
+ β(1− δ) max{E(x, y),U(x)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
continued employment
(1.4)
E(x, y) represents the value of a type x worker employed at firm type y and consists of
the flow payment of the match-specific wage, W (x, y), plus the value of the two possible
outcomes in the next period, discounted by β. With probability δ this match is subject
to an idiosyncratic separation shock and the worker receives the value of unemployment,
U(x). Accordingly, with probability (1 − δ), the worker continues to receive the value
of employment at firm x. The max operator allows for the possibility that the value of
employment falls below the value of unemployment in the next period, for instance, due
to a productivity shock. The asset value of an unemployed worker of type x is defined as
follows, with the limits of integration being equal to the boundaries of x and y, [0, 1]:
U(x) = b(x) + β(1− qu(θ))U(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no meeting
+ βqu(θ)
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V
µ+(x, y)E(x, y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
successful match
+ βqu(θ)U(x)
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V
µ−(x, y)dy︸ ︷︷ ︸
meet unacceptable firm
(1.5)
In case of unemployment, all workers receive a type-specific value of home production
b(x) with ∂b(x)
∂x
> 0. In the following period, there is a probability (1 − qu(θ)) that the
unemployed worker will not meet any firm and remains unemployed. With probability
qu(θ), the job finding rate, a meeting with a firm will occur. Whenever the type of firm y
is an element of this worker’s matching set (and vice versa), that is, µ(x, y) = 1, a match
is formed and production starts. Note that gv(y)/V under the integral sign represents the
probability of meeting every specific firm type. This probability weights the surplus. In
26In the model with continuous distributions, the surplus is never exactly 0. Due to discretization,
we allow for some smoothing of µ(x, y) when the surplus is very small.
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case the firm turns out to be an unsuitable match (µ(x, y) = 0), both parties continue
their search. The firms’ asset value equations are symmetric:
P(x, y) = F (x, y)−W (x, y) + βδV(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
separation
+ β(1− δ) max{P(x, y),V(y)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
continued production
(1.6)
The flow payment received by the firm in a productive employment relationship is the
match-specific output F (x, y) minus the wage, W (x, y). In the next period, the match
breaks up with probability δ, leading to the option value of a vacancy, or continues with
probability (1− δ). Finally, the asset value of a vacancy is as follows:
V(y) = −c(gv(y)) + β(1− qv(θ))V(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
no meeting
+ βqv(θ)
∫ 1
0
gu(x)
U
µ+(x, y)P(x, y)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
successful match
+ βqv(θ)V(y)
∫ 1
0
gu(x)
U
µ−(x, y)dx︸ ︷︷ ︸
meet unacceptable worker
(1.7)
The cost of maintaining an open vacancy is determined by the convex function, c(gv(y)),
which must be paid every period. In the next period, there is the possibility of not
meeting a worker, of meeting a suitable worker and filling the job, or of meeting an
unsuitable worker and continuing to search.
The Nash bargaining solution determines how the surplus is divided in the event of
a suitable match. The workers’ bargaining power parameter is α ∈ (0, 1). For both the
worker and the firm, the respective share of surplus equals the additional value of being
matched compared to the value of continued search, which serves as threat point in the
bargaining game.
αS(x, y) = E(x, y)− U(x) (1.8)
(1− α)S(x, y) = P(x, y)− V(y) (1.9)
Note that the values of employment (production) and unemployment (a vacancy) are
equalized when S(x, y) = 0, which is exactly the definition of the matching sets. It is
possible to simplify the four Bellman equations (Equations (1.4) to (1.7)) by adding and
subtracting the value of unemployment and a vacancy respectively. The surplus sharing
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rules of Equations (1.8) and (1.9) can then be plugged in and the surplus function shows
up under the integral signs.27
E(x, y) = W (x, y) + β (U(x) + α(1− δ) max{S(x, y), 0}) , (1.10)
U(x) = b(x) + β
(
U(x) + αqu(θ)
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V
max{S(x, y), 0}dy
)
, (1.11)
P(x, y) = F (x, y)−W (x, y) + β (V(y) + (1− α)(1− δ) max{S(x, y), 0}) , (1.12)
V(y) = −c(gv(y)) + β
(
V(y) + (1− α)qv(θ)
∫ 1
0
gu(x)
U
max{S(x, y), 0}dx
)
. (1.13)
Stationary Equilibrium of the Hierarchical Model
Due the integral terms in the values of unemployment (Equation (1.11)) and a vacancy
(Equation (1.13)), the hierarchical sorting model has no closed-form solution. Value func-
tion iteration on a discrete grid can be applied in this context to numerically approximate
the model’s stationary equilibrium. Technically, this procedure relies on the conjecture
that in a given parameter space, the surplus function is a contraction mapping.28
The first step is to compute the fixed point of the surplus value function S(x, y),
which is obtained by plugging Equations (1.10) to (1.12) into Equation (1.2). Note that
V(y) = 0 ∀ y due to free entry, so the value of a vacancy drops out.
S(x, y) = F (x, y) + β(1− δ) max{S(x, y), 0}
−
(
b(x) + βαqu(θ)
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V
max{S(x, y), 0} dy
) (1.14)
The surplus function includes the workers’ outside option in the large brackets due to
the Nash bargaining assumption.29 By solving the fixed point problem for every (x, y)
combination, the equilibrium matching sets of all worker and firm types summarized in
µ(x, y) are pinned down by S(x, y) ≥ 0. The agents’ acceptance strategy is as follows:
27Note that
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V max{S(x, y), 0}dy is equivalent to
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V µ(x, y)S(x, y)dy.
28This approach to solve the model is similar in spirit to the procedures described in Shimer and
Smith (2000), Hagedorn et al. (2017), and Lise and Robin (2017). Thanks go to Robert Shimer for
sharing the code used to produce the numerical results in Shimer and Smith (2000).
29This is an important difference from the model of Lise and Robin (2017), who show that incorporat-
ing search on the job with sequential auctions (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002) removes the distributional
terms from the surplus value and, hence, from the state space of the model.
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for every (x, y) combination with a weakly positive surplus, µ(x, y) contains a 1 and a 0
otherwise.30
In the second step, knowing S(x, y) and µ(x, y), an equilibrium flow condition can be
used to solve for the endogenous distribution of unemployed workers.
δgm(x, y) = gu(x) qu(θ)
gv(y)
V
µ(x, y). (1.15)
The left-hand side of Equation (1.15) represents the number of dissolved active matches
for every (x, y) combination in equilibrium. Without stochastic labor productivity, all
match dissolutions occur exogenously with probability δ. On the right-hand side of the
equation, the flow out of unemployment for the measure of all unemployed workers of
type x, given by gu(x), is determined by the job-finding rate, qu(θ), times the probability
of meeting a specific firm type y, gv(y)/V , times the match indicator function that takes
the value 1 if the respective (x, y) combination produces a positive surplus. New matches
are created solely for (x, y) combinations that produce a (weakly) positive surplus in
equilibrium. Integrating the firm dimension out of Equation (1.15) and substituting in
gw(x)− gu(x) on the left-hand side yields the following expression for gu(x):
gu(x) =
δgw(x)
qu(θ)
∫ 1
0
gv(y)
V
µ(x, y)dy + δ
(1.16)
Note that integrating Equation (1.16) over x yields an expression comparable to the
textbook equation pinning down equilibrium unemployment, that is, the Beveridge Curve:
U = δ
δ + qu(θ)
∫∫ gv(y)
V
µ(x, y)dydx
Compared to the textbook version, the above expression has a double integral term in
the denominator, which has to be smaller than 1 if ∃(x, y).µ(x, y) = 0. Thus, equilibrium
unemployment must be higher in the sorting model.
To determine the distribution of vacant firm types in the stationary equilibrium, we
use the free entry condition for all y. Any firm type will post vacancies as long as the
30In practice, however, it is necessary to apply some smoothing to the acceptance strategy to ensure
convergence. We allow for mixed strategy solutions close to the cutoff, following Hagedorn et al. (2017).
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discounted value of the job is at least as high as the cost implied by c(gv(y)).
c(gv(y)) = β(1− α)qv(θ)
∫ 1
0
gu(x)
U
µ(x, y)S(x, y)dx. (1.17)
Given gu(x), µ(x, y), and S(x, y), Equation 1.17 can be solved for the measure of vacancies
posted by every firm type y in equilibrium. Integrating over gu(x) and gv(y) yields
the aggregate stocks of unemployed workers and vacant firms, which in turn determine
aggregate labor market tightness, arrival rates, and the flow of new meetings via the
matching function.
The stationary equilibrium of the hierarchical sorting model consists of the objects
{S(x, y), µ(x, y), gu(x), gv(y)}, which are jointly determined by the surplus value function
(Equation (1.14)), the steady state flow condition (Equation (1.15)), and free entry of va-
cancies. The solution algorithm has two steps: it alternates between computing the fixed
point of the surplus function for all (x, y) combinations and updating the distributions
of unemployed workers and vacant firm types using steady-state flows and the free entry
condition, respectively. This procedure is repeated until the decision rule converges.31
The equilibrium can be computed with high precision in a relatively short amount of time.
To help visualize the properties of the stationary equilibrium of the hierarchical sorting
model, Figure 1.1 presents a projection of the surplus function on the type space, along
with the matching cutoffs. The model is solved on a discrete grid with 1,000 worker and
firm types. The hierarchy implied by the sorting model is immediately apparent, as the
surplus increases quickly toward the upper-right corner. Interestingly, the surplus also
increases toward the lower-left corner, that is, for matches between low type workers and
low type firms. This property is a direct expression of the production complementarity
in the sorting model. The surplus shrinks toward the cutoffs of the matching sets be-
cause the relatively higher ranked partner always needs to be compensated for his higher
outside option. With absolute advantage and the production function of Equation (1.1),
it is relatively more important to be optimally matched for low type workers and firms
than for medium types. In other words, this type of worker has a higher incentive to be
sorted and this is reflected in the surplus function.
31Convergence is achieved once the absolute difference of the surplus between two iterations is less
than 10−12.
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Figure 1.1: Surplus and Matching Set Cutoffs in Equilibrium
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1.3 Comparative Statics
Let us now introduce aggregate labor productivity into the hierarchical sorting model.
Labor productivity z can be imagined as an underlying technology that enables labor to
be used productively. Thus, it influences the output of every match in equal measure:
F (x, y, z) = F (x, y)× z, (1.18)
so the output of a match between worker x and firm y with labor productivity z is simply
the product of the match-specific part, F (x, y), and the potentially time-varying but type-
independent aggregate labor productivity, z. To better understand the properties that
lead to an amplification of shocks in the dynamic model, we analyze the comparative
statics of the model, shown in Figure 1.2. z changes from its steady-state value of 1 to
1.02. A key property of the production function F (x, y, z) = z× exy as introduced above
is that the strength of the production complementarity is positively correlated with z.32
This implies procyclical sorting, that is, the incentive to be optimally matched increases
with labor productivity.33
In response to a change in z from 1.00 (blue curves) to 1.02 (red curves), the equi-
librium of the hierarchical sorting model changes, as shown in Figure 1.2. First, the
matching sets become wider, see Panel 1.2a. The set of acceptable matches increases for
all worker and firm types. The boundaries do not shift in parallel but become (more)
asymmetric in response to an increase in z. This property of the model turns out to be
important for the wage adjustments in the dynamic sorting model. Panel 1.2b shows how
the surplus function shifts upward for a firm of type y = 750. Note that even though the
matching set becomes only slightly wider, the overall surplus of this firm increases more
than is proportional in response to a change in z, which illustrates that being optimally
sorted becomes more desirable as labor productivity increases. This property is key for
it implies that the integral terms also increase more than proportionally in response to
shocks in z. Panel 1.2c shows how the integral term of the firm in the job creation condi-
32This is a result of the (log-)supermodularity of the first derivative in the production function:
∂F (x,y,z)
∂x = Fx(x, y, z) = x z e
xy.
33To date, there is no conclusive empirical evidence about the cyclicality of labor market sorting.
Chapter 2 shows some evidence that the degree of labor market sorting in Germany seems to be roughly
aligned with the business cycle.
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Figure 1.2: Comparative Statics of a Change in z
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tion (Equation (1.17)) increases with z for all firm types y. Hence, all firms will have an
incentive to post more vacancies as labor becomes more productive, see Panel 1.2d, which
shows the measure of vacancies posted gv(y) by every firm type y. Note that vacancy
posting increases particularly for low and high type firms, in line with the properties
of the surplus function shown in Figure 1.1. Quantitatively, the depicted change of z
from 1.00 to 1.02 leads to an overall increase of the vacancy rate by more than 50%.
Unemployment falls by about 6%. These comparative statics results make a strong case
for finding a significant amplification effect in the dynamic sorting model.
1.4 The Dynamic Sorting Model
In the dynamic sorting model, z is stochastic, so we study the properties of the model
under aggregate uncertainty. Let zt denote the realization of aggregate labor productivity
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z in period t. I assume that zt follows an AR(1) process (in logs):
zt = ρ zt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε ), (1.19)
with the autocorrelation ρ and innovation parameter σε calibrated below. To simplify
notation, let z′ be next period’s realization (t + 1). Time subscripts are omitted in the
following to avoid notational clutter.
Define the state of the system to be Ω(gm(x, y, z), z). This state contains the exoge-
nous state variable z and the endogenous state gm(x, y, z), which is the distribution of
active matches. All endogenous objects depending on the state have Ω as an argument
in the following.
With this notation, the dynamic surplus value function becomes
S(x, y,Ω) = F (x, y, z) + βE [(1− δ) max{S(x, y,Ω′), 0}]
− βE
[
b(x)− αqu(θ(Ω′))
∫ 1
0
gv(y,Ω′)
V (Ω′) µ(x, y,Ω
′)S(x, y,Ω′) dy
]
.
(1.20)
F (x, y, z) depends on the exogenous state only. Home production b(x) does not depend
on z. E is the expectation operator regarding the future aggregate state. It includes all
information available in the period the expectation is formed.
1.4.1 Job Creation
The key for the analysis of sorting models out of steady state is the dynamic entry
problem of the firm. We assume free entry for all firm types y, so V(y) = 0 ∀ y. A firm
of type y will post vacancies as long as the expected discounted value of production is at
least as high as the cost implied by c(.):
c(gv(y,Ω)) = β(1− α)E
[
qv(θ(Ω′))
∫ 1
0
gu(x,Ω′)
U(Ω′) µ(x, y,Ω
′)S(x, y,Ω′) dx
]
. (1.21)
In the hierarchical sorting model, firm entry depends on the expectation of the inte-
gral over the firm-specific matching set, summarized in µ(x, y,Ω′), the surplus function
S(x, y,Ω′), and the probability measure of meeting every specific worker type within the
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firms matching set, gu(x,Ω
′)
U(Ω′) .
34 Due to the state dependence, the job-creation condition
in the hierarchical sorting model is richer than in standard search and matching models:
c = β(1− α)E[qv(θ(z′))S(z′)]. Note that vacancy posting costs are constant in the stan-
dard problem and the expectation does not involve an integral term. The quantitative
section of this chapter shows that the additional objects on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (1.21) are critical for the model’s response to aggregate shocks: all three endogenous
variables of the augmented problem depend on the state and adjust in response to shocks.
For a given firm, the surplus function shifts upward more than proportionally after a pos-
itive shock; recall Figure 1.2. Additionally, the cardinality of the matching sets increases
since more potential matches now yield a positive surplus. There is an additional surplus
to be realized both with workers who have been in the firm’s matching set before and
with new workers on the margins of the matching set. This channel is quantitatively
important for a large share of the amplification result documented in Section 1.5.
1.4.2 Wage Formation
Let us now turn to the derivation of match-specific wages in the hierarchical sorting
model using the Nash bargaining solution and free entry:
E(x, y,Ω)− U(x,Ω) = α1− αP(x, y,Ω). (1.22)
Plugging in the value functions, maximizing the Nash product, and some algebra yield
an expression that determines the match-specific wage in the dynamic model, W (x, y,Ω):
W (x, y,Ω) = αF (x, y, z) + (1− α)b(x)
+ (1− α)βαE
[
qu(θ(Ω′))
∫ 1
0
gv(y,Ω′)
V (Ω′) µ(x, y,Ω
′)S(x, y,Ω′) dy
]
.
(1.23)
The wage of a given worker is a convex combination of the match-specific output, F (x, y, z),
and the worker’s outside option, his value of being unemployed. With respect to the in-
tegral term, the same logic as in the firms’ job-creation problem applies: the outside
34The dynamic entry problem is the main difference between this research and Lise and Robin (2017).
In their model with search on the job, entry is a static problem because the surplus function does not
depend on the integral terms contained in Equations (1.11) and (1.13) of my model.
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option depends on the expected value of the surplus with all other potential employers
in the matching set, weighted by the distribution. The higher the surplus and the higher
the probability of meeting every specific firm type in the matching set, the higher the
bargained wage because the worker has more valuable outside options for which he needs
to be compensated. After factoring out α, Equation (1.21) can be plugged into the wage
equation to arrive at
W (x, y,Ω) = α
F (x, y, z) + c(gv(y,Ω))E
θ(Ω′)
∫ 1
0
gv(y,Ω′)
V (Ω′) µ(x, y,Ω
′)S(x, y,Ω′) dy∫ 1
0
gu(x,Ω′)
U(Ω′) µ(x, y,Ω′)S(x, y,Ω′) dx

+ (1− α)b(x).
(1.24)
Now, the same logic regarding the integral term over the matching set also applies for the
firm in the bargaining game: the expected value of the surplus, the matching set, and the
distribution of other unemployed worker types influence the negotiated wage negatively
through the denominator: the more workers who are available in the firm’s matching set,
the better the firm’s outside option of continued search, and the lower the match-specific
bargained wage with worker type x because the firm needs to be compensated. Note that
aggregate labor market tightness θ(Ω′) in front of the quotient cancels out with 1/V (Ω′) in
the numerator and 1/U(Ω′) in the denominator:
W (x, y,Ω) = α
(
F (x, y, z) + c(y)E
[ ∫ 1
0 gv(y,Ω′)µ(x, y,Ω′)S(x, y,Ω′) dy∫ 1
0 gu(x,Ω′)µ(x, y,Ω′)S(x, y,Ω′) dx
])
+ (1−α)b(x).
(1.25)
The match-specific wageW (x, y,Ω) does not depend on aggregate labor market tightness,
in contrast to the standard model. This is an important feature because it disconnects
wages from fluctuations in aggregate tightness. Instead, the quotient, call it relative labor
market tightness, determines wages. Relative labor market tightness is the expected ratio
of the two integral terms, which include the distributions of vacancies and unemployed
workers, and the surpluses with all types within the respective matching sets. (1.25)
provides a natural generalization of the textbook wage equation to the framework with
heterogeneous workers and firms. The key difference between the sorting model and
the baseline DMP model is now obvious. Compare Equation (1.25) with its textbook
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counterpart in a dynamic DMP model with state z and homogeneous firms and workers:35
W (z) = α(F (z) + κEθ(z′)) + (1− α)b. (1.26)
In the textbook model, the wage depends positively on aggregate labor market tightness.
The higher θ = V/U, the more difficult it is for firms to hire a worker. If there is fierce
competition between many firms for relatively few unemployed workers, wages are higher.
In this setting, the fully flexible Nash-bargained wage absorbs all the fluctuations in θ,
which is the essence of the lack of amplification in the standard model (Shimer, 2005). In
the sorting model, the impact of aggregate labor market tightness on wages is partially
muted because θ is replaced by the relative labor market tightness:
Θ(x, y,Ω) =
∫ 1
0 gv(y,Ω)µ(x, y,Ω)S(x, y,Ω) dy∫ 1
0 gu(x,Ω)µ(x, y,Ω)S(x, y,Ω) dx
.
The integral term in the numerator (denominator) represents a specific worker (firm)
type’s option value of search, that is, the value of the surplus function over the respec-
tive matching sets, properly weighted by the distribution of suitable types. Note that
in the hierarchical sorting model, the endogenous distributions of unemployed workers
and vacant firm types are typically not uniform, even with underlying uniform type den-
sities. Relative labor market tightness can have an impact on the wage bargain that is
very different from aggregate tightness in the standard model: aggregate tightness may
be high (and unemployment low), but if the measure of unemployed workers within a
firm’s matching set is high, the firm has no incentive to pay a high wage and workers
extract less, even if unemployment outside the firm’s matching set is very low. Thus,
the worker’s bargaining position does not depend on scarcity or abundance of other un-
employed workers outside the matching set of his potential employer. This mechanism
de-links match-specific wages from aggregate labor market conditions.
35Note that this equation corresponds to Shimer’s Equation (7) (Shimer (2005), p. 41), which is a
slightly generalized version of Equation (1.20) in Pissarides (2000), p. 17. Equation (1.25) collapses to
Equation (1.26) in the case of homogeneous workers and firms and constant output.
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Wage Rigidity with Sorting
In the dynamic setting, aggregate fluctuations lead to an under-proportional wage ad-
justment for all (x, y) combinations where Θ(x, y) is smaller than aggregate labor market
tightness θ. In the calibrated model, aggregate labor market tightness θ is normalized to
1. So whenever the denominator in Θ(x, y), the firm’s integral term, is bigger than the
worker’s integral term in the numerator, Θ(x, y) < θ will hold. This weakens the link
between aggregate fluctuations and the wage bargain: wages no longer respond to shocks
in a fully flexible manner. It is well known that mechanisms which disconnect wages
and aggregate fluctuations are key to enable search and matching models to generate
amplification. The finding that such a disconnect can endogenously arise in a setting
with heterogeneity, sorting, and Nash bargaining is novel and a central contribution of
this research. In the following, we show that the relative labor market tightness term
is smaller than 1 because the surplus function exhibits an asymmetry which arises in
relation to the workers’ bargaining parameter.
Figure 1.3 plots the cutoffs of µ(x, y) in steady state for three values of the bargaining
parameter (i.e., α = 0.5, 0.72, 0.95). When α = 0.5 (blue), the matching set cutoffs are
slightly asymmetric. To see this, note that the lowest worker type is acceptable for all
firm types below, roughly, 520, whereas the least productive firm is acceptable to all
workers up to almost type 700. The asymmetry increases with α. The extreme case of
α = 0.95 (black) underlines this. The best worker type is extremely picky; he will only
match with firms better than type 750. The best firm accepts workers down to rank 420
and is thus much more tolerant with respect to mismatch. Typically, calibrated search
and matching models assign the worker a higher bargaining parameter. In the following,
we use α = 0.72 (red), as in Shimer (2005). This value implies a significant asymmetry,
which is sufficient to ensure that Θ(x, y) < 1 ∀ (x, y), implying an under-proportional
wage adjustment in response to shocks. Intuitively, greater bargaining power on the
worker’s side translates to narrower matching sets because the worker can afford to be
more picky when choosing the firm types with which to match. The worker will always
extract a higher fraction of the surplus in a match, so the matching set can be smaller
in order to be indifferent between the value of employment and unemployment. Firms,
in turn, optimally choose wider matching sets because they command only a small share
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium Matching Sets and Worker Bargaining Power
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of the match-specific surplus. With small bargaining power, a wider matching set is
necessary to equalize the values of production and a vacancy.
The hierarchical sorting model exhibits an asymmetry of the surplus function that
translates into wider matching sets for the firms, a relative labor market tightness that
is smaller than aggregate labor market tightness for all (x, y) combinations, and, accord-
ingly, wages that do not fully adjust to shocks, and thus an endogenous wage rigidity
arises. The numerical simulations in the following quantify to what degree this en-
dogenous rigidity influences the model’s dynamics in conjunction with the augmented
job-creation condition.
1.5 Quantitative Analysis
We now test the quantitative importance of the augmented job creation and wage de-
termination mechanisms in the dynamic hierarchical sorting model. It is common in
this class of dynamic macro models to judge the model’s empirical performance by its
ability to match specific data moments. The Shimer Puzzle revolves around the search
and matching model’s ability (or lack thereof) to explain the volatility of the unemploy-
ment rate, the vacancy rate, aggregate labor market tightness, and the job-finding rate
over the business cycle. We run numerical simulations in a stochastic environment where
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aggregate shocks to labor productivity drive the business cycle. The stochastic labor
productivity process z is defined in Section 1.4 and calibrated below.
We find that second moments of simulated data from the sorting model are very
close to moments from U.S. data, due to both the augmented wage formation mechanism
and the additional margins in the job-creation condition. Both channels depend on the
additional endogenous objects in the sorting model: the match surplus, matching sets,
and type distributions. They all change with the state, so the computations need to
handle forward-looking expectations of the match surplus, the matching sets, and the
distributions of unmatched worker and firm types.
1.5.1 Computation
The state space Ω consists of the exogenous state z (labor productivity) and the en-
dogenous state gm(x, y, z) (joint distribution of active matches). All other endogenous
objects—the surplus, the matching sets, the distributions of unmatched worker and firm
types, the stocks U and V , the arrival rates qu(θ) and qv(θ), and aggregate labor market
tightness θ—follow from the state of the system Ω.
Keeping track of Ω’s evolution is computationally challenging because it contains
an endogenous distribution function and is hence infinite-dimensional. Discretization
is inevitable, but the dimensionality of the state space is still huge for the case of 100
distinct worker and firm types, the number used in the simulations.
We approach this computational complexity by defining two auxiliary state variables
for the integral terms in the job-creation condition and in the wage equation, which
contain all the high-dimensional endogenous objects. This trick allows log-linearizing
the model around its steady state. We can then apply standard techniques, in this case
second-order perturbation, to solve and simulate the dynamic model. To keep track
of the deviations of the auxiliary state variables during the simulation, we resolve the
model conditional on every draw of the exogenous state z. We compute the numerical
differentials of the auxiliary state variables with respect to z in a “brute-force” fashion
for all (x, y) and z combinations. The key to success for this method is a fast algorithm
that solves the model using the procedure outlined in Section 1.2.2. Once we know how
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the integral terms change in response to shocks, we can simply plug the deviations back
into the log-linearized system to obtain policy functions.36
Since we make heavy use of discretization and numerical approximations to simulate
the model, we check the reliability of the computational approach. It is well known
that log-linearization around the steady state is error prone in nonlinear systems.37 The
approximation error becomes worse with large shocks that push the model far away
from its steady state. Fortunately, the calibrated labor productivity process used in the
context of U.S. labor market dynamics is not very volatile. The calibrated standard
deviation of z is only 2%, so the model always remains in relatively close proximity to
the steady state. We check the computations by plugging the simulated data back into
the Bellman equations of our model to see whether the simulated data solve them. The
mean computational error is quite small at 3.8%. This value is very close to the error one
makes when solving simple dynamic search and matching models using log-linearization
and perturbation, so the method of dealing with the additional complexity of the sorting
model’s state space does not appear to significantly increase computational errors.38
Figures A1.1a and A1.1b in Appendix A.1 show the distribution of computational errors
and a positive correlation of the errors with z.
1.5.2 Calibration
As in Shimer (2005), a time period is set to be one quarter. Table 1.2 shows the calibra-
tion of the model based on the U.S. labor market data used for the simulation exercise.
To ensure comparability of the dynamics of the augmented model with the results in
Shimer (2005), identical parameter values are used whenever possible. A value of 0.1
for the separation rate translates into an average employment spell of about 2.5 years
during the United States in the relevant period (1951–2003). The quarterly discount rate
is set to 0.012, representing an annual interest rate of roughly 5%. The discount factor
36We use Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2014) for the standard computations, e.g., checking stability of the
system and computing policy functions. The actual calculations use an external routine which is called
in each iteration during simulation.
37Using more accurate projection methods to simulate the dynamic sorting model with its complex
state space is beyond the scope of this project.
38Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2017) show that solving the representative agent search and match-
ing model in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) via log-linearization and perturbation creates a mean
computational error of 3.75%. We find a mean error of 3.84% with slightly more dispersion.
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(as it appears in the model equations) is thus β = 1/1.012 ≈ 0.99. The matching function
elasticity is set to 0.72, in line with Shimer (2005), which is within the empirically sup-
ported range from matching function estimations reported by Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2001). We set the bargaining parameter equal to the matching function elasticity ap-
plying the Hosios (1990) condition for socially efficient vacancy posting in decentralized
equilibrium.39
Several parameters need to be recalibrated in the hierarchical sorting model. The
value of non-market activity b(x) is type dependent. We calibrate it to be 0.223 ×
argmax
x
F (x, y). This implies that home production b(x) has a mean of 40% of the
output a worker of type x can produce in his optimal match. This assumption is a
natural extension of Shimer (2005), who assumes a constant b of 0.4 when output is
normalized to 1. The efficiency parameter of the aggregate matching function, ϑ, needs
to be increased in the sorting model to take into account that not all meetings result in
matches. A value of 2 implies, along with the other parameter values, that the net job
finding rate, that is, the rate of matches that are formed after a meeting, is close to the
value Shimer (2005) constructs from the data, which is 1.355 (quarterly).
The convex vacancy posting cost function takes the following form:
c(gv(y)) =
c0
1 + c1
gv(y)1+c1
c0 and c1 are set to the values shown in Table 1.2 to target a steady-state aggregate labor
market tightness of 1.40 The calibrated economy has a steady-state unemployment rate
of about 7.8%.41
The stochastic labor productivity process z can be imagined as an underlying tech-
nology that enables labor to be used productively. It is type independent and affects all
matches in equal measure. As in Shimer (2005), it is normalized to 1 in steady state and
calibrated to resemble empirical labor productivity in the United States over the relevant
39It is unclear whether the Hosios condition holds in the sorting model. We do not claim that vacancy
posting is socially efficient here.
40We use more curvature as compared to the values estimated in Lise and Robin (2017) to ensure
quick convergence.
41This is slightly higher than typically targeted values of steady-state unemployment. The reason lies
in the adapted Beveridge Curve (see Equation (1.2.2)), which implies higher equilibrium unemployment
when the matching sets do not cover the whole type space.
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Table 1.2: Quarterly Calibration of the Sorting Model for the U.S. (1951–2003)
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Discount factor β 0.99 Shimer (2005)
Separation rate δ 0.1 Shimer (2005)
Workers’ bargaining power α 0.72 Shimer (2005)
Matching function elasticity ξ 0.72 Shimer (2005)
Matching function constant ϑ 2 Recalibrated
Value of nonmarket activity b(x) 0.223× argmax
x
F (x, y) Recalibrated
Vacancy posting costs c0 0.03 New Parameter
c1 0.4 New Parameter
First order autocorrelation ρ 0.765 Hagedorn
Standard deviation σε 0.013 & Manovskii (2008)
period of time. We follow Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and set up stochastic labor
productivity as a first-order autoregressive process:42
zt = ρ zt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε ). (1.27)
ρ ∈ (0, 1) captures the degree of first-order autocorrelation of the AR(1) process. In-
novations are drawn from a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
σε. Both parameters are set to match quarterly U.S. labor productivity.43 All values
in Table 1.2 are based on quarterly data. Shimer’s (2005) simulation results as well as
our results are reported as deviations from a HP trend, which is conventional in the
literature.44
42Many closely related papers use more general Markov chains to add a stochastic dimension to the
model. An AR(1) process is a homogeneous Markov process iff the error terms are i.i.d. We prefer to
use the AR(1) process under this assumption for computational reasons.
43Shimer (2005), Hornstein et al. (2005), and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) report the parameter
values necessary to represent U.S. labor productivity “as seasonally adjusted quarterly real average
output per person in the non-farm business sector constructed by the BLS” (Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008), p. 1694).
44The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is a technique for decomposing the trend and the cyclical com-
ponent of a time series (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Shimer (2005) sets the smoothing parameter of
the filter to λ = 105 instead of to the more common value of λ = 1600 for quarterly data. This makes
the cyclical component less volatile and more persistent. We use the same value as Shimer to generate
comparable moments. Hornstein et al. (2005) point out that a more volatile trend, using the common
smoothing parameter λ = 1600 for quarterly data, “has almost no effect on the relative volatilities” (p.
23).
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Table 1.3: Actual and Simulated Standard Deviations of Labor Market Variables
Standard deviations U V θ qu(θ) z F (x, y, z)
1. U.S. data 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.02 -
2. Results of Shimer (2005) 0.009 0.027 0.035 0.010 0.02 -
3. No sorting, no heterogeneity 0.009 0.026 0.035 0.010 0.02 -
4. Sorting, hierarchical model 0.102 0.277 0.380 0.168 0.02 0.06
Note: Rows 1 & 2: Based on Tables 1 and 3 in Shimer (2005), pp. 28, 39. Calculated based on quarterly
U.S. data, 1951–2003. Rows 3 & 4: Standard deviations of simulated data from my model with and
without sorting. All moments come from HP-filtered data with λ = 105.
Using the calibration in Table 1.2, the model produces realistic amounts of wage
dispersion and labor market sorting. The standard deviation of log wages in equilibrium
is about 0.418. Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, which is a measure for the degree
of labor market sorting, is 0.095. This is only a moderate degree of positive sorting, so the
strong complementarity of worker and firm types assumed via the form of the production
function does not translate into a strongly sorted distribution of matches, in line with
what we know from U.S. data.45
1.5.3 The Amplification Effect of Sorting
We find that the hierarchical sorting model produces a large amount of amplification in
response to shocks. Second moments of simulated time series data are of the same order of
magnitude as the volatility observed in U.S. labor market data for the relevant period of
time. In particular, the simulated standard deviations of unemployment, vacancies, labor
market tightness, and the job-finding rate are much closer to empirical second moments
than simulated data from standard search and matching models. Table 1.3 compares my
results to those of Shimer (2005) and the empirical data moments.
The first two rows of Table 1.3 show the well-known unemployment volatility problem
emphasized by Shimer (2005). The standard deviations of unemployment, U , vacancies,
V , labor market tightness, θ, and the job-finding rate, qu(θ), in simulated time series data
45Some evidence for the degree of labor market sorting in the United States is presented by Lise et al.
(2016), who make a parametric assumption about the production function (CES) and directly estimate
the elasticity of substitution. They find evidence for a relatively small degree of positive sorting, but
the magnitude of the estimated substitution elasticity is not readily comparable to a rank correlation
coefficient.
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miss the standard deviations in the data by a factor of about 10 to 20. As a first exercise,
we run simulations of a model from which worker and firm heterogeneity is removed with
output set to 1 and the exact same calibration as in Shimer (2005). The results are in
the third row of Table 1.3. They are nearly exactly the same as Shimer’s when sorting
and heterogeneity are switched off.
The main results are reported in the fourth row of Table 1.3. Note that the volatility of
z, the calibrated underlying labor productivity process, is the same in all models. In the
hierarchical sorting model, however, overall match-specific output (F (x, y, z)) fluctuates
somewhat more than z. This is because, as explained in the comparative statics exercise
in Section 1.3, the chosen production function implies that sorting itself is procyclical.
It becomes relatively more valuable to be optimally matched as z increases, so F (x, y, z)
is more volatile in response to shocks than z alone. This is included in the amplification
effect we find.
The second moments of simulated time series data from the hierarchical sorting model
are much closer to the data than are those from the standard model without sorting. The
standard deviation of the HP-filtered time series of labor market tightness (0.380) is very
close to the data (0.382). The sorting model generates realistic dynamics of labor mar-
ket tightness via two transmission channels: the additional margins of adjustment in
the firms’ job-creation problem (Section 1.4.1) and the endogenous wage rigidity (Sec-
tion 1.4.2). The simulated standard deviations of vacancies (V ) and the job-finding rate
(qut ) are also much higher than in the baseline model; they even overshoot their empirical
counterparts to some extent. The standard deviation of unemployment (U) is amplified
as well but remains somewhat lower than the empirical value.
To illustrate the dynamics of the hierarchical sorting model, Figure 1.4 shows impulse
response functions of six key variables: unemployment, vacancies, aggregate labor mar-
ket tightness, and the job-finding rate, as well as the autoregressive labor productivity
process and wages. In response to a positive shock to labor productivity, unemployment
falls by about 6 percentage points initially and shows a hump-shaped return to steady
state. Vacancy posting, job finding, and aggregate tightness of the labor market show
strong positive reactions directly after the shock. All impulse responses show a high de-
gree of persistence as well as realistic correlations and cyclical properties. For instance,
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Figure 1.4: Impulse Response Functions of Key Variables in the Search and Match-
ing Model with Sorting
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unemployment and vacancies move in opposite directions in response to the shock and are
thus highly negatively correlated (Beveridge Curve). Note also the under-proportional
adjustment of wages to the shock in labor productivity: the initial adjustment of wages
is roughly 85% of the jump in labor productivity in the depicted example, so the endoge-
nously generated wage rigidity becomes apparent.
Let us now take a closer look at the simulation results. The sorting model includes
two channels that lead to amplification: job creation and the endogenous wage rigidity.
How does each channel contribute quantitatively to the improved empirical performance
and how large is the implied degree of wage rigidity?
1.5.4 The Degree of Wage Rigidity
That rigid wages can amplify search and matching models’ response to shocks is well
known in the literature and typically based on altering the assumptions underlying wage
determination. (Hall, 2005; Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008; Hall and Milgrom, 2008).
The argument in favor of rigid wages in the context of the sorting model is novel and
different. It was shown in Section 1.4.2 that rigid wages originate from an equilibrium
property of the model: with sorting, the values of workers’ and firms’ outside options are
asymmetric, leading to a skewed surplus function. Workers optimally choose narrower
matching sets because they have greater bargaining power. This is based on the fact
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Figure 1.5: Simulated Time Series of Wages and Labor Productivity
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Note: Fluctuations around trend of simulated data for labor productivity and wages, HP-filtered with
λ = 105. Hierarchical model. The 50-period time frame was randomly chosen.
that workers receive a positive value of home production in the event of unemployment,
whereas a vacant firm earns nothing.
Perfectly flexible wages—as in the textbook model—always fully respond to changes
of labor productivity, leading to a one-to-one co-movement. The elasticity of wages with
respect to labor productivity is 1. Totally rigid wages, on the other hand, would not react
at all to changes in labor productivity, implying an elasticity of 0 (as in Hall (2005)).
Figure 1.5 shows how simulated wages (red, solid) and labor productivity (blue, dashed)
deviate from trend in the model with sorting. The data stem from a simulation of the
hierarchical model and the 50-period timeframe is randomly chosen. In the standard
search and matching model, these two time series are congruent. In the model with
sorting, however, wages turn out to be less volatile and do not fully adjust, as can be
seen in Figure 1.5. Wages follow labor productivity closely but adjust imperfectly. The
elasticity of wages with respect to labor productivity, a measure for the rigidity of wages,
hence must be somewhat smaller than 1. This is exactly the result one would expect from
comparing the sorting model to the baseline model. In the baseline model, wages are too
responsive. After a favorable shock, workers soak up most of the extra productivity
via immediately adjusting wages. This leads to an insufficient responsiveness of other
model variables, particularly vacancies, due to a lack of incentives for the firm. In the
model with sorting, however, the one-to-one link between wages and labor productivity is
weakened. The endogenous wage rigidity, which is visible in Figure 1.5, limits the extent
36
Sorting and Labor Market Dynamics
to which wages adjust in response to shocks. This increases firms’ incentives to create
new jobs and leads to amplification.
We go to the empirical literature to investigate whether the model-generated rigidity
is of a reasonable magnitude. Haefke et al. (2013) focus primarily on the different degrees
of wage rigidity for newly hired workers as compared to established employment relation-
ships. I can compare the reported wage elasticity with respect to labor productivity for
new hires to my results.46 Haefke et al. (2013) find an elasticity of wages with respect
to labor productivity of 0.8 with a standard error of 0.4. Using our simulated data, this
elasticity can be computed as the estimated coefficient η1 from a simple linear regression
of wages on labor productivity in logs and first differences:
∆ logWt(x, y, z) = η0 + η1∆ log zt + εt (1.28)
Running this regression yields a wage elasticity of η1 = 0.751 for the hierarchical model,
which is well within the empirically supported range. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008)
also compute an elasticity from U.S. wage and productivity data and report a coefficient
of 0.449, which is at the lower end of the empirically supported range. The elastic-
ity/derivative implied by the alternating-offer bargaining game proposed by Hall and
Milgrom (2008) is about 0.7, close to what we find. It is reassuring that our rigidity lies
close to these benchmarks.
1.5.5 Rigid Wages vs. Job Creation
It is instructive to decompose the sorting effect into she shares explained by the endoge-
nous wage rigidity and by the modified job creation condition. Sorting influences firms’
46Haefke et al. (2013) note that this value “is an appropriate and informative calibration target for
search and matching models.” (p. 898). Since the baseline search and matching model with Nash
bargaining is essentially a model of new hires, the elasticity of wages with respect to labor productivity
for this group is a reasonable target to match. Note that wages do not play an allocational role in a
random search model. The Nash bargaining solution simply determines how the surplus is shared in
every time period given the state of the model in the same period. Thus, the length of an employment
spell does not influence wages and there is no meaningful distinction between new hires and existing
employment relationships.
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forward-looking vacancy posting decisions. Recall the firms’ entry condition:
c(gf (y)) = β(1− α)E
[
qv(θ(Ω′))
∫ 1
0
gu(x,Ω′)
U(Ω′) max{S(x, y,Ω
′), 0} dx
]
. (1.29)
After a positive productivity shock, the inversely U-shaped surplus function shifts upward
as shown in the comparative statics exercise. In our parametrization, firms choose wider
matching sets in response to positive shocks because the surplus from an increased number
of potential matches is larger than zero. This leads to a higher expectation of the value of
matches with all workers in the firms’ matching sets. An opposing force is the changing
distribution of unemployed worker types. Since unemployment falls in response to a
positive shock, it will be harder for firms to meet workers within their matching sets.47
The combined effect of the additional channels in the sorting model is that firms
post more vacancies in response to shocks by increasing gv(y) subject to the convex cost
function. Relative to the standard model, this creates an amplification of shocks because
the value of being optimally sorted increases and the matching set and surplus function
adjust accordingly. For a productivity shock of equal magnitude, the right-hand side of
Equation (1.29) increases more than the expected future value of a job in the standard
model without sorting. Additionally, this implies that wages do not need to be extremely
rigid in the sorting model to generate sufficient volatility.
To quantify the contributions of the endogenous wage rigidity and the larger number
of vacancy postings to overall amplification, let us take the elasticity of wages with respect
to labor productivity calculated above as given and impose it on a model without sorting
and heterogeneity. The gap in volatility, which cannot be accounted for by the effect of
rigid wages alone, must then be the effect of sorting on job creation. The last row of
Table 1.4 shows the results of this exercise.
The volatility of labor market variables with an imposed wage rigidity of η1 = 0.751 is
too small compared to the data. As expected, the rigidity amplifies the model’s response,
but only by a factor of about 2–3 (depending on the variable). Thus, the relatively mod-
erate model-generated wage rigidity does not suffice to generate sufficient amplification.
47The described adjustments are not unambiguous and depend on the model’s parameterization. For
instance, as the value of being optimally matched increases after a positive shock, the matching sets
could also become smaller in principle.
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Table 1.4: Amplification Effect of an Imposed Wage Rigidity
Standard deviations Ut Vt θt qut
1. U.S. data 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118
2. Results of Shimer (2005) 0.009 0.027 0.035 0.010
3. Sorting, hierarchical model 0.102 0.277 0.380 0.168
4. Rigidity imposed, η1 = 0.751 0.031 0.084 0.114 0.051
Note: Rows 1 & 2: Based on Tables 1 and 3 in Shimer (2005), pp. 28/39. Calculated based on quarterly
U.S. data, 1951–2003. Rows 3 & 4: Standard deviations of simulated data from my model. All moments
come from HP-filtered data with λ = 105.
This is not surprising. Additionally, the effect of endogenous separations, which is present
in the dynamic sorting model, is quantitatively small. This is in line with the compar-
ative statics result that the matching sets do not change much in response to changes
in labor productivity. We conclude that the large amplification effect of sorting must be
primarily driven by additional job creation.
1.6 Conclusions
This research proposes a search and matching model with two-sided heterogeneity, sort-
ing, and aggregate shocks. The model’s relationship to previous literature is best un-
derstood from two reference points. The first reference point is the optimal assignment
model of heterogeneous agents in a frictionless market following Becker (1973), the classi-
cal sorting model. In this frictionless environment, a production complementarity makes
it optimal for all types to match with only their unique optimal counterpart. Shimer and
Smith (2000) take this model out of its Walrasian equilibrium by adding frictions and
making search costly, thus introducing the concept of matching sets that do not cover
the whole type space.
The second reference point is the baseline DMP search and matching model of the
labor market and its dynamic version.48 The DMP model has been very successful in
explaining equilibrium unemployment and a number of important stylized facts of labor
market data (e.g., the Beveridge Curve). In the DMP model, every agent is willing to
48The main references for this class of models are Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982), Pissarides
(1985), and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Pissarides (2000) provides an excellent textbook treatment.
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match with every other agent, but frictions limit the number of encounters in the labor
market and, therefore, equilibrium unemployment exists.
We construct a model in between these two reference points: in a labor market
with two-sided heterogeneity, search frictions, sorting, and aggregate shocks, subopti-
mal matches between heterogeneous jobs and workers are formed and persist through
time. This setup has the potential to match the data well. It generates sufficient volatil-
ity in response to shocks due to an endogenous wage rigidity and the firms’ dynamic
entry problem. Recent advances in empirically identifying the extent of sorting in la-
bor markets49 suggest that it provides an empirically supported complement to existing
approaches to better align search and matching models with the data.
Beyond the search and matching literature, wage and price rigidities play a key role
in modern macroeconomics. Blanchard and Galí (2010) survey a number of papers that
explore the implications of real and nominal rigidities in different variants of real business
cycle (RBC) or New-Keynesian macro (NKM) models. The models developed by Merz
(1995), Andolfatto (1996), Christoffel and Linzert (2005), Krause and Lubik (2007), Faia
(2008), and Gertler and Trigari (2009) are all examples of DSGE models that integrate
variants of price and wage rigidities to create persistence and sufficient amplification
for the analysis of different kinds of shocks. Gertler and Trigari (2009), for example,
adapt the well-known Calvo (1983) pricing structure for wage formation in the labor
market. Rigid wages are generated by allowing only a fraction of matches to renegotiate
wages in every period. Another recent example is Christiano et al. (2016), who use the
alternating-offer bargaining game of Hall and Milgrom (2008) to induce wage inertia in
a New Keynesian model. In the light of this literature, a key contribution of this chapter
is to show that a search and matching model with two-sided heterogeneity and sorting
can generate rigid wages endogenously and match the large unemployment fluctuations
in the data.
49See Chapter 2 as well as Andrews et al. (2008, 2012); Card et al. (2013); Hagedorn et al. (2017);
Lopes de Melo (2016); Bonhomme et al. (2016); Bartolucci et al. (2015); Lise et al. (2016); Bagger and
Lentz (2016).
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Computational Appendix
To check the accuracy of the computational method described in Section 1.5.1, we plug
simulated data from the dynamic sorting model back into the Bellman equations of the
model. Ideally, the simulated data would solve these equations exactly. However, we
make heavy use of discretization and approximation techniques, so it is reasonable to
expect some imprecision. For convenience, we use the wage equation for this test because
it contains both the firms’ and the workers’ integral terms:
W (x, y,Ω)− α
(
F (x, y, z) + c(gv(y,Ω))E
[ ∫ 1
0 gv(y,Ω′) max{S(x, y,Ω′), 0} dy∫ 1
0 gu(x,Ω′) max{S(x, y,Ω′), 0} dx
])
− (1− α)b(x) ?= 0.
Solving the dynamic sorting model by log-linearization and perturbation results in
a mean computational error of 3.84%. The 2.5th, 50th, and 97.5th percentiles of the
distribution are −15.0%, 4.67%, and 17.6%, respectively. This distribution is slightly left
skewed due to the fact that the model’s response to shocks is not symmetric around the
steady state, for example, because of endogenous separations, which only happen after
negative shocks. Figures A1.1a and A1.1b show a histogram of the computational errors
and a scatter plot that shows the positive correlation of the errors with z.
A recent paper by Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2017) can serve as a benchmark for
the size and distributions of the errors. The authors show that solving a representative
agent search and matching model via log-linearization and perturbation—they use Hage-
dorn and Manovskii (2008) as an example—creates a mean computational error of 3.75%
with the 2.5th, 50th, and 97.5th percentiles of the distribution being −11.1%, −3.66%,
and 8.76%, respectively. We conclude from this that the errors resulting from the com-
putational approach we propose lead to errors of an expectable magnitude, even though
the errors we find are slightly more dispersed than what Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang
(2017) find for a representative agent search and matching model.
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Figure A1.1: Computational Errors
(a) Histogram of Computational Errors
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A.2 The Circular Sorting Model
Define the distance between a worker type x and a firm type y match along the circle as
d(x, y) = min{x− y + 1, y − x}.
Without loss of generality, we consider only the case x > y because y > x is completely
symmetric. The maximum distance is 1/2 since it starts decreasing again halfway around
the circle. The circular production function F (d) maps d onto output with an interior
maximum at F (d = 0):
F (d) = F̄ − 12γd. (1.30)
The functional form we consider is comparable to that of Marimon and Zilibotti (1999),
Gautier et al. (2010), and Gautier and Teulings (2015).50 F̄ > 0 is the output of an
optimal match with d = 0. The distance d ∈ (0, 12) is a measure of mismatch between
workers and firms. γ governs how quickly output is decreasing in distance. It represents
the strength of the production complementarity and the cost of mismatch.51 The smaller
γ, the more substitutable are different types in production.52 We consider only interior
50Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) have a non-negative lower bound, which I do not need for my purposes.
Gautier et al. (2010) and Gautier and Teulings (2015) let the output decrease quadratically in distance.
This difference only affects the calibration of the model.
51γ is also known as the “complexity dispersion parameter” (Teulings and Gautier, 2004; Teulings,
2005).
52The limiting case γ = 0 would be a labor market without worker and firm heterogeneity. With
γ =∞, agents would match only with their optimal partner and nobody else.
42
Sorting and Labor Market Dynamics
solutions in which matches are unacceptable beyond a certain distance, so γ has to
be sufficiently high to ensure that, in equilibrium, workers do not accept jobs at every
distance.
The circular sorting model has two properties that vastly simplify it compared to the
hierarchical version. First, it follows from Lemma 1 in Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)
that if unemployed workers x are distributed uniformly along the circle initially, the
distribution of vacancies y will also be uniform. This implies, second, that the values
of unemployment, U , and vacancies, V , are the same for all worker and firm types.
The value of non-market activity, b, and the vacancy posting costs, c, are constants
and not type dependent. The values of employment and production, E(d) and P(d),
depend on d only and not on the underlying worker and firm types. The same is true
for the Nash wage bargain W (d). These properties highlight why the circular version is
a comparative advantage sorting model: the underlying worker and firm types do not
matter for production by themselves; there is no hierarchy. We solve the circular model
to obtain a closed-form expression for the interior cutoff distance, which we call d∗. In an
interior solution (d∗ < 12), workers and firms will accept matches only up to a distance of
d∗ and reject matches beyond that point. This conforms with the matching set logic of
the more general hierarchical model.
The following circular sorting model is a discrete time version of Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999). The steady-state value functions are standard expect for the integral term in the
value of unemployment and a vacant firm. Unmatched agents will accept matches up to
d∗ both to the left and to the right of their own position on the circle. For this reason,
the integral terms are multiplied by 2.53
E(d) = W (d) + β(δU + (1− δ)E(d)) (1.31)
U = b+ 2βqu(θ)
∫ d∗
0
(E(c)− U)dc (1.32)
P(d) = F (d)−W (d) + β(δV + (1− δ)P(d)) (1.33)
V = −c+ 2βqv(θ)
∫ d∗
0
(P(c)− V)dc (1.34)
53We use c as the variable of integration to avoid notational confusion.
43
Sorting and Labor Market Dynamics
Due to the free entry assumption, V is 0 in equilibrium, so c = 2βqv(θ)
∫ d∗
0 (P(c))dc. The
standard Nash bargaining solution then implies
E(d)− U = α1− αP(d), (1.35)
where α is the workers’ bargaining power. By plugging in (1.31), (1.32), and (1.33) and
using the fact that c
qv(θ) must be equal to P(d) with free entry, We obtain the following
wage equation
W (d) = α(F (d) + cθ) + (1− α)b, (1.36)
which is just the Pissarides (2000) textbook wage equation with the additional twist that
wage and output depend on the distance d in the circular sorting model.
Stationary Equilibrium of the Circular Model
The main advantage of the circular model from a computational perspective is that it
delivers a closed-form solution for the matching cutoff d∗. We find the cutoff by using
the fact that the value of a producing firm must be 0 at the cutoff in an interior solution.
P(d∗) = (1− α)(F (d∗)− b)− αcθ = 0 (1.37)
Equation (1.37) can easily be solved for d∗. To find the value of aggregate labor market
tightness θ compatible with d∗ and free entry, plug the value functions into Equation 1.35,
substitute out the wage using P(d), integrate both sides, and substitute the integral term
out of the entry condition. The equilibrium θ value is unique because we consider interior
solutions only.
The Dynamics of the Circular Model
As a final computational test, we run simulations of the simple circular sorting model.
The model has a closed-form solution for the matching cutoff d∗ ∈ (0, 12), the maximum
distance along the circle workers and firms are willing to accept when forming a match.
Due to this closed-form solution, solving and simulating the circular sorting model is
much simpler than the hierarchical version. The matching cutoff is procyclical in the
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circular model, so the acceptable distance from the optimal match increases in response
to a positive shock. This channel amplifies job creation in a manner similar to that
found with the hierarchical model. The question is whether the simpler circular model
also produces sufficient amplification or if the additional complexity of the hierarchical
sorting model is necessary to match empirical labor market dynamics
We simulate the model using the Shimer (2005) calibration, the value of home pro-
duction b and vacancy posting costs c are constants. We calibrate the parameters of the
circular production function (Equation (1.30)) in order to match the output dispersion
of the hierarchical production function. We find that the circular model produces a small
amount of amplification. The standard deviation of simulated labor market tightness is
about 0.052. This is a small increase in comparison to Shimer (2005) (0.035) but still far
from the empirical moment to be matched (0.382). We conclude from this exercise that
the additional features of the more complex hierarchical sorting model, particularly the
endogenously adjusting distributions in the state space, are important for explaining the
observed cyclical dynamics of the labor market.
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Labor Market Sorting in Germany∗
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2.1 Introduction
Increasing wage inequality is a topic of high interest for both policymakers and aca-
demics. For Germany, Dustmann et al. (2009) show that between 1990 and 2000 real
wage growth for full-time working men was negative below the 18th percentile of the wage
distribution and increasingly positive above.54 Using by now widely available matched
employer-employee data, Abowd et al. (1999) (henceforth AKM) first demonstrate how
to quantify the respective contributions of unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity to
wage dispersion. AKM models provide a very good fit and typically find that most of the
observed wage dispersion is explained by unobserved heterogeneity. Card et al. (2013)
(henceforth CHK) apply the AKM methodology to the universe of German social se-
curity records.55 They decompose the increase of wage dispersion into three elements:
rising worker heterogeneity, more dispersion of wage premiums paid by employers, and
increased sorting based on unobservables, measured by a rising correlation of worker and
firm-fixed effects.
This Chapter is motivated by the discussion about the potential misspecification of the
AKM two-way fixed effect model. As pointed out by, among others, Gautier and Teulings
(2006), Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), and Lopes de Melo (2016), the assumption that log
wages are additively separable into worker and firm-fixed effects leaves, by construction,
no role for match-specific effects.56 In theoretical sorting models, however, output and
wages are match-specific; they are determined by a production complementarity between
workers’ skill and firms’ productivity types. If this match-specific component of wages
was quantitatively important, the AKM model would be inapplicable to quantify wage
dispersion. CHK argue that the abstraction from match-specific effects is defensible
54Remarkably, the yearly increase of wage dispersion in Germany has an order of magnitude compa-
rable to the United States; this trend can be traced back well into the 1980s/70s. Dustmann et al. (2009)
find that the gap between the 85th and 50th percentiles of the German wage distribution has increased
by about 0.6 log points per year between 1975 and 2004. This is comparable to Autor et al. (2006), who
report that the gap between the 90th and 50th percentile in the United States has increased at a rate of
roughly 1 log point per year during the same period.
55Having access to the universe of data is crucial for the AKM methodology because the observation
of all workers per firm reduces the potential impact of the so-called “limited mobility bias”, a problem
emphasized by Andrews et al. (2008, 2012).
56In the remainder of this Chapter, we will sometimes refer to this assumption as the “AKM assump-
tion”.
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because deviations in terms of wage residuals appear to be small for most, but not all,
combinations of worker and firm types.
We build a bridge between these two opposing views on the sources of wage dispersion.
We analyze German matched employer-employee data57 through the lens of a structural
sorting model featuring heterogeneity on both sides of the market, search frictions, and
search on the job. Our main analytical tool is the identification technique proposed by
Hagedorn et al. (2017) (henceforth HLM). To identify the sign and strength of sorting,
they estimate economy-wide rankings of both workers and firms using data on wages
and labor market transitions only. In their model, the match-specific output is non-
parametrically identified. HLM report a rank correlation coefficient, a natural measure
for sorting, of 0.76. The respective correlation of worker and firm-fixed effects in CHK is
much lower, about 0.21 for a comparable period.58 First, we make a methodological con-
tribution by using the German labor market as a laboratory to reconcile these seemingly
incompatible approaches. Using the worker ranking procedure proposed by HLM and a
firm ranking which does not depend on wages, we confirm that matching patterns are
positive assortative in Germany. We find an overall rank correlation coefficient of 0.24,
which is closer to the CHK-AKM benchmark than to HLM.
Our second contribution is a thorough quantitative investigation of labor market sort-
ing in Germany. We find that sorting increased significantly over time. It rose particularly
for matches formed by workers out of unemployment. Low-skill workers are increasingly
sorted into low-productivity firms. This development can be linked to increasing domestic
outsourcing of firms.59 Sorting of high-skill workers into high-productivity firms has, if
anything, slightly decreased during our period of observation. Interestingly, the increased
sorting of workers at the bottom of the type distribution is related to non-monotonic wage
patterns. These workers maximize their wages in matches with low-type firms and the
increased sorting leads to wage gains. We provide direct empirical evidence that for some
57German social security register data are provided by the Institute for Employment Research (Institut
für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the German Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagen-
tur für Arbeit).
58For simplicity, this is the arithmetic mean of the correlations reported by CHK for the two subperiods
which span the same period as HLM.
59Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) analyze domestic outsourcing in Germany. They use an AKM
model and find that displaced workers suffer wage losses. Using our more flexible framework, we observe
that the wage of low-type workers increases on average when they move to firms that offer services which
are typically outsourced (cleaning, security, temporary work agencies).
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worker types wages are not monotonically increasing in the productivity-type of the firm
they are matched with. This non-monotonicity of wages is a key feature of theoretical
sorting models like Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006), and Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011), but it is at odds with the AKM two-way fixed effect approach, because in the
reduced-form model wages mechanically increase in the firm effect. Accordingly, the
residuals of the CHK-AKM model are substantial for some combinations of worker and
firm types, specifically those including low-type workers.60 We find that increased sorting
and the non-monotonicity of wages are most pronounced for these high-residual workers
at the bottom of the type distribution. For medium and high-type workers, however,
wages increase monotonically in the firm type, consistent with CHK and AKM. This
explains why two-way fixed effect models generate a good fit overall. Nevertheless, it
is important to emphasize that the AKM model cannot explain wage determination for
low-type workers. The outcomes for this group of employees are the ones with which
labor market policy is typically most concerned.
In the related literature, a number of recent papers explores ways to identify the
sign and strength of sorting and its contribution to wage dispersion without relying on
the AKM assumption. Bagger and Lentz (2016), Gautier and Teulings (2015), and Lise
et al. (2016) develop structural search models and take them to the data. Bonhomme
et al. (2016) propose a flexible empirical framework with a discrete number of types
(finite mixture model) which also allows for unrestricted interactions of worker and firm
heterogeneity. Our analysis is inspired by HLM, which also belongs to this group of
papers. HLM show how match-specific output, wages, and the sign and strength of
sorting are non-parametrically identified with standard matched employer-employee data
available for many countries. The key challenge for the empirical study of sorting is
to construct credible global rankings of workers and firms. While studies in the AKM
tradition implicitly rank workers and firms by their fixed effects, HLM solve a Kemeny-
Young rank aggregation problem to merge intra-firm wage rankings into a global ranking
of workers. This procedure uses the largest connected set of workers. A computational
algorithm running on this graph can effectively maximize the likelihood of the correct
60In the AKM context, worker and firm types are equivalent to their estimated fixed effects. Regarding
residuals in CHK, see Figure VI on p. 996 and the discussion on pp. 989-991 in Card et al. (2013).
49
Sorting in Germany
global worker ranking, as proven by Kenyon-Mathieu and Schudy (2007). Once workers
are globally ranked, HLM show how to use the model structure to rank firms based on the
value of a job vacancy. This approach delivers a rank correlation which lies considerably
above the correlation for Germany estimated by CHK and above related results for other
countries in the studies mentioned before. The German case is well-suited to take the
HLM approach to a test. We have access to very detailed information for a large number
of firms from the IAB Establishment Panel. If all information necessary to rank both
workers and firms globally was indeed contained in wages alone, additional firm data
would be redundant and not alter the results in any meaningful way. We construct an
efficiency-based firm ranking using the distance to an estimated production frontier. Our
ranking is independent of wages and produces lower rank correlations, which are more
in line with the empirical sorting literature and with CHK for Germany in particular.
We also construct a profit-based firm ranking inspired by Bartolucci et al. (2015), which
yields similar results.
A closely related paper is Kantenga and Law (2016). They use the full HLM model
to structurally decompose increasing overall wage dispersion into the contributions of
worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, search frictions, and sorting. They reject the
assumption of additive separability statistically by following pairs of workers that jointly
change employers. We do not have to impose the full structure of the HLM model on the
data because we rank firms independently of wages. This prevents us from performing a
structural decomposition of wage dispersion. We go beyond Kantenga and Law (2016),
however, by providing an explanation for why additive separability is rejected in some
parts of the type space. Thus, we see our results as largely complementary.
This Chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes our data. Section 2.3
briefly discusses the theory of sorting that guides our thinking. Section 2.4 explains our
approach to identifying the sign and strength of sorting. Section 2.5 presents our results:
correlations of our estimated worker and firm rankings, the dynamics of sorting over
time, and how this relates to wages, wage inequality, and increased domestic outsourcing.
Section 2.6 concludes and selected additional results and robustness tests can be found
in the Appendix.
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2.2 Data
We use matched employer-employee data for Germany provided by the Institute for Em-
ployment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, IAB) of the Ger-
man Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). We use the “LIAB Mover
Model”61 and restrict our analysis to the years 1998-2008.62 This data set is ideal for
our purposes as it provides information about a large number of workers moving between
firms and it can be linked directly to firm-level survey data from the IAB Establish-
ment Panel. We provide a short overview of our data preparation procedures in the
following; more details on sample selection and imputation procedures can be found in
Appendix A.1.
2.2.1 Data Preparation
One major advantage of German matched employer-employee data is the high quality of
the wage data due to plausibility checks carried out by the social security institutions
followed by sanctions for non- and misreporting. In our raw data, we observe nominal
gross daily wages, which we deflate using the consumer price index from German na-
tional accounts with 2005 as the base year. Every wage observation corresponds to one
employment spell, which can last from one day up to one year due to the reporting rules
of the German social security system.63 On average, the workers in our sample have 6.4
job spells between 1998 and 2008 (with a standard deviation of 5.0) and the average
spell lasts 289 days (with a standard deviation of 114). We drop workers with more than
150 job spells (less than 0.01%). Observed spells are sometimes identical except for the
ending date and the corresponding wage, which could be the result of multiple reports in
case of a changing contract end date. In such cases the longer spell is typically associated
with a higher wage, possibly due to Christmas bonuses or other salary supplements. We
always keep the spell with the higher wage.
61File: LIAB_MM_9308. See Heining et al. (2012) for a detailed description of the data set.
62We chose this period of time because it is roughly split in half by the German labor market reforms
passed and implemented between 2002 and 2005 (Hartz I-IV).
63The reporting rules require employers to file a report whenever an employee joins or leaves the
establishment or, in the event of no change in an ongoing employment relationship, on December 31
each year.
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The education variable in German social security data suffers from missing values
and inconsistencies, essentially because misreporting has no negative consequences. We
impute missing and inconsistent observations using the methodology proposed in Fitzen-
berger et al. (2006). Missing values cannot be imputed for about 2% of the data and we
drop these spells. A second limitation of the wage data is that the German social security
system tracks earnings only up to a certain threshold, the contribution assessment ceil-
ing (“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”).64 We follow the procedure suggested by Dustmann
et al. (2009) and impute the upper tail of the wage distribution by running a series of
Tobit regressions, allowing for a maximum degree of heterogeneity by fitting the model
separately for years, education levels, and eight five-year age groups.65
We restrict our data set to West German male employees between 20 and 60 years of
age who were liable for social security contributions. Self-employed workers, civil servants,
and students are not included in the sample. Although it would be very interesting to
analyze the sign and strength of sorting for the excluded subgroups, we put a higher
priority on using a dataset which is, on the one hand, homogeneous and, on the other,
comparable to data used in previous studies of wage dispersion in Germany, CHK in
particular. To minimize working-time effects in our wage data, we further exclude part-
time and marginal employment.66
After the initial data preparation, our sample consists of 16,361,068 employment
spells, 1,824,580 workers, and 472,869 establishments for the years 1998-2008. Note that
the employers we observe are not firms in the legal sense, but establishments or local
production units. These do not necessarily coincide with the legal entity to which they
belong. We use the terms “firm”, “establishment”, and “employer” interchangeably. The
standard deviation of log wages in this sample is 0.455. This value is close to the measures
64The average yearly censoring rate is 13.6% of wage observations. We define a wage observation as
censored whenever the reported wage is higher than 99% of the censoring threshold.
65An alternative to imputing the censored part of the wage distribution would be to simply drop
top-coded wages. Although we would lose the ability to analyze sorting patterns of workers earning
very high wages, our main findings would not be affected as they pertain to workers with low and hence
non-censored wages. Moreover, the calculation of residual wages, the main input for our analysis, is
largely unaffected by the imputation: Table A2.2a shows that a wage variance decomposition delivers
very similar results with and without the imputed part of the wage distribution.
66To reliably identify spells of marginal or part-time employment we use both indicator variables in the
data and, additionally, drop spells with wages below the time-varying marginal employment threshold,
which is on average 12.2 Euro per day across years in our sample (“Geringfügigkeitsgrenze”).
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of wage dispersion reported by CHK, indicating that our data preparation procedure
indeed generates a comparable sample.67
2.2.2 Residual Wages
We analyze how unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity as well as their potential
interaction influence wages and the selection of workers into jobs, i.e sorting. Therefore,
we use residual wages—wages net of the effects of observable worker characteristics—as
the main input to rank workers. To compute them, we use a simple empirical model of
wage dispersion of the AKM-type and regress, following CHK, log wages on a person-
fixed effect, an unrestricted set of year dummies, and quadratic and cubic terms in age
fully interacted with educational attainment:
lnwit = x′itγ + αi + rit. (2.1)
lnwit denotes the log real daily wage of a worker i in year t, x′it includes the time-varying
observable characteristics, αi is a worker-fixed effect, and rit is the error term. Typical
of an AKM-type wage regression, the explanatory power of this model is very high. The
adjusted R2 is 81%, slightly below the around 90% reported by CHK. This difference is
easily explained by the lack of an establishment-fixed effect in our specification, which is,
however, inconsequential for our ranking purposes.68 Table 2.1 shows the decomposition
of the variance of log wages. The unobservable components of wages explain the vast ma-
jority of wage variation in our data, namely, 91%. The person-fixed effect alone explains
74% of log wage variance; the residual absorbs another 17%. To compute the residual
wages, we simply subtract the share of the wage predicted by observable characteristics
67CHK report a standard deviation of log wages of 0.432 for 1996-2002 and 0.499 for 2002-2009.
68In contrast to CHK, who have access to the universe of German social security records, we cannot
reliably estimate establishment-fixed effects because we do not observe the full workforce of the estab-
lishments in our sample. This is not a problem for our analysis. The ranking procedure proposed by
HLM relies on pairwise wage comparisons of workers who are employed at the same establishment (see
Section 2.4.2). The unobserved firm effect affects the wages of two workers at the same establishment
by exactly the same amount. The ranking of a pair of workers employed by the same firm is thus not
affected by the firm effect.
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Table 2.1: Decomposition of the Variance of Log Wages
lnwit x′itγ̂ α̂i r̂it
lnwit 0.207
x′itγ̂ 0.014 0.008
α̂i 0.158 0.006 0.152
r̂it 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.035
Notes: Variance-Covariance matrix of regression
model 2.1. The variance of log wages (lnwit) is
decomposed into the variance of observable char-
acteristics (x′itγ̂), the person-fixed effect (α̂i), and
the residual (r̂it). Rounded to three decimal
places.
from the observed wage for every individual:
ln w̃it = lnwit − x′itγ̂. (2.2)
The log residual wage has a standard deviation of 0.433 (variance 0.187). It is thus only
slightly less dispersed than observed wages in our sample, underlining the small role that
observable characteristics play for wage dispersion. The correlation between observed
and residual wages is very high (0.98).
To address concerns about the influence of occupations on wages which we do no
account for in the specification above, we augment Equation (2.1) by controlling for 32
occupational categories.69 We interact them with education and year dummies. Reassur-
ingly, controlling for occupations does not significantly increase the explanatory power of
the wage regression. The adjusted R2 stays virtually the same (81%) and the portion of
variance explained by observable characteristics rises only slightly from 3.9% in the base-
line regression to 6.7% when including occupational controls.70 The correlation between
baseline residual wages and residual wages net of occupational effects is very high, above
0.99. Taking into account the workers’ occupation to calculate residual wages would not
69In accordance with Bundesagentur für Arbeit (1988) the classification in our data consists of a
about 330 occupational codes on the 3-digit level. We use 32 2-digit values (“Berufsabschnitte”) in order
to being able to estimate a large set of interaction terms.
70Table A2.2b shows the decomposition of wage variance including occupational controls.
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lead to a significantly different worker ranking and hence not affect our results. We are
confident that the residual wages w̃it are the appropriate input for our analysis.71
2.2.3 Firm Data
We use the IAB Establishment Panel to calculate measures of firm performance which
we develop and use in Section 2.4.3. The IAB Establishment Panel draws a stratified
random sample of establishments from the register data.72 We restrict our attention to
establishments that employ at least 10 workers on average during our period of interest.73
The data contains no direct information about the capital stock on which an establish-
ment operates. To circumvent this shortcoming, we use the perpetual inventory method
proposed by Müller (2008) to approximate the capital stock of the establishments in our
sample. This method uses information about the average economic lives of different cap-
ital goods (buildings, IT, production machinery, transport equipment), which is available
from national accounts, and the firms’ net investments in the different categories of cap-
ital goods. We exclude the public sector of the economy and firms which do not report
revenues as their primary measure of output.74 Finally, we merge our firm sample with
the data on employment spells. This leaves us with 4,901 establishments for which we
observe 1,714,450 employment spells of 234,800 workers.
2.2.4 Matches
The main unit of our empirical analysis in the following is a match between a worker and
a firm. For our study of the allocation of workers to jobs, we focus on the first person-
year observation of a new employment spell. Hence, we abstract from the spell length.
This ensures that certain match types are not over-represented (under-represented) in
the distribution of matches simply because they last longer (shorter) on average, leading
71CHK provide a comprehensive analysis of the explanatory content of additional controls in their
setting. In line with our finding, they report that occupational (and industry) controls do not significantly
increase the explanatory power of AKM-type models of wage dispersion.
72For details on the IAB Establishment Panel see Kölling (2000) and Fischer et al. (2009).
73We lose only 0.2% of employment spells due to this restriction.
74The public sector includes health care, education, non-profit organizations. We exclude these firms
because they typically do not seek to maximize profits or minimize costs, what is at odds with the
rationale of our firm ranking procedure. The most important group of establishments which do not
report revenues are banks.
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to more (less) person-firm-year observations. This is the most conservative way to study
sorting. Technically speaking, we define a new match as the first worker-id establishment-
id combination we observe in the data. We further distinguish between two types of
matches: matches out of unemployment and matches resulting from job-to-job switches
of an employee. A match out of unemployment occurs whenever a particular worker
is employed after a period of registered unemployment or an uncompensated time gap
between two consecutive jobs which is longer than 1 month. Job-to-job matches are
defined as job switches with no time gap or a time gap smaller than 1 month. Whenever
a worker and an establishment match twice, we only consider the first match and exclude
job recalls.
The worker ranking procedure we apply relies on the HLM model with search on the
job.75 In this framework, identification of the worker ranking is based on wage information
from matches formed by workers out of unemployment only. These wages can be shown
to be monotonically increasing in the unobserved worker type in the context of the model.
As a result, we lose all workers in our sample who are never unemployed and only switch
jobs. Workers unemployed at some point in time, however, can be ranked and we follow
them as they switch jobs.76 Our final sample consists of 183,156 matches, 75,831 arise
out of unemployment and 107,325 from workers switching jobs.
2.3 Sorting Theory
To support our analysis of labor market sorting in Germany, this section briefly sum-
marizes the theory of sorting that guides our thinking about the allocation of workers
to jobs and the determination of wages. Thinking about sorting conceptually requires
heterogeneity of agents in a two-sided market. Since this is research in the context of
the German labor market, we denote our heterogeneous types workers and firms. Firms
are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity and workers have different skill levels.
75Details are discussed in Section 2.4.2.
76All our conclusions are unaffected by this choice. Ranking workers based on all their wages, not just
out of unemployment, leads to a very similar worker ranking with a correlation of above 0.99. In this
case, the final sample contains about three times as many matches. Even though the difference between
the two rankings is very small, we use the ranking out of unemployment for the sake of methodological
cleanness.
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Workers and firms carry identifiers i and k, respectively. We assume for now that unam-
biguous rankings of both worker and firm types exist and are observable to the researcher.
In practice, rankings are unobservable. Establishing these rankings empirically is thus
the key challenge in measuring the sign and strength of labor market sorting.
Let the true rank of worker i be denoted x(i) while the true rank of firm k is y(k).
For simplicity, heterogeneity across workers and firms is assumed to be one-dimensional.77
The starting point for the theory of labor market sorting is the neoclassical optimal as-
signment model proposed by Becker (1973). In the absence of search frictions, every
worker finds his optimal firm assignment instantaneously and matches are formed. This
leads to a Walrasian first-best allocation of workers to firms. The specific nature of the
optimal assignment depends on the production structure of the economy. One possible
assignment pattern is positive assortative matching (PAM). In Becker’s theory, a comple-
mentarity between worker and firm types gives rise to PAM. Technically, the production
function, which takes worker and firm types as arguments, must be supermodular, that is,
the cross-derivatives must be strictly positive. To maximize output, the complementarity
then requires the most productive firm to employ the most skilled worker, the second most
productive firm to employ the second most skilled worker, and so forth. The worker with
the lowest skill level is optimally matched with the least productive firm. This allocation
implies a perfect positive correlation of worker and firm ranks: ρ = Cov[x(i),y(k)]
σx(i)σy(k)
= 1,
where ρ is Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient, computed by dividing the covariance
of the rank variables by the product of their standard deviations.78 Spearman’s ρ is a
natural measure for the sign and strength of sorting. A negative rank correlation, ρ < 0,
implies negative assortative matching (NAM) with a submodular production function.
NAM features high-productivity firms employing low-skilled workers (and vice versa) to
maximize output. In turn, ρ = 0 indicates the absence of sorting patterns in allocating
workers to jobs, corresponding to a modular production technology.
A major step forward for the theory of labor market sorting has been the incorporation
of search frictions into the Beckerian model. Shimer and Smith (2000) show existence and
77Of course, this is a simplifying assumption. However, it is not obvious ex-ante that having more
than one dimension of heterogeneity would meaningfully increase the explanatory power of the model.
For some recent explorations of the empirical content of multi-dimensional sorting models see Lise and
Postel-Vinay (2016) and Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2016).
78Spearman’s ρ is equal to a standard Pearson correlation coefficient applied to the rank variables.
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Figure 2.1: A Simple Sorting Model
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Note: The blue curves depict the equilibrium of a simple Shimer and Smith (2000) economy. The black line represents
the equilibrium matching set of a worker of type 500. The model is a simplified version of the structural search model
presented in HLM. It is solved numerically using standard parameter values. For the derivation and solution procedure
see also Chapter 1. The red line in Panel (b) is a simple stylized representation of a monotonic relation between worker’s
wages and the type of the firm as it is assumed in two-way fixed effect models of wage dispersion.
the properties of an equilibrium in a two-sided assignment model with frictions. With
a continuum of types and random search, frictions imply that the first-best allocation
cannot be realized because the probability of meeting any specific partner type on the
other side of the market is zero. Therefore, a subset of firm and worker types in the
vicinity of the optimal allocation must be acceptable. These subsets of types, the match-
ing sets, are determined by the option values of a all potential matches.79 Figure 2.1
depicts the equilibrium of a simple Shimer and Smith (2000) economy. This illustrative
economy is populated by a population of 1,000 discrete and heterogeneous worker and
firm types, each of them having an equal mass normalized to one. Since we abstract from
the ranking problem for now, the indices (i, k) ∈ {1, ..., 1000} are directly interpretable
as the workers’ and firms’ ranks. The production function exhibits a complementarity
which induces PAM as explained above. Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 shows the space of all
worker and firm type combinations, the type space. The 45-degree line represents the
Beckerian first best allocation. The blue curves depict the cutoffs of the matching sets of
all worker and firm types. The black line is the matching set of one specific worker type,
i = 500. This worker type is willing to match with, roughly, all firm types above 180 and
79Matches are acceptable if their option value is higher than the value of continued search.
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below 820. Within these boundaries, the surplus is (weakly) positive and matches are
formed. Matching with firm types outside of the boundaries, in turn, is precluded due
to a negative surplus. According to the model, no matches are formed in the upper-left
and lower-right corners of the type space, indicating the absence of matches between
high-type workers and a low-type firms as well as low-type workers and high-type firms.
Panel (b) shows how the model-generated wage of the exemplary worker type, i = 500,
varies across firm types. In the model, wages are determined by splitting the match
surplus according to the Nash bargaining solution. Note that due to the production
complementarity in this economy, the wage of a given worker type is non-monotonically
related to the firm type. For worker type i = 500, it is maximized in a match with firm
k = 500 (first best allocation). Apart from the wage-maximizing allocation, the worker
has to accept lower wages because the production complementarity is not fully exploited.
The worker needs to compensate the firm for the foregone option value of waiting for a
better hire. This non-monotonicity lies at the heart of the critique of the AKM two-way
fixed effect approach (Gautier and Teulings, 2006; Eeckhout and Kircher, 2011; Lopes
de Melo, 2016). In the log-linear AKM model, the wage must monotonically increase in
the estimated firm-fixed effect, which is simply being equated with the unobservable firm
type. Such a monotonic relation between wages and firm type might look like the stylized
red line in Panel (b) of Figure 2.1. The higher the firm type, the higher is the wage of
every worker the firm employs, a simple wage premium. The theoretically predicted non-
monotonicity is clearly at odds with the AKM model, which assumes monotonicity. This
potential misspecification of the AKM model led to a number of alternative strategies
to quantify the contributions of worker and firm heterogeneity as well as their potential
interaction to overall wage dispersion. The HLM identification strategy, which we rely on
to a significant extent, makes direct use of the model structure described in this section.
We discuss it in relation to alternative identification strategies in the next Section.
2.4 Identifying Sorting
We identify the sign and strength of sorting in the labor market by combining the wage-
based worker ranking procedure (global rank aggregation) proposed by HLM with firm
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rankings which are constructed independently of wages. The next subsections explain
our motivation for this approach and our ranking procedures in detail before we turn to
the results in Section 2.5.
2.4.1 Motivation
The main contribution of HLM is to show how to construct global worker and firm
rankings and identify the sign and strength of sorting using data on wages and labor
market transitions only. Their identification strategy is viable in the class of structural
models discussed in Section 2.3, building upon Shimer and Smith (2000). The quality
of wage and transition data is typically high in commonly available matched employer-
employee data sets. Detailed information about the firm, however, is not always available.
It is thus an asset that the firm data requirements of the HLM approach are small. For
Germany, we have access to very detailed information for a large number of firms from
the IAB Establishment Panel.80 The German case is therefore well-suited to take the
HLM approach to a test: if all necessary information to rank both workers and firms
globally were contained in wages, additional firm data would be redundant and not alter
the results in any meaningful way. We show below that using additional firm data leads
to a different firm ranking and different results.
Once workers are ranked and binned using the global rank aggregation algorithm (see
details below), the value of unemployment for a specific worker type can be estimated by
interpreting the lowest observed wage of all workers of the same type as this type’s reser-
vation wage. Subsequently, HLM use the model structure, primarily Nash bargaining, to
show that firms can be ranked based on the value of a vacant job.81 It can be constructed
as a statistic of wages and transition rates. The value of a vacant job is shown to be
monotonically increasing in the firm type and it is identified from the observed differ-
ences of wages paid to different workers of the same type and their estimated reservation
wage. This wage premium is proportional to the expected surplus of a vacancy due to the
80HLM use data from the IAB Establishment Panel as well. Vacancy data at the firm level greatly
simplify the computation but is not necessary for their approach to work in principle.
81Technically, Nash bargaining is not specifically required. It is sufficient that both parties benefit
from an increase of the surplus, the proportions do not have to be fixed.
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assumption of Nash bargaining.82 Thus, the bargaining assumption is crucial to identify
the value of a vacancy using wage data. Once the worker-specific value of unemployment
and the firm-specific value of a vacancy are known, the model structure allows HLM to
simply invert the wage equation for match-specific output. Thus, the production function
is identified non-parametrically at the match level in this setting. As a consequence, it
is possible to analyze the sign and strength of sorting without making functional form
assumptions about the production function.
The assumption that wages are determined by contemporaneous bargaining made by
HLM is critical for identification as it enables them to rank firms based on wages and
invert the wage equation for match-specific output. Empirically, the assumption that
wages are determined by splitting the surplus of a match period-by-period is backed
up by evidence presented in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013). For the U.S., they show
that wages are robustly not history dependent but driven by current aggregate labor
market conditions and idiosyncratic match-specific productivities, consistent with period-
by-period bargaining.83 For Germany, new evidence suggests that history dependence is,
in contrast to the U.S., a prevalent feature of wage determination. Bauer and Lochner
(2016) use the on-the-job-search model proposed by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013)
and estimate it on German social security data (SIAB-7514). Following Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2013), they explicitly control for unobserved match-quality and even allow
for heterogeneity across occupations. Unlike in the U.S., wages turn out to depend on
the initial labor market conditions or on the best outside offer a worker receives while
being in a specific job.84 The influence of current labor market conditions is thus smaller
than in the U.S. This suggests that the bargaining assumption necessary to rank firms
and invert the wage equation might be less appropriate for Germany than it would be in
the U.S. context.
82See Hagedorn et al. (2017) p. 15 ff. for more details and proofs.
83In contrast, earlier studies for the U.S., most notably Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), find history
dependence in wages and interpret it as evidence for infrequent bargaining or implicit contracts. This
result disappears after controlling for unobserved match quality as Hagedorn and Manovskii (2013) show.
84The labor market conditions at a specific point in time are measured by the unemployment rate.
Empirically, these papers use the unemployment rate at the begin of an employment spell to control
for initial conditions. The likelihood of receiving outside offers, which the firm may match to retain the
worker, is captured by the lowest measured unemployment rate during an employment spell.
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The baseline results in HLM are derived using an extended version of the model with
search on the job. As in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006), in case
an employed worker meets another firm, the firms engage in Bertrand competition and
depending on the potential surplus at the new firm the worker might switch jobs. HLM
show that their constructive proof of identification extends to this richer framework under
the assumption that unemployed workers extract the full surplus of the match when they
are hired. In this case, the wage is monotonically increasing in the unobserved worker
type, the key requirement to rank workers. A disadvantage of identifying the model
from out of unemployment wages only is that workers who are never observed in an
unemployment spell cannot be ranked.85
Using German data, HLM find a very high correlation of estimated worker and firm
ranks, it is 0.76 for the years 1993-2007. This value suggests a high degree of PAM and
severe misspecification of AKM models. It is much higher than the correlation of esti-
mated worker and firm-fixed effects reported by CHK using the AKM methodology on
German data. CHK report correlations of 0.17 (1996-2002) and 0.25 (2002-2009).86 The
HLM result also lies considerably above rank correlations reported in related studies us-
ing alternative identification strategies and data from other countries. Bagger and Lentz
(2016) use Danish data and estimate a structural model with endogenous search intensity
and on the job search. Job-switchers are used to rank firms by their poaching rank. They
report a correlation of only 0.11. Bonhomme et al. (2016) propose a clustering technique
(finite mixture model) to identify a discrete number of firm types based on the similarity
of their within-firm wage distributions. This very flexible empirical model allows for un-
restricted interactions between worker and firm heterogeneity. Using Swedish data, they
find correlations around 0.44. Bartolucci et al. (2015) rely on high-quality Italian firm
data (balance sheets). They develop a refined reduced-form approach to identify the sign
and strength of sorting and find a correlation of worker and firm types of 0.52. Finally, ev-
idence for the U.S. is presented by Lise et al. (2016). They make a parametric assumption
85We find that ranking workers based on all their wages, not just out of unemployment, leads to a
very similar worker ranking with a correlation of above 0.99 for the workers in both samples. However,
we stick to the ranking out of unemployment for the sake of methodological cleanness.
86Recall that CHK have access to the universe of German social security records. Using the AKM
model on those data does not suffer from the limited mobility bias emphasized by Andrews et al. (2008,
2012).
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about the production function (CES) and directly estimate the elasticity of substitution.
They also find evidence for PAM, but the magnitude of estimated substitution elasticity
is not readily comparable to a rank correlation coefficient.
The sign of sorting found in all these studies is unambiguously positive, suggesting that
some degree of PAM is indeed a prevalent feature of labor markets in developed economies.
The variation of estimated correlation coefficients, however, is huge.87 Using our method,
we shed light on the large spread of estimated correlation coefficients for Germany. As
mentioned before, the benchmark studies are CHK using the AKM model (0.17-0.25)
and HLM using a structural framework (0.76). Both studies use German social security
records and comparable time periods. Different correlation coefficients must therefore
stem from methodological differences. Using additional firm information from the IAB
Establishment Panel is instructive because we can construct firm rankings independently
of wages and thus test whether the HLM approach of ranking both workers and firms on
wage data alone is a reliable way of capturing both worker and firm heterogeneity.
We find confirmatory evidence for PAM in the German labor market. Interestingly,
our results are much closer to the CHK-AKM benchmark than to HLM. Using the HLM
worker ranking and our alternative firm ranking, we find an overall rank correlation of
0.24 (1998-2008). Thus, the specific structural assumptions made to rank firms based
on wages, particularly wage bargaining, appear to severely increase the measured rank
correlation. Overall, we find that the AKM model applied by CHK seems to deliver a sat-
isfactory approximation of the data. However, we do not conclude from this observation
that match-specific effects play no role for wage determination whatsoever. Low-type
workers have large estimated residuals in CHK.88 For these workers, the empirical wage
profiles we observe are at odds with the monotonicity assumption. The sorting of low-
type workers indeed appears to be driven by match-specific interaction effects, possibly
as a result of production complementarities as suggested by theory. Applying the AKM
model shrouds these effects: the monotonicity assumption may be met for large fraction
87To some extent the large variation of estimated correlation coefficients is probably driven by cross-
country differences rather than methodological issues. Also, possible cyclical fluctuations of the degree of
labor market sorting are not taken into account in the aforementioned studies. Both topics are exciting
avenues for future research.
88CHK show residuals for type combinations, measured in worker and establishment effect deciles, in
Figure VI on p. 996. In fixed effect models, the estimated fixed effects of both workers and firms are
implicitly interpreted as their cardinally rankable type.
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of the data, leading to the well-known high explanatory power of the model. Deviations
for smaller groups of workers, however, remain undetected. Whether AKM or a more
flexible model is applicable therefore depends on the specific research question: the AKM
model can be a valid approximation to study the extent of wage dispersion in the labor
market as a whole, jointly analyzing all worker and firm types. In a study that focuses
on low-type workers, the group that labor market policy typically is most concerned
with, the AKM model would fail because wage patterns are highly non-monotonic in this
group. Below, we show in detail for which worker types wages across firms are indeed
non-monotonic (in line with the theory depicted in Figure 2.1) or monotonically increas-
ing in the firm type (in line with the AKM assumption of additively separable log wages).
Before we turn to the results, we describe our ranking procedures in more detail.
2.4.2 Ranking Workers
HLM present a computational algorithm that merges intra-firm wage rankings into a
global ranking of workers by solving a Kemeny-Young rank aggregation problem.89 The
procedure makes use of the fact that matched employer-employee data allows wage com-
parisons across firms because workers switch jobs: co-workers at one firm move from firm
to firm over time and form a graph (or connected set) of workers with comparable wage
observations. A computational algorithm running on this graph can effectively maximize
the likelihood of the correct global ranking, as proven by Kenyon-Mathieu and Schudy
(2007). The input of the algorithm are the workers’ residual wages, w̃it, net of observ-
able effects as presented in Section 2.2.2. The algorithm is initialized by ranking workers
according to a simple wage statistic which needs to be monotonically increasing in the
unobserved worker type.90 Using a Bayesian approach with a normal prior, HLM show
how to compute the probability of worker i being ranked higher than worker j given wage
89Rank aggregation is an ancient problem that originated in social choice theory. Kemeny-Young
rank aggregation solves this problem by minimizing the number of disagreements between potentially
inconsistent rankings of voting alternatives by different voters, see Kemeny and Snell (1962). In the
HLM application to the labor market, the firms are the voters and the workers the voting alternatives.
90HLM prove that, in the context of their model, the reservation wage, the maximum wage, and the
adjusted average wage of a worker are monotonically increasing in the unobserved type. Importantly, av-
erage wages, sometimes used to rank workers in empirical applications, are not monotonically increasing
in the type because they do not factor in the values of workers’ interjacent unemployment spells.
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histories at firm k in the presence of measurement error:
c(i, j) = P (w̃i,k > w̃j,k) = Φ
 ¯̃wi,k − ¯̃wj,k
σ2
ni,k
+ σ2
nj,k
 . (2.3)
Φ is the standard Normal CDF. Observed (residual) wages are assumed to follow a noisy
process: w̃i,k,t = w̃i,k + εt, with σ2 being the variance of ε. Intuitively, the difference of
the average residual wages ¯̃wi,k − ¯̃wj,k at firm k is weighted by the wage variance σ2 in
proportion to the number of wage observations for workers i and j at firm k, ni,k and
nj,k. The more available observations, the smaller is the potential impact of measurement
error on the average wage of worker i at firm k and the more plausible is the ranking
implied by the wage observations at this firm, resulting in a higher value of c(i, j).91
Note that σ2 is the overall wage variance and not firm-specific because HLM make the
assumption that all variation in wages for a specific job stems from measurement error
only.92 The probability c(i, j) is defined for worker pairs employed at the same firm.
In case a pair of workers is observed at more than one firm, the wage observations are
considered to be independent and the probabilities are simply multiplied. By comparing
the initial ranking with the ranking implied by the posterior probabilities c(i, j), the
algorithm iteratively increases the value of the following objective function and, hence,
maximizes the likelihood of the global ranking:
∑
i>j
[c(i, j) Π(i, j) + c(j, i) Π(j, i)] . (2.4)
91For details of the derivation of c(i, j), see Appendix III.1 in Hagedorn et al. (2017).
92While this assumption is consistent with period-by-period wage bargaining in their model, from an
empirical perspective it could be desirable to allow for heterogeneity of the within-firm wage distributions
beyond the mean. Imagine a firm using different contracts to discriminate between worker types: two
workers could have different slopes in their wage profile over time because tenure is remunerated differ-
ently. Such patterns could be due to history dependence, as evidenced by Bauer and Lochner (2016),
or due to the coexistence of wage bargaining and wage posting, as evidenced by Gartner and Holzner
(2015) (both for Germany). Ranking the two workers based on their mean wage in this setting might
not yield the correct ranking. In contrast, the k-means clustering technique proposed by Bonhomme
et al. (2016) allows for heterogeneity of within-firm wage distributions even beyond the second moment.
However, the computational complexity of this method increases quickly with the number of moments
to be estimated, hence the number of clusters/types is limited. The HLM method, in turn, allows for
(almost) unique worker and firm ranks. The researcher faces a trade-off: to allow for more heterogeneity
of the within-firm wage distributions, the number of types to be identified must be smaller. Our results
indicate that it can be insightful to have a large number of types: it allows us to detect non-monotonic
wage patterns for small worker groups.
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Table 2.2: Properties of Worker Ranking
w̄i α̂i age education
Correlation with x̂(i) 0.75 0.87 0.19 0.48
Note: The table shows correlations of our estimated worker ranking (x̂(i))
with other statistics used to rank workers in the literature: individual
mean wages (w̄i) and estimated person-fixed effects (extracted from run-
ning the wage regression 2.2, α̂i), as well as workers’ observable charac-
teristics, the individual means of age and education.
Π(i, j) (Π(j, i)) is an indicator function that takes on the value 1 in case i (j) is ranked
higher than j (i) and 0 otherwise. Whenever c(i, j) > c(j, i) but Π(i, j) = 0 and Π(j, i) =
1, the values of the indicator functions are swapped and the value of the objective rises.
The procedure continues until no further swap of workers increases the value of the
objective. It runs on the set of worker pairs who are employed by the same firm at
some point in time. The employment spells do not have to overlap.93 We choose the
“LIAB Mover Model” version of German matched employer-employee data because the
sampling procedure maximizes the numbers of observed coworker pairs in our data, an
ideal environment for the outlined computational procedure to run.94 Importantly, we do
not need to observe all workers of a given establishment to compute c(i, j). The pairwise
comparison of residual wages of two workers at the same firm is not affected by a potential
wage premium (or firm-fixed effect) because both workers receive it.95 We arrive at a
final ranking which gives an estimate of the unobserved type, x̂(i), for every individual
worker in our data. We group workers into 100 bins of equal size.96 In the following,
workers within one bin should be thought of as workers with the same estimated type
x̂(i).
To understand the properties of our worker ranking x̂(i), we compare it to other
wage statistics commonly used to rank workers in the empirical literature: mean wages,
person-fixed effects (AKM), and rankings based on the observable characteristics age
93Recall that residual wages are deflated and net of time effects.
94See Appendix A.1 for sampling details.
95This is a big advantage over the AKM model with respect to data requirements. In a reduced-form
fixed effect model, the full workforce of a firm needs to be observed in order to reliably estimate the
firm-fixed effect. CHK meet this data requirement by using the universe of German employment records.
96The number of individual workers in every bin must be sufficiently large. We find that 100 bins/types
is a good compromise between observations per bin and fineness of the type space which allows us to
detect wage non-monotonicity even for small groups of workers.
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and education. Table 2.2 shows correlations of those statistics with our final ranking.
Notably, the rank aggregation procedure produces a ranking which is markedly different
from rankings based on the alternative statistics. The correlations of our final ranking
with individual mean wages (w̄i) and estimated person-fixed effects (α̂i) are, naturally,
positive but markedly different from 1. The correlation with the estimated worker-fixed
effect (0.87) can be interpreted as a measure for how different the worker rankings in
CHK-AKM and HLM are. Moreover, our final ranking is only weakly correlated with
age and education. This is reasonable since the ranking procedure uses residual wages,
which are net of the effect of observables.
To understand how the binning of workers modifies the ranking, Table 2.3 shows a
decomposition of the respective variances of workers’ observed wages, residual wages,
age, and education into the shares explained within and between the bins. A relatively
homogeneous distribution of a variable within the bins indicates that the binning provides
a meaningful summary of the underlying heterogeneity in the respective dimension. Since
our worker ranking is based on wages, the share of variance explained between the bins
is relatively high, roughly two-thirds both for log wages (lnwit) and log residual wages
(ln w̃it). Hence, our bins are internally homogeneous in terms of wage variation. Since
our ranking is based on the residual wage (net of observables), the bins are much less
homogeneous for the covariates age and education with, respectively, 95% and 66% share
of the overall variance within the bins. We find workers of almost all ages (20-60 in our
sample) in every bin. A high-type worker is not necessarily old and low-type workers are
not simply young workers without experience. For our six education categories, the same
is true, albeit to a lesser extent. Plots showing the distribution of age and education
across worker bins are shown in Appendix A.2, Figure A2.1.
2.4.3 Ranking Firms
As reasoned before, we seek to rank heterogeneous firms independently of wages. This
approach sets a counterpoint to both CHK-AKM and HLM, who use wage data and
worker mobility to capture firm heterogeneity. The downside of our approach is that the
measures we use to rank firms are by construction firm-specific and not match-specific
(like wages). Ideally, the researcher would like to directly observe the firms’ share of
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Table 2.3: Properties of Worker Bins
lnwit ln w̃it age education
Overall Variance 0.182 0.163 96.927 1.910
Between bins 0.119 (65%) 0.107 (65%) 4.725 (5%) 0.666 (35%)
Within bins 0.064 (35%) 0.057 (35%) 92.202 (95%) 1.244 (65%)
Note: The table decomposes the overall variance of log wages (lnwit), residual wages (ln w̃it), age, and
education in our sample into the respective shares explained within and between the worker bins. The
age of individual workers in our sample ranges from 20 to 60. There are 6 education categories: 1 = “no
degree”, 2 = “vocational training”, 3 = “high school”, 4 = “high school and vocational training”, 5 =
“technical college”, 6 = “university”.
rents obtained from matches with each individual worker.97 In the absence of these data,
we have to be content with the argument that match-specific influences are most likely
largely integrated out of firm-level statistics, particularly in large firms.
We interpret firm heterogeneity in terms of efficiency. Conceptually, this idea builds
upon stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).98 An individual firm’s distance to the production
frontier is a natural measure of relative performance. Given its inputs, capital and labor,
the most productive firm in the economy is located on the frontier. Less efficient firms
generate less output relative to their inputs. They have a positive distance to the frontier
in output space. In this setting, each individual firm’s distance to the production frontier
is inversely related to the firm-fixed effect, which is equivalent (in absolute terms) to the
technical efficiency residual in SFA terminology. A firm on the frontier has a distance of
zero and thus the highest estimated fixed effect.
To rank firms indexed by k based on the distance to the production frontier, we
estimate a rich empirical model of firm performance with a large number of controls from
the IAB Establishment Panel. We use a flexible translog specification with firm and
time effects. Log value added is our measure of output, ln vkt. x′kt contains time-varying
explanatory variables. In the translog setting, these include capital, labor, capital and
labor squared as well as their interaction.99 z′kt includes dummies for 32 sectors of the
97This would be equivalent to directly observing match-specific output. In this hypothetical case, it
would not be necessary to make a structural assumption on bargaining (like HLM do) to identify the
value of a firm’s vacancy and rank firms according to it.
98SFA has been developed in the context of cross-sectional data, see Aigner et al. (1977). It was then
extended to the panel data context by, among others, Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Cornwell et al.
(1990).
99We approximate the capital stock using a perpetual inventory method, see Section 2.2.3. The labor
input is measured by the size of the workforce.
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Table 2.4: Properties of Firm Ranking
ln v̄k ln v̄kN̄k φ̂k ln N̄k π̄k
Correlation with ŷ(k) 0.47 0.75 0.94 0.17 0.60
Note: The table shows correlations of our firm ranking (ŷ(k)) with other
statistics that could be used to rank firms: log mean value added (v̄k), log
mean value added per worker (ln v̄k/N̄k), and estimated firm-fixed effects (ex-
tracted from running regression 2.5, φ̂k), the log of the average size of a firm’s
workforce, N̄k, as well as average profits per worker, π̂k.
economy which we include as additional controls.100 Time effects are captured by ωt, φk
is the firm-fixed effect, and rkt is the residual.
ln vkt = φk + ωt + x′ktβ + z′ktγ + rkt. (2.5)
After running this regression, we rank firms based on their estimated fixed effect, φ̂k.
This is our estimate of each individual firm’s type. We group the firms into 30 bins of
equal size, denoting the estimated rank of all firms within one group ŷ(k).
Table 2.4 shows the correlations of our firm ranking with other firm-level statistics:
log value added, log value added per worker, the log of the firms’ workforce size, and
profits per worker (all in firm-level means), as well as the estimated firm-fixed effect.
It is not surprising that the production frontier based ranking is highly correlated with
the estimated firm-fixed effects due to the close link between the two. The moderately
high correlations with log value added and log value added per worker, however, are
not mechanic and show that the various controls included in the regression lead to a
very different firm ranking as compared to, for instance, ranking on value added alone.
Moreover, controlling for the size of the workforce, its square and the interaction with
the capital stock in the translog setting leads to a low but positive correlation with the
log of the mean workforce size, N̄k. The correlation of the production frontier based
ranking with our measure of profits per worker (discussed below) is of the same order of
magnitude as the ranking’s correlation with value added and value added per worker.
100We use the WZ93/WZ03 classification of industries available in the IAB Establishment Panel. The
WZ classification of the German Federal Statistical Office is compatible to the common international
classifications of industries, NACE and ISIC.
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Table 2.5: Properties of Firm Bins
π̄k ln v̄k ln v̄kN̄k Sector
Overall Variance 4.734E+09 3.584 0.733 66.825
Between bins 2.715E+09 (57%) 1.084 (30%) 0.475 (65%) 6.321 (9%)
Within bins 2.019E+09 (43%) 2.500 (70%) 0.258 (35%) 60.504 (91%)
Note: The table decomposes the overall variance of profits (π̄k), log value added (ln v̄k), log value added per
worker (ln v̄k/N̄k), and of the sectors the firms operate in into the respective shares explained within and between
the firm bins in our sample. We use the WZ93/WZ03 classification of industries available in the IAB Establish-
ment Panel, which is compatible to the common international classifications of industries, NACE and ISIC. We
use 32 industries, roughly classified as follows: 1-2 = “Agriculture & Mining”, 3-18 = “Manufacturing”, 19-20
= “Construction”, 21-23 = “Retail Trade”, 24-32 = “Service Sector”.
As we did with the binned worker ranking, we decompose the variance of some key
firm variables in our data into the shares explained between and within our firm bins to
show in which dimension the bins are internally homogeneous and in which they are not.
Table 2.5 shows the decomposition. The bins are internally homogeneous in terms of
average profits per worker and log value added per worker with the majority of variance
between the bins. This is not true for log value added alone, underlining the importance
of controlling for size effects in the ranking exercise. Moreover, the variable indicating
in which sector a firm operates has a very high share of within variance. Thus, the
sector, which we also control for in the production function estimation, is not a strong
determinant of a firm’s position in the final ranking. In every bin, we find firms from
almost all sectors. Additionally, we show in Figure A2.2 the plotted distributions of firm
size, the sector variable, as well as collective bargaining and employee representation
dummies. There is no clear relation of our firm bins to collective bargaining schemes or
employee representation, the dispersion of these attributes within the firm bins is huge.
The results we present do not hinge on a specific way of ranking firms. To illustrate
this, we use an alternative measure of firm performance, the average profit per worker,
and check the robustness of our findings. The average profit per worker is a simple and
transparent statistic to rank firms. We build on Bartolucci et al. (2015), who use very
detailed firm data (balance sheets) to study labor market sorting in the Italian region
of Veneto.101 Their main argument in favor of profits is that all firms share a similar
objective: maximizing profits. In addition, as argued before, firms tend to be matched
101They test a variety of potential measures of firm performance based on the firms’ balance sheets
and find that economic profits per worker are well suited to rank firms.
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to a large number of workers and match-specific noise should thus be integrated out
of firm-level profits.102 On the other hand, in the context of the model presented in
Section 2.3, average profits are not necessarily increasing in the unobserved type of the
firm. Similar to the argument presented for the non-monotonicity of workers’ wages,
profits could be non-monotonically related to the unobserved firm type. This would
invalidate a firm ranking based on profit data. Since the production frontier ranking is
unaffected by this theoretical obstacle, we chose it to generate our baseline results.103 The
correlation between the profit-based ranking and the production frontier ranking is very
high, 0.79, indicating that both rankings do an almost similarly good job in summarizing
firm heterogeneity. Hence, all our main conclusions are unaffected by the ranking choice.
The next Section presents our baseline results, the robustness check using the profit
ranking is relegated to Appendix A.3.
2.5 Labor Market Sorting in Germany
Having ranked both workers and firms, we are now in a position to construct and analyze
the empirical bivariate density of matches across all possible combinations of worker and
firm types. We use 100 worker and 30 firm bins based on the types estimated in the
preceding section. To compute the density of matches, we use our definition of a match
described in Section 2.2.4. A match is always the first new person-year observation of an
employment spell between a worker and an establishment in our data, so we count every
individual worker-establishment combination only once to be as conservative as possible
when estimating rank correlations. This also excludes recall. Our match definition is
well-suited for the analysis because our primary interest is the allocation of workers to
jobs. The abstraction from the spell length ensures that certain match types are not
over-represented (under-represented) in the distribution of matches simply because they
last longer (shorter) on average, leading to more (less) person-firm-year observations.
Figure 2.2 plots the bivariate density of matches to illustrate the sorting patterns in our
102Conversely, workers are typically matched only to a small number of employers throughout their
career, creating noisy wage histories.
103An earlier version of this research used the profit-based ranking as baseline and checked robust-
ness with the production frontier ranking. We exchanged the two rankings solely for the purpose of
methodological cleanness, none of our main results changed.
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Figure 2.2: Empirical Bivariate Match Density in Germany (1998-2008, ρ = 0.24)
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Note: Two-dimensional kernel density estimation with an axis-aligned bivariate normal kernel, evaluated on a grid with
dimensions 100× 30 (#worker types × #firm types).
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data. There is a distinct tendency of low-type workers to be matched with low-type firms
as indicated by the two spikes in the lower-left corner of the plot. Most of the matches
in our data are located in the upper half of the plot, representing matches with firms in
the upper half of the firm ranking. Dispersion is higher in this part of the distribution,
many low-type workers are employed by medium and high firm types. The maximum
match density, however, is observed for matches between the highest worker and firm
types. Correlating our binned worker and firm rankings for the full sample, we find that
the rank correlation coefficient (Spearman’s ρ) is significantly positive with a value of
0.24. This indicates that the matching process in the German labor market features
positive sorting of workers to jobs, albeit not to a very high degree. Sorting is more
pronounced for matches out of unemployment with a rank correlation of 0.26. In the
sample of job-to-job switchers, the rank correlation is 0.20. The degree of sorting we find
for all matches is somewhat higher than the values reported by CHK for the first half of
our sample. CHK report a correlation of the estimated person and establishment effects
of 0.17 for the years 1996-2002. We find a rank correlation of 0.21 for 1998-2002. For
the second half of our sample, the correlation found by CHK is 0.25 (2002-2009); ours
is virtually similar at 0.25 (2003-2008).104 HLM do not report rank correlations for sub
samples, only an overall correlation of 0.76 (1993-2007).
Figure 2.3 presents a direct comparison of the theoretical model and the empirical
density of matches. Panel (a) shows the theoretically optimal allocation along the 45-
degree diagonal and the matching sets around it; Panel (b) is a contour plot of our
bivariate match density in Figure 2.2. Recall that theory predicts that no matches are
formed by type combinations outside the matching sets, that is, no matches of high-type
firms and low-type workers or vice versa. Empirically, we clearly see in Panel (b) that
a large number of matches is located in the vicinity of the diagonal, in line with theory.
This explains why we find a positive rank correlation. If one would connect the points
with the highest match density for every worker bin, however, the result would not be
a straight line from the lower-left to the upper-right corner. Rather, we would get a
concave curve above the diagonal, suggesting that the empirical allocation of workers to
104See Table III in Card et al. (2013), “correlation of person/establ. Effects”, p. 994. Note that CHK
compute the correlation for all person-firm-year observations in their sample, not just for new matches.
All rank correlations reported here are rounded to two decimal points.
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Figure 2.3: Sorting: Theory and Empirical Evidence
(a) Sorting in Theory (b) Contour Plot of Empirical Match Density
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Note: In both Panels, worker and firm types are normalized into the unit interval to facilitate comparison. Panel (a)
depicts the equilibrium of a simple Shimer and Smith (2000) economy. The model is a simplified version of the structural
search model presented in Hagedorn et al. (2017). It is solved numerically using standard parameter values. For the
derivation and solution procedure see Chapter 1. Panel (b) shows a contour plot of the empirical match density depicted
in Figure 2.2.
jobs is different from the optimal allocation in the simple model. The density of matches
in the lower-right corner is very low, indicating that high-skilled workers almost never
work at low-productivity firms, in line with the theoretical matching sets. The prediction
regarding the opposite corner, however, is not met by the data. The density is stretched
out towards the upper-left corner, indicating that matches between low-type workers and
high-type firms are common. The symmetry of the simple theoretical plot is thus rejected
by the data, along with the diagonal optimal allocation.105
2.5.1 Sorting over Time
Interestingly, the depicted sorting patterns in Germany changed considerably over time.
We show this in Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 2.4. Splitting our sample into two distinct
time periods reveals that sorting between high-type workers and high-type firms was very
pronounced in the first half of our sample (Panel (a), 1998-2002).106 In the second half
105In the model, symmetry hinges on the assumption of equal bargaining powers of workers and
firms. By relaxing this assumption, it is easily possible to align the theoretical model with the apparent
asymmetry of matching patterns in the data. HLM show how the bargaining power can be measured in
the data.
106The time periods are 1998-2002 and 2003-2008. We interpret our worker and firm ranks as time-
constant and do not rerun the ranking procedures on the subsamples. We simply condition on the year
when computing the match density.
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Figure 2.4: Empirical Bivariate Match Density by Sub-Period
(a) 1998 - 2002 (ρ = 0.21)
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(b) 2003 - 2008 (ρ = 0.25)
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Note: Two-dimensional kernel density estimation with an axis-aligned bivariate normal kernel, evaluated on a grid with
dimensions 100× 30 (#worker types × #firm types). Ranks of workers and firms are time invariant, the plots are simply
conditioned on the year of the match.
(Panel (b), 2003-2008), the allocation in the upper half of the plot became much more
dispersed, the spike disappeared. The opposite is true at the bottom of the distribu-
tion. There was almost no match density for low-type workers and low-type firms before
2003107, but in the second sub period we observe a huge increase of new matches between
low worker and firm types. These contrary trends in the lower and upper half of the
match density indicate that the overall increase of the rank correlation from 0.21 to 0.25
across the two time periods is the combined effect of two opposed developments: sorting
strongly increased for low-type workers, their allocation moved closer to the theoretically
predicted optimal allocation on the diagonal, increasing the overall rank correlation. The
allocation of high-type workers, however, became more dispersed and moved away from
the diagonal, reducing the overall rank correlation. Note that our sample split corre-
sponds to the announcement and implementation of a big labor market reform program
in Germany, the Hartz reforms.108 Simply conditioning the match density on years sug-
gests that the reforms potentially had a large effect on the allocation of workers to jobs
in the labor market. We will investigate this hypothesis in more detail later
107The small hump is not present in the conditional densities before the year 2000.
108The so-called Hartz reforms consist of four “Acts for Modern Services on the Labor Market”
(‘Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt’), which came into effect on January 1, 2003
(Hartz I and II), on January 1, 2004 (Hartz III), and on January 1, 2005 (Hartz IV). Hartz reforms I –
III were mainly concerned with active labor market policies (ALMPs). Hartz IV significantly reformed
the unemployment benefit system.
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Figure 2.5: Rank Correlations by Match Type over Time (1998-2008)
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Figure 2.5 shows a different decomposition of sorting patterns over time. The blue
line plots rank correlation coefficients for all matches. We then differentiate between the
two types of matches: new matches of workers out of unemployment and matches from
workers who switch jobs, meaning they changed their employer without an intervening
unemployment spell. About 41% of the matches in our sample are formed out of unem-
ployment, the remaining 59% are matches of job switchers. This relation is stable over
time. Overall, the extent of positive sorting in the German labor market increased during
our period of observation. For all matches, the rank correlation rose from 0.20 in 1998 to
0.26 in 2008 (blue line). We see no uniform trend and considerable year-to-year variation
of the correlation coefficient. Specifically, the correlation fell by about 24% from 2000 to
2001. This might be related to the recession in the early 2000s, which is suggestive of a
cyclical component in sorting patterns. Conditioning the rank correlation on the different
match types sheds some more light on the time variation. For matches out of unemploy-
ment, a surprisingly clear trend emerges (red line): the rank correlation increased almost
uniformly from 0.17 in 1998 to 0.31 in 2008. In turn, most of the year-to-year variation
we observe for the overall rank correlation appears to be driven by job-to-job switchers.
The green line exhibits considerable fluctuation and there is no clear time trend for this
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group of matches. The observed degree of sorting for new matches resulting from search
on the job did not change significantly during our period of observation. If anything, it
has slightly decreased from a correlation of 0.20 in 1998 to 0.19 in 2008.109
Our analysis of the changing rank correlation over time suggests that the relative im-
portance of the two match types for the overall degree sorting has reversed. Specifically,
in the beginning of our sample, the rank correlation was slightly higher for job-to-job
switchers, but starting in 2001, the rank correlation for new matches out of unemploy-
ment dominates. This is remarkable since theoretical models of on the job search typically
suggest that sorting patterns should be more pronounced for new matches resulting from
search on the job.110 Recall that we use only wage information from employment spells
formed out of unemployment to rank workers using the HLM procedure. This implies
that we cannot rank workers who switch jobs throughout our sample but are never ob-
served as being unemployed. We therefore suspect that the observed rank correlation
for job-to-job switchers might be somewhat depressed in our results. This is, however,
inconsequential for the remaining analysis because we largely focus on low-type workers
and match formation out of unemployment.
2.5.2 Sorting by Education
To better understand empirical sorting patterns, it is also instructive to condition on
education. For the U.S., Lise et al. (2016) similarly find that matches are not uniformly
distributed across the type space. By splitting their sample into college graduates and
workers with a high school degree or less, they show that sorting patterns are very
pronounced for highly educated workers but less so for the low education group. For
these workers, their results are only suggestive of a mild production complementarity,
which cannot be distinguished from linearity. The German picture looks different. Panel
(c) of Figure 2.6 shows, consistent with the findings for the U.S., a high concentration of
109A table with all rank correlations and numbers of observations by year and match type can be found
in Table A2.3 in Appendix A.2.
110In a sequential bargaining model à la Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Cahuc et al. (2006), workers
gradually move toward their optimal employer (in terms of wages) and observed sorting is expected to
increase. Unemployed workers, however, have an incentive to accept all job offers as long as the option
value of the job lies above their reservation value, including unemployment benefits. The observation of a
lower degree of sorting from search on the job as compared to sorting out of unemployment is somewhat
puzzling from a theoretical perspective.
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Figure 2.6: Sorting by Education
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Note: Two-dimensional kernel density estimation with an axis-aligned bivariate normal kernel, evaluated on a grid with
dimensions 100× 30 (#worker types × #firm types). Panel (a) contains workers in category 1 of our education variable
(no degree), Panel (b) contains workers in categories 2, 3, and 4 (vocational training only, high school only, high school
and vocational training), Panel (c) contains workers in categories 5 and 6 (technical college, university).
workers with tertiary degrees at the highest firm types. These are the workers at the top
of our ranking and they are strongly sorted. The allocation of workers with secondary
degrees in Panel (b) is much more dispersed. We find these workers in all bins besides
the highest ones. They contribute to most of the match density in the upper half of
the firm ranking. However, we also observe a spike for matches of the lowest worker
types in this education category with low-type firms, consistent with our finding that
sorting of low-type workers into low-type firms is very pronounced in Germany. Panel
(a) underlines this picture. We find workers with no educational degree exclusively in the
bottom half of our worker ranking and they are concentrated in matches with low-type
firms to a high degree. In contrast to what Lise et al. (2016) find for the U.S., the sorting
of low-type workers is very pronounced in Germany and it has increased over time (recall
Figure 2.4).
2.5.3 Distributional Dynamics
We have established that labor market sorting in Germany has increased between 1998
and 2008 in terms of aggregate rank correlations. This increase is primarily associated
with a higher sorting propensity out of unemployment, while the degree of sorting of
matches resulting from job switches is roughly constant over time in our data. To under-
stand which worker-firm combinations contributed to the respective trends, we track the
changing univariate distributions of worker types across firms over time, both for matches
out of unemployment and for job-to-job switches. This allows us to show precisely for
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which worker types the distribution across firms shifted towards the theoretically pre-
dicted optimal allocation, where it shifted away from it, and where no significant change
occurred. Figuratively, we slice through the empirical bivariate density of matches de-
picted in Figure 2.2 and compare the “density slices” for different time intervals to see
where the distribution across firms changed and where it remained constant. Figure 2.7
shows the estimated univariate density functions for the worker bins 1, 10, 50, 90, and
100.111 We compare the first half of our sample, 1998-2002 (red line), to the second half,
2003-2008 (black line). Notably, the distribution changed significantly primarily for low-
type workers, see bin 1 in Panel 2.7a. For workers of medium and high-types, the density
functions largely lie on top of each other and cannot be distinguished statistically.
For the lowest type of workers in bin 1, we observe an increase of the density of matches
with firms of the lowest types. The density of matches with firms below, roughly, bin 8
has increased, significantly so below bin 6.112 At the same time, the density of matches
with firms in bins 12 to 22 has decreased significantly. Apparently, the distribution
of workers in bin 1 across firms shifts to the left during our period of observation, see
Panel 2.7a. Low-type workers become more concentrated in low-type firms, leading to
increased sorting because workers of the lowest type moved towards their theoretically
predicted optimal allocation. Having in mind the bivariate density in Figure 2.2, the
spike of the bivariate density in the lower-left corner moved closer to the 45-degree line
and became more pronounced. Distinguishing between matches out of unemployment
and job-to-job switches reveals that the described shift is significant only for matches
formed after an unemployment spell of the worker. This is in line with our observation
that the aggregate rank correlation increased strongly for matches out of unemployment,
recall Figure 2.5. Due to space constraints, we cannot plot estimated densities for all 100
worker bins. A significant distributional shift is present for all workers up to bin 8. The
shifts are consistently more pronounced for matches out of unemployment than for job-
to-job switches. In worker bin 10, we start observing distributions which do not change
111Histograms of the raw match data can be found in Appendix A.2, Figure A2.3.
112We deliberately choose to be conservative by determining statistical significance based on the overlap
of confidence intervals. It is always true that with non-overlapping confidence intervals two statistics are
significantly different. The converse, however, does not necessarily hold. As long as the difference of two
statistics is significantly different from zero, a possible overlap of the confidence intervals does not imply
insignificance.
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Figure 2.7: Estimated Density Functions: 1998-2002 (red) vs. 2003-2008 (black)
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Note: Estimated univariate kernel densities of matches conditional on worker bins, time, and match type. The kernel is
estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel function. The bandwidth is calculated by Silverman’s rule of thumb. Pointwise
confidence intervals are calculated using a quantile of the standard normal distribution.
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significantly over time, see Panels 2.7d through 2.7i. Bin 10 workers are distributed
almost uniformly across firms. As we move up the worker ranking, the estimated density
becomes more concentrated at the top of the firm ranking. We observe a small but
significant decrease of the match density at high-type firms starting around worker bin
90, which is mainly driven by job-to-job switches, consistent with the slightly shrinking
rank correlation that we observe for this match type. For the highest worker type in bin
100, this distributional shift is still visible but only marginally significant. Overall, the
distribution of high-type workers shifts away from high-type firms. Dispersion increases,
in line with the development depicted for the whole type space in Figure 2.4, and sorting
becomes less pronounced. The mode of the distribution of high-type workers, however,
is well above firm bin 25 in both halves of our sample. This is already true in bin 50, see
Panels 2.7g through 2.7o.
We use estimated kernel density functions in Figure 2.7 to analyze the changing
distributions of workers across firms with confidence intervals. Our findings do not hinge
on the density estimation procedure, they are present in raw data as well. To show this
in the context of our two sub periods, 1998-2002 and 2003-2008, we plot the difference of
the two empirical densities conditional on worker bin, time interval, and match type in
Figure A2.4. In case of a positive (negative) difference for a certain firm bin, the empirical
density of matches has shifted upwards (downwards) for this worker-firm combination.
The density differences confirm the observed distributional shifts towards more sorting at
the bottom of the worker ranking, small changes in the middle, and slightly less sorting
at the top.
2.5.4 (Non-)Monotonicity of Wages in Firm Types
Wages are the main determinant of how workers select themselves into jobs.113 Hence,
they are the key to understanding the distributional shifts and the increase of labor market
sorting we observe in Germany. Our analysis is motivated by the theoretical prediction
113Sorkin (2015) uses revealed preference information contained in worker mobility patterns to con-
struct a firm ranking and divide wage dispersion into the respective contributions of rents (or wages)
and compensating differentials. Sorkin finds that compensating differentials explain up to 15% of the
wage variance in the U.S. While this is a novel and interesting finding, the rents/wage-based expla-
nation of worker selection into jobs that we and the papers we build upon focus on clearly dominates
quantitatively.
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Figure 2.8: Mean Wages for all Worker-Firm Type Combinations (1998-2008)
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Note: The Figure shows the mean of the log real daily wage for all combinations of worker and firm types on a grid with
dimensions 100× 30 (#worker types × #firm types).
of non-monotonic wage patterns of worker types across firm types. With sorting, wages
are maximized in the type-specific optimal allocation, arguably due to a production
complementarity. Apart from this point, wages fall in both directions, what is at odds
with the monotonicity assumption of the AKM model. Moving to a better firm does
not necessarily lead to a higher wage because the worker needs to compensate the firm
for not waiting for a better match. Our semi-structural identification method does not
restrict the interaction of worker and firm heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we estimate rank
correlations of the same order of magnitude (around 0.24) as the benchmark estimates
provided by CHK, using the more restrictive AKM method. Figure 2.8 illustrates why
this is the case. Simply plotting the mean of observed log wages for all combinations of
worker and firm types according to our rankings reveals that linearity in logs, overall, is
not a bad assumption to empirically analyze wage dispersion. The pattern of wages across
the type space is not very different from a simple linear plane. This explains why the
AKM framework produces a good fit. It does a good job in decomposing wage dispersion
in the respective contributions of worker and firm heterogeneity, especially when the
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researcher has access to a data set as big and detailed as the universe of German social
security records used by CHK.114 Consistent with CHK, we find that worker heterogeneity
is the dominant source of wage dispersion. Wages increase strongly in the direction of the
worker type in Figure 2.8. In the firm dimension, however, they hardly visibly increase.
It almost appears as if, given the worker type, it does not matter much for the wage at
what type of firm a worker is employed. As we will show in the following, this conclusion,
which would call the importance of labor market sorting into question, is premature.
We find that the large overall wage dispersion in a joint analysis of all workers and
firms masks non-monotonic wage patterns for specific worker types, particularly at the
bottom of the ranking. This is consistent with the fact that deviations from monotonicity
are most pronounced for worker types with large residuals in an estimated AKM model.
CHK themselves state that those residuals might indicate systematic departures from the
monotonicity assumption and demand an in-depth analysis.115 We attempt to provide
such an analysis in the remainder of this Chapter.
Figure 2.9 plots wage patterns across firms for single worker types. The observed
higher tendency of low-type workers to sort into low-type firms indeed appears to be
associated with a non-monotonic wage pattern across firms, in line with theoretical sorting
models. The mean log wage of our lowest worker type (worker bin 1) increases at first,
reaches its maximum in matches with firms around bin 10 and decreases thereafter in the
type of the firm. This wage pattern suggests selection of low-type workers into low-type
firms, simply because these are the wage-maximizing matches for them. This explains
the increase of sorting at the bottom of the bivariate match distribution. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to provide direct empirical evidence for a negative relation
between a worker’s wages and a performance measure of the firms he is matched with.
Note, however, that this negative relation is visible in our data only for the lowest worker
types. Consistent with the good overall fit of the AKM model, we find that wages are
monotonically increasing in the firm type for the majority of workers in our sample. In
114Recall that it is imperative for applying the AKM model to observe all workers at every establish-
ment in order to consistently estimate firm-fixed effects. Most samples of matched employer-employee
data do not meet this requirement and suffer from the limited mobility bias emphasized by Andrews
et al. (2008, 2012). Our semi-structural method is well-suited also for smaller samples because it is not
necessary to jointly estimate worker and firm-fixed effects.
115A plot of the residuals and the related discussion can be found on p. 996 in CHK.
83
Sorting in Germany
Figure 2.9: Mean Wages across Worker Types
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Note: Wages are means of real log cell-wages for the given worker bins. Line plots are the result of a locally weighted
regression with running-line least squares smoothing and a tri-cube weighting function.
bin 25, on can observe a small non-monotonicity at the top where wages level off and
slightly decrease at the highest firm types. For medium-type workers in bin 50, wages are
monotonically increasing everywhere. For high-type workers, the fixed effect model and
the theoretical sorting model are observationally equivalent. Both frameworks predict
the highest wages in matches with high-type firms. For workers in bins 75 and 100,
monotonicity is only partly met. For the upper two thirds of firm types, wages increase
as expected. In the bottom third, where high worker types are matched with firms of
low types, we see stark deviations from monotonicity. Wages decrease at first, reach a
minimum around firm bin 12 and increase only thereafter. One possible explanation for
this pattern is that these workers are managers or executives at these low-type firms.
Their wages might be determined in a way very different from the simple wage equations
in CHK-AKM and HLM. For instance, managers could be able to extract rents from the
firm in form of higher pay, even (or especially) at badly performing firms.116 The analysis
116Indeed, rent extraction by managers might be a cause of bad firm performance. We see identifying
different compensation schemes for different worker types within the firm as a fascinating avenue for
further research, related to recent advances in our understanding of CEO compensation, see Gabaix and
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of mean wages per worker bin across firm types confirms that the AKM assumption of
monotonically increasing wages is met for a large part of our data, as we already suspected
from Figure 2.8. For low-type workers, it is clearly violated. Match-specific effects appear
to be a more important determinant of wages for low-type workers as compared to the
majority of higher-ranked workers. In Section 2.5.6, we conjecture that increased sorting
at the bottom and the non-monotonicity of wages are related to the tendency of firms to
increasingly outsource workers in certain occupations.
Our results are in line with CHK in the sense that deviations from the two-way fixed
effect model are small on average. We have shown, however, that deviations are large and
systematic for low-type workers. Depending on the question at hand, the AKM model
can do a good job in explaining the link between unobservable characteristics of medium
and high-type workers, firms, and the wages paid. However, the model leads to wrong
conclusions regarding low-type workers because the non-monotonicity of their wages is
at odds with AKM. From a policy perspective, it appears crucial to take the negative
relation between low-type workers’ wages and the type of firm they are matched with
into account, for instance to optimally design unemployment insurance.
2.5.5 Wage Inequality
Overall, wage dispersion in Germany has strongly increased during our period of observa-
tion. This is well-know, e.g. from Dustmann et al. (2009). CHK report that the variance
of log real wages has increased from about 0.2 in 1995 to 0.34 in 2009.117 This is an
increase of 70%. The ranking tools we use allow us to analyze how wages change for
single worker types and how these changes contribute to the overall trend of increasing
wage dispersion. To this end, we plot the difference of the log wage variances over two
time periods for the same worker bins as before (see Figure 2.10). We observe negative
differences of log wage variances for low worker types (here bin 1) and firms in the bottom
two thirds of the firm ranking. These negative differences indicate that the wage vari-
Landier (2008). Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish normal workers from managers and executives
in German data. We find, however, that dropping a fraction of workers at the very top of the wage
distribution within every firm reduces the prevalence of higher wages of high-type workers at low-type
firms as compared to medium-type firms.
117These variances include imputed wages beyond the censoring threshold. For more information about
the imputation procedure and wage variances, see our Section 2.2 and Table I on p. 975 in CHK.
85
Sorting in Germany
Figure 2.10: Differences of the Variance of Log Wages over Time and across Worker
Types
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Note: Variances are calculated from log real daily wages of 30x100 bin-cells. The Figure shows differences between the
variance in 2003-2008 and the variance in 1998-2002 for certain worker bins. Line plots are the result of a locally
weighted regression with running-line least squares smoothing and a tri-cube weighting function.
ance within these worker bins has decreased over time. This effect is most pronounced for
workers in bin 1 who are employed at firms of type 1. For low-type workers, the variance
has decreased stronger in the parts of the firm ranking most affected by the documented
distributional shifts. In other words, increased sorting of low-type workers decreased the
wage dispersion in these worker bins and, hence, compressed the wage distribution at the
bottom. For worker bins 25, 50, and 75, the wage variance increased most for matches
with low-type firms, particularly so for workers in bin 50. At the top of the firm ranking,
wage dispersion did not change much or decreased even slightly. The wage distribution
in bin 100 has become more unequal across all firm types. The lowest variance differences
are found with firm types between bins 20 and 25, indicating that the slight downward
shift of the match density we documented for these worker-firm combinations might have
somewhat dampened wage growth (recall Figure 2.7m).
Since the observed changes of sorting and the related wage patterns have led to a
reduction of within-bin wage inequality for low-type workers and an increase of within-
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Figure 2.11: Wage Dynamics
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Note: The Figure shows deviations of mean log real daily wages for single and grouped worker bins relative to 1998
(multiplied by 100).
bin wage inequality for high-type workers, it is worth asking the question how these
developments relate to the overall increase of wage dispersion in Germany. Therefore, in
Figure 2.11 we plot how the mean wages for our worker bins evolved over time. Panel
(a) confirms, in line with CHK and Dustmann et al. (2009), that overall wage inequality
in Germany has increased over time during our period of observation. For the highest
worker types in bins 81-100, real log daily wages grew by more than 20%. For medium
worker types in bins 21-80, wages increased by around 10% to 15%. On the other hand,
real log daily wages for the 20 lowest worker bins decreased by about 6% relative to 1998.
Dustmann et al. (2014) point out that a large part of the recent favorable development
of the German labor market118, can be traced back to decreasing real wages at the lower
end of the wage distribution. They argue that this wage moderation was largely a result
of a decentralization of the wage-setting process.119 Zooming into the lowest worker
bins as depicted in Panel (b) of Figure 2.11 reveals a novel fact relative to Dustmann
et al. (2014). Using our rankings, we observe that wages for low-type workers have not
been uniformly decreasing over time. In fact, the wages of workers in bin 1 increased
118The German aggregate unemployment rate decreased from 11.7% in July 2005 to 6% in July 2016
according to data from the Federal Statistical Office.
119Traditionally, wages in Germany are set by employer associations, trade unions, and works councils,
typically at the industry level. The share of workers covered by this kind of industry-wide agreement
decreased sharply because firms started opting-out increasingly from the mid 1990s, primarily to make
the wage setting process more flexible.
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by about 10%. The wages of workers in the other bins depicted here (3, 5, 7, 9) largely
evolved between -5% and 5% without a clear time trend.120 Hence, not all low worker
types contributed to increasing wage dispersion in Germany. The decentralization of
the wage-setting process emphasized by Dustmann et al. (2014) supposedly affected low-
type workers in the manufacturing sector in particular because collective bargaining is
traditionally strong in this sector. This wage moderation, or negative real wage growth,
quantitatively dominates in worker bins 1-20. Low-type workers in, for example, the
service sector might have very different wage dynamics. In line with our finding of non-
monotonic wage patterns for workers of the lowest type and their increased propensity
to sort into their wage-maximizing jobs at the bottom of the firm ranking, workers in
bins 10 and below exhibit wage dynamics which are not in line with the wage moderation
hypothesis, see Panel (b). However, the increased sorting of low-type workers into their
wage-maximizing jobs, which is in line with wage growth for low-type workers and their
reduced within-bin wage dispersion, was apparently not strong enough to revert the
overall trend of increasing wage dispersion in Germany.
2.5.6 Sorting and Domestic Outsourcing
Finally, we present an explanation for the increased sorting of low-type workers into low-
type firms and their non-monotonic wage patterns. We observe that a large share of the
new matches of low-type workers and low-type firms is concentrated in a specific sector of
the economy, the so-called business service firms. These firms are at the center of a trend
towards domestic labor service outsourcing in Germany.121 They provide services that
many firms traditionally organized internally, for instance cleaning, logistics, security, and
food services. Temporary work agencies are another type of business service firms. They
allow firms to hire workers for tasks directly related to production, for instance assembly
line workers in manufacturing, without directly employing them. By outsourcing workers,
firms can exclude them from high wage premia within the firm and reduce their overall
120We selected bins 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 for visibility reasons only. The same plot for bins 2, 4, 6, 8, and
10 can be found in Figure A2.5 with the patterns of wage growth being very similar.
121Outsourcing is commonly understood as the process of relocating tasks beyond the boundary of
the firm. The term domestic implies that this happens within a country rather than internationally
(offshoring).
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wage bill. This point is made by Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015), who provide a
thorough analysis of domestic outsourcing in Germany using an AKM model and the
universe of social security records. They show that the wages of displaced workers drop
by around 10 log points due to foregone wage premia.122 Note that in an AKM model,
the establishment-fixed effect is the only channel capable of explaining a wage change
when a worker switches employers. The estimated worker-fixed effect does not change
by definition and the additive separability assumption excludes additional interactions of
unobserved heterogeneity.
We re-evaluate the interplay between domestic outsourcing and observed wages using
our more flexible worker and firm rankings. This makes a difference as compared to an
AKM model because our framework allows a worker’s wage to increase when he switches
jobs to a firm with a lower rank. A positive match-specific component of the wage may
outweigh a negative change of the firm component and lead to an overall increase. As
we demonstrated in Section 2.5.4, these patterns can be observed empirically. Wages
do indeed rise on average when low-type workers move down the firm ranking. We find
that this wage pattern and the increased sorting of low-type workers are primarily driven
by business service firms. In other words, displaced workers do not necessarily suffer
a wage loss and the reason lies in possible production complementarities as highlighted
by sorting theory. For example, imagine a manufacturing plant with a small number of
directly employed cleaning personnel. Since cleaning is not at the core of its business, the
establishment does not have an incentive to invest in increasing the productivity of these
workers. Once the cleaners are displaced, they might be employed at a highly specialized
cleaning service provider. This business service firm has a large incentive to invest into
the productivity of these workers because it directly affects its output. This is an example
of a complementarity between the worker and the firm type, which determines wages in
theoretical sorting models.
To show that domestic outsourcing is a quantitatively important phenomenon, we first
introduce a distinction between four broad sectors in the economy: business service firms,
manufacturing, consumer services, and other services. Business service firms are at the
122By identifying on-site outsourcing events, where the worker and the location of the job stay the
same but the employer changes, Goldschmidt and Schmieder (2015) can analyze the causal effect of
outsourcing on wages. These are, however, only a small share of all outsourcing events.
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heart of the outsourcing hypothesis and include temporary work agencies, security ser-
vices providers, cleaning companies, and other supplementary services specifically offered
to firms. Manufacturing comprises all companies engaged in the industrial production
of goods. Consumer services include trading firms and the retail sector. Insurance com-
panies, leasing providers, and other firms supplying more complex services to firms are
included in the other services category.123 For simplicity, we condense our rankings and
group all worker bins into four and all firm bins into three broad groups.
In our full sample, more than 20% of all new matches in the lowest 10 firm bins
involve a business service firm. Most of these firms in our sample are temporary work
agencies. The majority of them has been founded after 1998, so these are young firms. For
medium and high firm bins, the percentages of new matches with business service firms
are much smaller, only 4.6% (firm bins 11-20) and 2.5% (firm bins 21-30), respectively.
Additionally conditioning on the worker type, leads to a share of new matches with
business service firms in excess of 36% for worker bins 1-25. Hence, more than a third
of all matches between low-type workers and low-type firms in our sample is likely a
result of domestic outsourcing activities. The German labor market reforms124 play an
important part in the observed increase of domestic outsourcing, particularly due to the
deregulation of temporary work agencies. The Hartz I reform package, which came into
effect on January 1, 2003, greatly liberalized temporary employment and subcontracted
labor.125 Accordingly, we observe that of all matches which low-type workers (bins 1-25)
formed with low-type firms (bins 1-10) in the business service sector, about 77% were
formed after 2002.
Table 2.6 provides more details about the changing distribution of matches across our
four sectors. The listed numbers are percentage point differences of the shares of new
123To be precise, we allocate companies to the four broad sectors using the WZ93/WZ03 classification
of industries available in the IAB Establishment Panel. The respective WZ codes are 1-500 for man-
ufacturing, 501-700 for consumer services, 701-744 for other services, and 745-748 for business service
firms.
124The so-called Hartz reforms consist of four “Acts for Modern Services on the Labor Market”
(‘Gesetze für moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt’), which came into effect on January 1, 2003
(Hartz I and II), on January 1, 2004 (Hartz III), and on January 1, 2005 (Hartz IV).
125Before the reform, it was prohibited to repeatedly hire a worker on temporary contracts, to rehire
a temporary worker within 3 months, to synchronize the length of the contract with an agency and the
length of the assignment to a firm, and to assign a worker to a firm for more than 24 months. All these
rules were abolished as a part of the Hartz I reform.
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Table 2.6: Percentage Point Differences of Industry-Shares in New Matches by
Worker Bins and Firm Bins (1998-2002 vs. 2003-2008)
(a) Business Services (b) Manufacturing
Firm Bins 1-10 11-20 21-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
Worker Bins 1-25 10.82 1.24 0.08 -1.04 1.98 2.53
Worker Bins 26-50 2.28 0.50 0.23 -1.90 1.33 3.77
Worker Bins 51-75 1.06 0.09 0.31 -3.76 0.61 3.03
Worker Bins 76-100 0.32 -0.08 0.15 -6.51 -4.25 -8.42
(c) Consumer Services (d) Other Services
Firm Bins 1-10 11-20 21-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
Worker Bins 1-25 1.50 1.02 0.88 0.20 0.68 0.06
Worker Bins 26-50 -1.01 -0.28 -0.09 -0.25 -0.05 0.28
Worker Bins 51-75 -0.65 -0.26 -0.15 -0.18 -0.90 -0.16
Worker Bins 76-100 -0.94 -0.52 -1.04 0.07 -1.12 -1.46
Note: WZ Codes 1-500 = “Manufacturing”, WZ Codes 501-700 = “Consumer Services”, WZ
Codes 701-744 = “Other Services”, WZ Codes 745-748 = “Business Services”. All the
percentage point differences in this Table sum to zero by construction.
matches in every sector between the two sub periods used before, 1998-2002 and 2003-
2008, for different combinations of worker and firm types. For instance, we observe that
the share of new matches of low-type workers (bins 1-25) and low-type firms (bins 1-10) in
the business service sector has increased by 10.82 percentage points. It rose from 8.90%
(1998-2002) to 19.72% (2003-2008). This is by far the largest change we observe in our
sample. Similarly, but to a lesser extent, new matches of low-type workers with medium-
type firms and of medium-type workers with low-type firms has increased by 1.24 and
2.28 percentage points, respectively. Conversely, manufacturing firms have reduced their
direct hiring, in line with the outsourcing hypothesis. Particularly, low-type manufac-
turing firms have negative percentage point differences with all worker types. Moreover,
manufacturing firms particularly reduced the hiring of high-type workers between the two
sub periods. For consumer and other services, the percentage point differences are small.
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Low-type consumer service firms increased their share of matches with low-type workers
by 1.5 percentage points, the biggest change for these two sectors. It rose from 10.11%
to 11.61%, so the share of new matches in this cell is substantial and it contributes to
observed sorting patterns, but it did not increase as much as in the business service sec-
tor. We conclude that most of the dynamics of sorting this research documents is driven
by domestic outsourcing of manufacturing firms to business service firms. Manufacturing
firms reduce their direct hiring of workers and, apparently, increasingly rely on business
service firms to satisfy their labor demand. Interpreting this trend in relation to low-
type workers’ non-monotonic wage profiles leads to the conclusion that this development
and the liberalization of subcontracted labor did not necessarily lead to wage losses for
low-type workers as the AKM model would suggest.
2.6 Conclusions
This Chapter reconciles empirical models of wage dispersion in the spirit of AKM with
recent structural work emphasizing the importance of production complementarities and
match-specific effects for wage determination and the sorting of heterogeneous workers
into heterogeneous firms. In the German case, the difference of estimated rank correla-
tions using either an AKM model (CHK) or a structural equilibrium search model (HLM)
is huge. We start out from the structural identification procedure proposed by HLM and
test its main identifying assumption, wage bargaining, which allows them to rank both
workers and firms based on wages. We use additional firm data to construct an efficiency-
based alternative firm ranking which is independent of wage information. Correlating the
HLM worker ranking with the independent firm ranking delivers rank correlation which
are slightly higher but broadly in line with CHK. While this confirms that AKM models
generate a good fit, we document important deviations from wage monotonicity and a
tendency towards more labor market sorting in the portion of the type space where the
AKM model produces the largest residuals. Moreover, this research provides a detailed
empirical analysis of labor market sorting in Germany which reveals a number of novel
empirical facts: first, we find evidence for an increasing degree of positive sorting in the
German labor market throughout a period of profound institutional change. Sorting has
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increased particularly for low-type workers out of unemployment, who show an increased
propensity to match with low-type firms, their theoretically predicted optimal match.
Second, we present direct empirical evidence that the wages of low-type workers decline
in the type of the firm they are matched with. This wage pattern drives the distributional
shift of low-type workers towards low-type firms. Higher wages in these matches guide
the sorting of low-type workers, supporting the non-monotonicity prediction of sorting
theory. Such wage patterns are at odds with the AKM fixed effect model of wage disper-
sion, which assume that firms pay the same wage premium to all their workers. Third,
many of the new matches that contributed to the increased sorting of low-type workers
involve business service firms. Increased domestic outsourcing, which has been liberalized
as part of the German labor market reforms, is an important driving force behind the
observed shift of the distribution of low-type workers across firms. In contrast to an AKM
analysis of this trend, we conclude that domestic outsourcing does not necessarily imply
wage losses for low-type workers. Fourth, our results are in line with previous studies
documenting the rising overall wage inequality in Germany. We see deviations from this
trend for low-type workers using our ranking method. Their wages grew by about 10%
over the eleven years of our data (1998-2008), in line with the wage non-monotonicity and
increased sorting. However, this wage growth for low-type workers could not overturn the
overall trend of increasing wage dispersion. We did not attempt to make causal claims
linking recent changes of labor market policy in Germany to the changing allocation of
workers to jobs. It would appear far-fetched to assert, however, that the changes occurred
in isolation. Taking our data at face value, we do not see a clear-cut discontinuity in the
sorting patterns which could have been triggered by, for example, the Hartz IV reform
in Germany, which reduced unemployment benefits for long-term unemployed workers.
Rather, our analysis supports the conclusion of Dustmann et al. (2014), who find that
the recent trends in the German labor market—the severe reduction of aggregate unem-
ployment as well as increasing wage dispersion—can be traced back well into the 1990s
and are not a direct result of the Hartz reforms. Institutional changes which take effect
over prolonged time periods—for instance the decline of collective bargaining at the in-
dustry level or the trend towards domestic outsourcing—have been determinative for the
development of the wage distribution and labor market sorting in Germany.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Details of Data Preparation
Our analysis is based on German matched employer-employee data. We use the “LIAB
Mover Model” (file: LIAB_MM_9308). This section serves to detail the various data prepa-
ration and imputation procedures we apply. The LIAB Mover Model is based upon the
IAB Establishment Panel. First, establishments are selected which employ at least one
employee who is employed at least at two different establishments of the IAB Establish-
ment Panel. Op to 500 additional employees per establishment are chosen randomly. The
sampling procedure includes a robustness check regarding the number of employees in
a certain establishment, i.e. whenever the information in the IAB Establishment Panel
survey data deviates by more than 50% from the information in the register data the
establishment is excluded.
Education Imputation
The employee education information is reported by employers after every year and when-
ever a job ends. Its quality may suffer because employers do not face consequences for
non- and misreporting. However, the existence of a reporting rule allows for correction. It
prescribes that only the highest educational degree of an employee needs to be reported.
Therefore the individual educational attainment should not decline over consecutive job
spells. The imputation procedure (IP1) as suggested by Fitzenberger et al. (2006) builds
upon this reporting rule by assuming that there is any over-reporting in the data.
The original education variable distinguishes the following four different educational
degrees: high school, vocational training, technical college and university. By imputing
following the IP1 procedure we extrapolate both back and forwards and do some addi-
tional adjustments using individual information on age and occupational status. As a
result we get six education categories which can be ranked in increasing order. However,
we still observe missing entries of about 2 percent of the initial data after imputation.
We drop these observations because we simply cannot make any statement about their
true educational background.
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Table A2.1: Summary Statistics of the Wage Distribution (1998-2008)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Censored 4.582 0.393 2.411 5.153
Imputed 4.618 0.455 2.411 7.132
Note: Summary statistics of the distribution of daily real log
wages.
Wage Imputation
In the LIAB data earning are right censored at the contribution assessment ceiling
(’Beitragsbemessungsgrenze’). We use the pension insurance of workers and employees.
This earning limit is given by the statutory pension fund and is adjusted annually due to
changes in earnings. First we deflate daily wages by using the CPI with base year 2005.
Then we identify censored wage observations by comparing wages with the contribution
assessment ceiling. We define a wage observation as censored whenever the reported wage
is higher than 99% of the censoring threshold. On average about 13% among all wage
observations are censored according to our definition. Then we follow Dustmann et al.
(2009) and fit a series of Tobit regression on age-education-year-combinations to impute
the right tail of the wage distribution. In all of these regressions we control for eight five-
year age-categories, six education categories and all possible interactions between these
two categories. The imputation methodology assumes that the error term in the Tobit
regression is normally distributed and each education and each age category can have
different variances. Hence for each year, we impute censored wages as the sum of the
predicted wage and a random component which is obtained from the standard error of
the forecast. This component is separately drawn from a normal distribution with mean
zero and a different variance for each education and age category. Table A2.1 shows
moments of the imputed wage distributions compared to the censored wage distribution.
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Table A2.2: Additional Variance-Covariance Matrices
(a) Without Top-Coded Wages
lnwit x′itγ̂ α̂i r̂it
lnwit 0.126
x′itγ̂ 0.006 0.005
α̂i 0.091 0.002 0.089
r̂it 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.029
Notes: Variance-Covariance matrix of regres-
sion model 2.1 without imputation of the cen-
sored part of the wage distribution. Top-coded
wages are dropped. The variance of log wages
(lnwit) is decomposed into the variance of ob-
servable characteristics (x′itγ̂), the person-fixed
effect (α̂i), and the residual (r̂it). Rounded to
three decimal places.
(b) Including Occupational Controls
lnwit x′itγ̂ α̂i r̂it
lnwit 0.207
x′itγ̂ 0.031 0.016
α̂i 0.143 0.014 0.128
r̂it 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.034
Notes: Variance-Covariance matrix of regres-
sion model 2.1 with 32 additional occupational
controls, interacted with education and time ef-
fects. The variance of log wages (lnwit) is de-
composed into the variance of observable char-
acteristics (x′itγ̂), the person-fixed effect (α̂i),
and the residual (r̂it). Rounded to three deci-
mal places.
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A.2 Further Results
Rank Correlations
Table A2.3: Rank Correlations for Different Time Intervals by Match Type
Spearman’s ρ (Number of Observations)
all matches out of unemp. job-to-job
1998-2008 0.235 (183,156) 0.257 (75,831) 0.195 (107,325)
1998-2002 0.213 (83,348) 0.218 (32,399) 0.190 (50,949)
2003-2008 0.250 (99,808) 0.281 (43,432) 0.200 (56,376)
1998-1999 0.211 (28,493) 0.196 (11,062) 0.189 (17,431)
2000-2001 0.206 (40,698) 0.217 (15,408) 0.188 (25,290)
2002-2003 0.229 (28,860) 0.239 (12,051) 0.197 (16,809)
2004-2005 0.245 (33,913) 0.257 (14,925) 0.211 (18,988)
2006-2008 0.259 (51,192) 0.306 (22,385) 0.191 (28,807)
1998 0.198 (13,924) 0.171 (5,739) 0.204 (8,185)
1999 0.221 (14,569) 0.220 (5,323) 0.170 (9,246)
2000 0.233 (21,741) 0.198 (8,589) 0.238 (13,152)
2001 0.176 (18,957) 0.240 (6,819) 0.135 (12,138)
2002 0.233 (14,157) 0.256 (5,929) 0.188 (8,228)
2003 0.225 (14,703) 0.221 (6,122) 0.206 (8,581)
2004 0.215 (17,442) 0.244 (7,622) 0.177 (9,820)
2005 0.276 (16,471) 0.270 (7,303) 0.247 (9,168)
2006 0.271 (18,177) 0.301 (8,202) 0.214 (9,975)
2007 0.250 (18,187) 0.310 (7,857) 0.169 (10,330)
2008 0.260 (14,828) 0.306 (7,857) 0.190 (8,502)
Notes: We test the null hypothesis that worker and firm bins are statistically indepen-
dent. All rank correlation coefficients are different from 0 at 1% level of significance.
Rounded to 3 decimal places. Numbers of observations (new matches according to
our definition) are reported in brackets.
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Distribution of Observables Across Worker and Firm Bins
Figure A2.1: Observable Characteristics of Workers by Bin (Full Sample, 1998-
2008)
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Note: Panels (a) and (b) show the means +/– one standard deviation of workers’ age and education across worker bins.
The age of individual workers in our sample ranges from 20 to 60. There are 6 education categories: 1 = “no degree”, 2 =
“vocational training”, 3 = “high school”, 4 = “high school and vocational training”, 5 = “technical college”, 6 =
“university”.
Figure A2.2: Observable Characteristics of Firms by Bin (Full Sample, 1998-2008)
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Note: Panel (a) shows means +/– one standard deviation of the average workforce size of firms within the bins. Panel (b)
shows means +/– one standard deviation of the firms’ sectoral classification within the bins. We use the WZ93/WZ03
classification of industries available in the IAB Establishment Panel, which is compatible to the common international
classifications of industries, NACE and ISIC. We use 32 industries, roughly classified as follows: 1-2 = “Agriculture &
Mining”, 3-18 = “Manufacturing”, 19-20 = “Construction”, 21-23 = “Retail Trade”, 24-32 = “Service Sector”. Panel (c)
shows means +/– one standard deviation of the variable indicating the application of a collective bargaining agreement
within the bins: 1 = “sectorwide bargaining”, 2 = “firmwide bargaining”, 3 = “no collective bargaining”. Panel (d) shows
means +/– one standard deviation of the variable indicating the presence of formal employee representation within the
bins: 1 = “employee representation exists”, 2 = “no employee representation”.
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Histograms and Kernel Density Estimates
Figure A2.3: Histograms of Raw Data and Estimated Density Functions
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(c) Worker Bin 1, Job-to-Job
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
D
en
si
ty
0 10 20 30
firmbin
(d) Worker Bin 10, all Matches
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(i) Worker Bin 50, Job-to-Job
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(j) Worker Bin 90, all Matches
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(k) Worker Bin 90, out of Unemp.
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(l) Worker Bin 90, Job-to-Job
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(m) Worker Bin 100, all Matches
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(n) Worker Bin 100, out of Unemp.
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Note: Histograms of raw data and estimated univariate kernel densities of matches conditional on worker bins, time, and
match type. Kernel: Epanechnikov. The bandwidth is calculated by Silverman’s rule of thumb. Pointwise confidence
intervals are calculated using a quantile of the standard normal distribution.
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Density Differences
Figure A2.4: Density Differences: 2003-2008 − 1998-2002
(a) Worker Bin 1, all Matches
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(b) Worker Bin 1, out of Unemp.
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(m) Worker Bin 100, all Matches
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Note: Density differences are calculated by subtracting the raw match frequencies by bin. Line plots are the result of a
locally weighted regression with running-line least squares smoothing and a tri-cube weighting function.
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Wage Dynamics
Figure A2.5: Wage Dynamics in Worker Bins 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10
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Note: The Figure shows deviations of mean log real daily wages for single worker bins relative to 1998 (multiplied by 100).
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A.3 Robustness
Alternative Firm Ranking based on Profits per Worker
The construct a firm ranking based on average profits per worker, we build on Bartolucci
et al. (2015) who use very detailed firm data (balance sheets) to study labor market
sorting in the Italian region of Veneto. Using the IAB Establishment Panel, we can
compute economic profits per worker of firm k in period t, πkt, by simply subtracting the
reported costs from firms’ revenues: πkt = ΠktNkt = Rkt − Ckt −Wkt − Kkt. Πkt denotes
aggregate profits, Nkt the size of the workforce, Rkt revenues, Ckt input costs, and Wkt
the wage bill. Kkt represents the capital cost of firm k in year t, which we compute by
multiplying the capital stock with a yearly interest rate of 7.1%.126 We do not observe the
capital stock directly and approximate it for each establishment-year observation using
a perpetual inventory method as outlined in section 2.2.3. We then rank firms based on
the average of profits per worker over time, π̄k. We drop the most extreme outliers and
group firms into 30 bins of equal size, denoting the estimated rank of all firms within
one group ŷ(k). Table A2.4 shows correlations of the profit based firm ranking with
other firm-level statistics: log value added, log value added per worker, the log of the
firms’ workforce size (all in firm-level means), as well as the estimated firm-fixed effect.
Table A2.5 decomposes the variance of some key firm variables in our data into the shares
explained between and within the firm bins based on the profit ranking.
126This number is taken from Evers et al. (2015).
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Table A2.4: Properties of Firm Ranking based on Profits
ln v̄k ln v̄kN̄k φ̂k ln N̄k
Correlation with ŷ(k) 0.52 0.70 0.75 0.15
Note: The table shows correlations of our alternative firm ranking
based on profits per worker with other statistics that could be used
to rank firms: log mean value added (v̄k), log mean value added per
worker (ln v̄k/N̄k), and estimated firm-fixed effects (extracted from
running regression 2.5, φ̂k), the log of the average size of a firm’s
workforce, N̄k.
Table A2.5: Properties of Firm Bins based on Profits
π̄k ln v̄k/N̄k N̄k Sector
Overall Variance 4.78E+09 0.873 1.92E+07 65.64
Between bins 4.06E+09 (85%) 0.477 (55%) 2.02E+06 (11%) 5.99 (9%)
Within bins 7.27E+08 (15%) 0.396 (45%) 1.72E+07 (89%) 59.65 (91%)
Note: The table decomposes the overall variance of average profits per worker (π̄k), log value added per worker
(ln v̄k/N̄k), the size of the firms’ workforce (N̄k), and of the sectors the firms operate in into the respective shares
explained within and between the firm bins based on the alternative profit ranking. We use the WZ93/WZ03 clas-
sification of industries available in the IAB Establishment Panel, which is compatible to the common international
classifications of industries, NACE and ISIC. We use 32 industries, roughly classified as follows: 1-2 = “Agriculture
& Mining”, 3-18 = “Manufacturing”, 19-20 = “Construction”, 21-23 = “Retail Trade”, 24-32 = “Service Sector”.
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Rank Correlations using the Profit Ranking
Table A2.6: Rank Correlations for Different Time Intervals by Match Type
Spearman’s ρ (Number of Observations)
all matches out of unemp. job-to-job
1998-2008 0.254 (167,764) 0.253 (69,398) 0.228 (98,366)
1998-2002 0.251 (77,892) 0.228 (30,236) 0.242 (47,656)
2003-2008 0.255 (89,872) 0.270 (39,162) 0.215 (50,710)
1998-1999 0.227 (26,743) 0.196 (10,386) 0.215 (16,357)
2000-2001 0.272 (37,949) 0.238 (14,303) 0.271 (23,646)
2002-2003 0.234 (26,694) 0.241 (11,174) 0.211 (15,520)
2004-2005 0.251 (31,003) 0.251 (13,675) 0.228 (17,328)
2006-2008 0.264 (45,375) 0.293 (19,860) 0.209 (25,515)
1998 0.195 (13,070) 0.177 (5,411) 0.200 (7,659)
1999 0.254 (13,673) 0.214 (4,975) 0.225 (8,698)
2000 0.250 (20,171) 0.225 (7,906) 0.249 (12,265)
2001 0.295 (17,778) 0.253 (6,397) 0.294 (11,381)
2002 0.236 (13,200) 0.259 (5,547) 0.203 (7,653)
2003 0.232 (13,494) 0.222 (5,627) 0.220 (7,867)
2004 0.228 (15,974) 0.248 (6,983) 0.198 (8,991)
2005 0.275 (15,029) 0.253 (6,692) 0.259 (8,337)
2006 0.269 (16,549) 0.281 (7,467) 0.226 (9,082)
2007 0.251 (15,935) 0.299 (6,916) 0.185 (9,019)
2008 0.275 (12,891) 0.302 (5,477) 0.218 (7,414)
Notes: Rank correlations using alternative firm ranking based on average profits per
worker as detailed in Section A.3. We test the null hypothesis that worker and firm
bins are statistically independent. All rank correlation coefficients are different from
0 at 1% level of significance. Rounded to 3 decimal places. Numbers of observations
(new matches according to our definition) are reported in brackets.
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Main Plots using the Profit Ranking
Figure A2.6: Empirical Bivariate Density of Matches in Germany (1998-2008)
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Note: Two-dimensional kernel density estimation with an axis-aligned bivariate normal kernel, evaluated on a grid with
dimensions 100× 30 (#worker types × #firm types). Alternative firm ranking based on average profits per worker as
detailed in Section A.3.
Figure A2.7: Contour Plot of Empirical Bivariate Match Density
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Note: Contour plot of Figure A2.6. Alternative firm ranking based on average profits per worker as detailed in
Section A.3.
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Figure A2.8: Rank Correlations by Match Type over Time (1998-2008)
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
S
pe
ar
m
an
's
 rh
o
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
 
all matches job to job matches
out of unempl. matches
Note: Alternative firm ranking based on average profits per worker as detailed in Section A.3.
Figure A2.9: Estimated Mean Wages
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Note: Alternative firm ranking based on average profits per worker as detailed in Section A.3. The Figure shows the
mean of the log real daily wage for all combinations of worker and firm types on a grid with dimensions 100× 30
(#worker types × #firm types).
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Figure A2.10: Estimated Mean Wages across Worker Types
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Note: Wages are means of real log cell-wages for the given workerbins. Line plots are the result of a locally weighted
regression with running-line least squares smoothing and a tri-cube weighting function. Alternative firm ranking based on
average profits per worker as detailed in Section A.3.
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Marriage and Divorce under Labor
Market Uncertainty∗
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3.1 Introduction
Among the many choices individuals make during their lifetime marriage is one of the
most, if not the most, important decision. The marriage vow to be true to each other in
good times and in bad, in sickness and in health and to love and honor each other for
as long as one shall live reminds both partners that this is truly a decision taken under
uncertainty. Strokes of fate like unexpected unemployment and severe sickness can stress
a partnership and cause partners to drift apart and divorce.
The relative importance of economic shocks compared to other shocks disrupting a
marriage is still poorly understood. The economic literature has documented that unem-
ployment, especially male unemployment, is associated with an increase in the divorce
rate.127 Also, we know that marriage and divorce rates are negatively correlated with the
unemployment rate over the business cycle.128 Additionally, we know that marriage rates
declined since the 1970s and that assortative matching with respect to education has in-
creased.129 Researchers have proposed explanations based on improvements in household
technology since World War II and increased female labor supply,130 as well as increased
incentives for females to invest in education.131 Very little is known, however, about the
nature of the channels that connect marriage market decisions to the underlying source
of economic shocks.
To investigate the importance of economic shocks, we integrate labor market shocks
into a two-sided marriage market model with transferable utility and ex-ante heteroge-
neous men and women (Shimer and Smith, 2000; Jacquemet and Robin, 2013; Goussé
et al., 2017). Individuals search for partners in the marriage market and, at the same
time, switch between employment and unemployment. The employment statuses of both
partners influence utility flows and the sharing of resources within the household.132 A
127See Jensen and Smith (1990), Hansen (2005), and Amato and Beattie (2011) among others.
128See Schaller (2013) and González-Val and Marcén (2017a,b), among others.
129Both Doepke and Tertilt (2016) and Greenwood et al. (2017) offer excellent literature overviews,
the latter with some cross-country facts.
130See Greenwood et al. (2005a) and Greenwood et al. (2005b). More recently, Greenwood et al. (2016)
use a search model to analyze these trends empirically for the U.S. with an emphasis on sorting.
131See Nick and Walsh (2007); Chiappori et al. (2009)
132Guler et al. (2012) show that the joint search behavior of married couples in the labor market may
be very different from the search of singles, for instance due to different reservation wage strategies or
risk sharing motives. We must abstract from this important issue because it is impossible to estimate
labor market transition rates conditional on marital status with our data.
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negative shock, i.e., job loss of one spouse, may decrease the marital surplus sufficiently
to trigger a divorce. Additionally, an idiosyncratic component captures non-economic
factors of marriage (e.g. mutual affection). It is subject to shocks and may lead to
separations as well. A complementarity in the household production function induces
the tendency to sort positively. Given the German context, we also consider benefits
from joint taxation, which have the opposite effect and encourage negative sorting. In
the model, the balance between all these forces determines marriage and divorce flows,
differentially across heterogeneous men and women.
The relative importance of each of these forces is an open empirical question. We thus
take our model to the data. Using German micro data from various sources, we use our
model as a tool to decompose marriage and divorce flows into the respective contributions
of economic and non-economic forces. To this end, we develop a structural estimation
procedure that allows us to back out key components of our model from the data. We
estimate meeting rates, marriage probabilities, and separation rates, all differentiated
according to individuals’ education and labor market status.
The marriage rate depends on an individual’s chance to meet somebody from a cer-
tain education group times the probability he/she is willing to marry. We show that the
probabilities to marry (willingness to marry) upon meeting is highest for employed indi-
viduals with equally educated couples. A similar positive assortative matching pattern
emerges for medium and highly educated individuals in all other labor market status
combinations (male employed/female unemployed, male unemployed/female employed,
and male unemployed/female unemployed). Low educated females still have reasonably
high chances to marry with a medium or highly educated male if they stay out of the
labor force (remain unemployed), most likely because of the high financial incentives
provided by joint income taxation in Germany. Low educated, unemployed males have
almost no chances to marry. Marriage rates are also driven by an individual’s chance to
meet somebody from a certain education group. Our estimates suggest that medium and
highly educated individuals direct their search such that the number of meetings with
individuals from the other sex with similar education level are higher than the number
of meetings with lower educated individuals. Conversely, our estimates tend to suggest
random meetings for low educated individuals.
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We finally decompose the number of divorces into economic (labor market) factors
and non-economic factors and show how their contributions evolve over time. The overall
majority of divorces is driven by non-economic factors. Overall, less than 10% of divorces
are due to labor market transitions of one spouse. However, the share of “labor market
divorces” exhibits very interesting dynamics, it has increased by more than 20% since
the mid 2000s. We take a granular view and investigate which types of heterogeneous
couples have started to divorce more frequently in response to labor market transitions.
Surprisingly, we find that positively sorted couples are the major contributor to this
trend. In our sample, the largest and growing share of labor market divorces can be
attributed to couples in which a previously unemployed highly educated female starts
working. On the other hand, low education couples with a high likelihood of job loss
contribute a shrinking number of labor market divorces. Both trends might be related
to the booming German labor market. Low separation rates make marriages among low
education individuals more stable. With high education, the option value of going on the
marriage market with good employment perspectives can outweigh the value of staying
married.
This Chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces our data sources. Sec-
tion 3.3 discusses descriptive empirical evidence relevant to our hypothesis and modeling
choices. In Section 3.4, we introduce our marriage market model and solve it. Section
3.5 presents a model-based, structural decomposition of marriage and divorce flows into
their sources. Section 3.6 concludes and further results as well as technical details can
be found in the Appendix.
3.2 Data Sources
The empirical content of this Chapter is based on three sources of German micro data:
1. The German Microcensus, a household survey.
2. The Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies, a matched employer-employee
data set.
3. The German marriage and divorce registers.
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We briefly introduce and describe each data source before presenting and discussing the
respective empirical results relevant to our analysis.
3.2.1 The German Microcensus (MC)
The German Microcensus (henceforth MC) is an annual survey that yields representative
statistics on the German population and labor force. Data access is provided by the
Research data center (FDZ) of the statistical offices of the German federal states.
It samples 1% of the population, consisting of all persons legally residing in Germany.
It is the largest household survey in Europe. Participation is mandatory133 and only a
subset of questions can be answered on a voluntary basis.
The MC survey design relies on single-stage stratified cluster sampling. The primary
sampling units are artificially delimited districts with a number of neighboring build-
ings. All households residing in these buildings are interviewed (principal residence).134
Typically, one household member responds to the survey for all individuals living in the
household, including the spouse, children, and other cohabitants if applicable. The sur-
vey program of the MC consists of a set of core questions that remains the same in each
wave, covering general socio-demographic characteristics like marital status, education,
employment status, individual and household income, and many other things.
Data Preparation
We restrict our attention to adults of ages 18 to 68 living in private households, either
as singles (alone or with cohabitants) or as heterosexual married partners in the same
household. Our definition of singles includes never-married, divorced, and widowed in-
dividuals. To reliably identify couples, we have to condition on legal marriage, since
we cannot distinguish cohabitation of non-married couples from shared apartments in
the earlier MC waves. Married couples are legally required to have the same principal
residence, if they want to file a joint tax statement in order to enjoy the benefits of joint
income taxation.
133According to the German Microcensus law, non-response may be fined.
134Since 1990 the average number of buildings has been 9, the targeted number of individuals is 15.
Larger buildings are subdivided.
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In principle we could use all MC waves from 1976 to 2013 for our analysis.135 We
carefully clean and properly weight the cross-sectional data sets in order to represent the
German population. This enables us to study the composition of the German married and
non-married population conditional on gender, education, and employment over time.
For our analysis we use the data starting from 1993. With this short sample we avoid
complications related to the German reunification and, in turn, can analyze the German
population as a whole. Another reason is that the SIAB data (see below) does not fully
cover the East German labor market before 1993.
Unfortunately, the MC is not a panel. In contrast to Goussé et al. (2017), who use
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we cannot follow individuals over time
and directly observe them switching between states of singlehood and marriage as well
as employment and unemployment. This complicates connecting the model to German
data. To tackle this issue, we categorize the individuals in each cross-section into 84
classes based on gender (male or female), education (low, medium, high), employment
status (employed or unemployed), marital status and, if married, the education and
employment status of the partner. We use these aggregated data to study the German
marriage market.
Our theoretical sorting model is based on the presumption that the value of the
spouse’s labor in home and market production (labor productivity) is an important de-
terminant of matching and separation decisions in the marriage market (in addition to
non-economic forces like love and companionship). The empirical part of this analysis
uses education and wages as a proxy for labor productivity. The MC includes detailed
information on individuals’ school education and vocational degrees. The way this in-
formation is collected in the survey varies across waves. To construct a time-consistent
measure, we rely on the ISCED-1997 scale136 and, accordingly, define three education
categories:
135The MC has been conducted in West Germany since 1957 and in East Germany since 1991. The
waves before 1976 contain no information on individual education. Before 1995 we have one wave every
two or three years (1976, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1985, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993). This is due to the fact that
the MC was not always a yearly survey and, once it was, not all waves asked for education information.
From 1995 onwards we have all waves at an annual frequency.
136The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) of the UNESCO intends to make
education systems internationally comparable.
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1. Low education: individuals, who at most graduated from lower secondary schools
with or without a vocational degree (ISCED categories 1 & 2).
2. Medium education: individuals, who graduated from upper secondary schools with
or without a vocational degree (ISCED categories 3 & 4).
3. High education: individuals with a tertiary degree (ISCED categories 5 & 6).
The second important dimension of individual heterogeneity in our analysis is the
labor market status. Some details about job search behavior in the labor market are
available in our data, but only for a subsample in the later years. In order to ensure that
employment and unemployment are defined consistently over the whole time horizon, we
pool unemployment and non-participation and do not subdivide the non-employed into
job-seekers and inactive persons.
Our final MC data set (1993 - 2013) contains information on 8,426,756 individuals137
of whom 47% are men and 53% women. 72% of men and 64% of women are married.
Across all ages in our sample, from 18 to 68 years, the labor force participation rate is 62%
for men and 46% for women, respectively.138 In the period after German reunification,
the individuals in our sample are representative of a roughly constant population of about
53 million adults.139
3.2.2 Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB)
To construct labor market transition rates and wage measures, we rely on German
matched employer-employee data. We use the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Bi-
ographies (henceforth SIAB) provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB)
in Nuremberg, Germany.140 These data cover the years 1975 to 2014. The SIAB is a
137The average number of observations per wave is 443,513.
138The participation-age profiles are hump-shaped. In the 2006 MC wave, participation for men is
highest in the age bracket 35-39 (88%) and the maximum for women (77%) is reached for ages 40-44.
139We use the MC sample weights to scale our sample. The population increases somewhat after
reunification and reaches a maximum of almost 55 million people in 2007, afterward it starts declining.
The mean population between 1993 and 2013 is about 53 million people with a standard deviation of 1
million.
140We use the factually anonymous Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (File: SIAB_7514).
Data access is provided via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the IAB, project no. 101693. See also Ganzer et al. (2016)
for more details on the data set.
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2 percent random sample drawn from the universe of employment and unemployment
spells registered at the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) within
the German social security system.141 Individuals who are not subject to social insur-
ance contributions i.e. self-employed workers, civil servants, students, and non-employed
persons are not included in the sample.
Every observation in the SIAB corresponds to an employment or unemployment spell
lasting between one day and one year in accordance with the reporting rules of the Ger-
man social security system. This allows us to measure the employment status of an
individual exact to the day. We observe individuals switching between different employ-
ers, employment and unemployment, as well as (with limitations) non-employment. For
every employment spell we observe the nominal gross daily wage. In case of unemploy-
ment, the wage variable contains the amount of benefits paid to the worker. Since the
SIAB is a sample of the labor force, we do not have the number of individuals not par-
ticipating in the labor force. The SIAB is simply not representative for this part of the
population. We are therefore unable to calculate transition rates out of inactivity and
only use the transition rates from employment into unemployment and vice versa.142
The SIAB data contain a wide array of individual characteristics including gen-
der, age, educational attainment, details on they type of employment (part/full-time,
marginal/subject to social security) as well as occupation and some information on the
employer. Unfortunately, only unemployment spells contain the information whether an
individual is married or not. Since this is a non-representative fraction of the data, we
cannot condition on marital status when estimating wage measures and labor market
flows. The German social security data are collected at the individual level so they
contain no information on the spouse that we could condition our estimations on.143
141The data consist of individuals which are characterized as follows: employed subject to social
security, marginal part-time employed, unemployed benefit recipient, officially registered job-seeker,
(planned) participant in programs of active labor market policy.
142Since we are interested in transition rates between labor market states, we have to divide the number
of individuals changing the labor market status by the stock of individuals in the state from which the
respective individuals exited.
143This limitation will be mitigated in a future version of the IAB data. Goldschmidt et al. (2017)
develop a method for identifying married couples in the German matched employer-employee data by
using confidential address and name data. The resulting couple identifier will be made available to other
researchers and we will incorporate it in a future version. For now, we are forced to estimate wage
distributions and labor market transitions without controlling for marital status and the partner’s labor
market attachment.
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Data Preparation
In order to create a sample comparable to the MC data, we use data for both men and
women in East and West Germany. The available age range in our SIAB sample, 17 to
62 years, is slightly narrower than in the MC. We conduct our estimations with the data
from 1993 onwards, the same start year as in our primary MC sample. As mentioned
before, the East German labor market was not completely covered by the institutional
data sources before 1993. We drop all spells of marginal employment because they are
not included in the data before 1999. In case an individual has multiple jobs at a given
point in time we always define the highest paying job as the primary one and discard all
other employment spells.
We use the SIAB education information to construct a variable that resembles the
three ISCED categories in the MC data. Education information in the SIAB suffers from
inconsistencies and missing values.144 To solve this problem, we follow Fitzenberger et al.
(2006) and impute missing and inconsistent values in the education variable. Spells with
missing education after imputation are dropped.
Regarding wages, we start by deflating nominal gross daily wages using the German
consumer price index with base year 2010. The German social security system tracks
earnings only up to a certain limit. Beyond this threshold, further earnings are not taken
into account for the calculation of social security contributions. We follow Dustmann
et al. (2009) and impute the upper tail of the wage distribution by running a series of
Tobit regressions, fitted separately for years, education levels, and age groups.
After data preparation, our SIAB sample consists of 18,623,471 employment spells
from 968,215 individuals, 58% of which are male. The male share of all employment
spells is similar (57%).
3.2.3 Marriage and Divorce Registers (MDR)
The marriage and divorce register data (henceforth MDR) originates from the German
civil registry offices and the divorce courts. It is compiled by the Research Data Center
of the statistical offices of the German federal states. The data are organized at the level
144Employers are not forced to report an employee’s highest educational degree and might in some
cases not even know about it, for instance when a worker switches occupations.
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of the married couple and contain information on the exact birth dates of both spouses,
the exact date of marriage, and, if applicable, the date of divorce. Additionally, the data
contain various covariates including religion, citizenship, place of residence, number of
children (before marriage and at the time of divorce), as well as who filed for divorce and
the court’s ruling. Unfortunately, there is no information about education, so we have to
rely on age differences as a proxy for marital sorting.
Data Preparation
The marriage and divorce data are separate yearly files and we have access for the waves
from 1991–2013 (marriage registers) and 1995–2013 (divorce registers). We clean the
yearly files from missing and inconsistent observations. The waves of marriage and di-
vorce data are then merged to get two big data sets. For one, we are interested in the
aggregate yearly flows of marriages and divorces. We need these numbers for the struc-
tural decomposition of marriage and divorce flows in Section 3.5. We then proceed to
link the two register data sets in order to estimate a series of hazard models.145 21.3% of
the 17,166,070 marriages we observe ended in divorce. The rest survived until the end of
our observation period. This data set enables us to study marriage duration conditional
on the observable characteristics available to us, in particular age.
3.3 Empirical Results
3.3.1 Sorting in the Marriage Market
The aim of our analysis is to connect an equilibrium search model of the marriage market
with heterogeneous men and women to German micro data. Our theoretical model allows
for positive as well as negative assortative matching. A complementarity in the household
production function induces homophily—the love of the same—and encourages positive
assortative matching. Benefits from joint income taxation, which increase with the wage
145Due to the strict German data protection regulations it is not allowed to match the marriage and
divorce observations at the level of the individual couple. We aggregate the marriage and divorce data to
yearly cells containing the number of individuals with equal observable characteristics, particularly age.
We then merge the cells based on the marriage year and “unpack” the linked data-set into individual
marriage spells.
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gap between spouses, encourages negative assortative matching. We use our MC and
MDR data to document the extent of assortative matching on the German marriage
market. Our model will have to match the empirical patterns we find.
Results from MC data
In this section we study how the homogeneity of married couples in terms of education,
employment, and income has evolved over time. Overall, it has increased significantly.
The correlations are depicted in Figure 3.1. In 1993, the correlation between spouses’
education levels was just above 0.4. For comparison, this is somewhat lower in magnitude
than what Greenwood et al. (2016) report for the U.S.146 However, they have only two
education categories, college and less than college, so the correlation should be somewhat
higher than what we find with three education categories. The education correlation
increases and reaches a maximum of 0.5 in 1999. Afterwards, it levels off and starts
decreasing slightly in the second half of the 2000s. It remains well above its initial level,
however. The leveling-off could be driven by supply factors, e.g. a limited number of
highly educated individuals looking for a partner.147 Also, the changing macroeconomic
environment in Germany, especially the booming labor market, might have led to a
change in matching patterns. We will pick up this thought in our structural empirical
analysis in Section 3.5.
We do not observe a similar hump-shape for employment or income. The correla-
tion between spouses labor market attachment (employed or unemployed) has increased
steadily from just above 0.4 in 1993 to almost 0.6 in 2013. Today, it is more common that
partners are either both employed or unemployed. In stark contrast to this observation,
it is striking to see that the correlation between spouses’ income levels has been negative
until well into the 2000s. It turns positive in 2007 and increases further after 2009. This
finding shows that the classical role model with one bread-winning individual, typically
the husband, is still very dominant in Germany, even despite the high degree of education-
based sorting. When both spouses are employed, however, earnings differences must be
146The long-run analysis of Greenwood et al. (2016) reveals a correlation of 0.41 in 1960 which rises
to 0.52 in 2006.
147Figure A2.1 in the appendix shows the shares of education groups for men and women and their
evolution over time.
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Figure 3.1: Correlations of Education, Employment, and Income within Marriages
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Note: Yearly Pearson correlation coefficients of the within-couple levels of education (three categories: low, medium,
high), employment (two categories: employed, unemployed) and income (between 15 and 24 categories, depending on the
wave). Source: Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus,
1993-2013, own calculations.
large in order to be consistent with an almost zero correlation between spouses’ income.
This is due to the fact that many working wives have a weak labor market attachment,
work part-time or in marginal employment. One explanation for this observation is the
German system of joint taxation for married couples, which provides strong disincentives
for the secondary earner to increase labor supply.148
Figure 3.2 shows the extent of marriage market sorting in Germany in an alternative
way. We now focus on education-based sorting only and use our MC aggregated data to
calculate weighted population shares of men and women in partnerships of all possible
education combinations. To set this into perspective, the population shares of all indi-
viduals by gender and education are depicted in Appendix Figure A2.1. For both men
and women, the share of highly educated individuals has increased and the low education
share has decreased. This trend is much more pronounced for women.
Each row in Figure 3.2 shows men (left Panel) and women (right Panel) for the same
education category. For these individuals, we plot the share of marriages with partners
148See Gustafsson (1992) for a comparative empirical study of joint taxation and female labor supply in
Germany and Sweden. The author exploits the Swedish switch to individual taxation in 1971 to identify
the dampening effect of the high marginal tax rates on female labor supply under joint taxation.
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Figure 3.2: Partner’s Education by Education and Gender of Married Individuals
(a) Men with low education
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(b) Women with low education
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(c) Men with medium education
1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Years
0.0%
2.5%
5.0%
7.5%
10.0%
12.5%
15.0%
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
sh
ar
e 
(w
ei
gh
te
d 
an
d 
sc
al
ed
)
Low education 
spouse
Medium education 
spouse
High education 
spouse
(d) Women with medium education
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(e) Men with high education
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(f) Women with high education
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Note: Population shares are weighted and scaled using the MC sample weights. 100% on the y-axis corresponds to the
full population, including married and unmarried individuals of both sexes. Source: Research Data Center of the
Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own calculations.
of each education category.149 We see an increase of education-based sorting particularly
for highly educated individuals. For men with university degrees (Panel 3.2e), the share
149Note that the lines representing marriages with partners of the same education level are identical
by construction for men and women in each row (blue in the first, orange in the second, green in the
third).
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of marriages with highly educated women has almost doubled to 5% in 2013. At the
same time, the share of marriages with women of the lowest education category has
decreased significantly. The widening gap between the green and the blue line represents
increasing homophily of highly-educated individuals. From the perspective of highly
educated females (Panel 3.2f), the share of marriages with men of both high and medium
education has increased. The medium education share starts increasing later and does
not grow beyond 2%. Highly-educated women are almost never married to men from the
lowest education group.
The increase of education-based sorting is not homogeneous across education groups.
The first row of Figure 3.2 shows that the share of marriages among lowly educated indi-
viduals only increased somewhat in the beginning of our observation period but steadily
decreased thereafter. The decline in the share of married low educated women across all
groups of men is driven by the overall decrease in marriages of low educated women over
the same time horizon. The same is true for men, albeit to a lesser extent. To show the
increasing shares of singles, Figure A2.2 in the Appendix breaks down the population
shares of the gender-education groups by marital status. The share of marriages between
men and women of medium education (Panels 3.2c and 3.2d) is the highest in our sam-
ple with more than 12.5% and it is relatively stable over time. Sorting in this group is
prevalent but not increasing. For the women, the share is constant across all groups.
Men of medium education, however, become less likely to be married to women with low
education and more likely to be married to highly educated women.
Results from MDR Data
We run a series of survival regressions on our linked marriage and divorce data in or-
der to understand how the probability of divorce depends on the age difference in the
married couple. Ideally, we would like to control for education. Since we do not have
this information available in the MDR data, we use the age difference to proxy for the
heterogeneity within married couples.
The correlation of the differences in education and age for married couples in the
MC data is 0.66, indicating that spouses with small age differences also tend to be
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Table 3.1: Hazard Ratio Estimation Results
Age (1) (2) (3)
difference Cox Weibull Exponential
2-5 years 1.075∗∗∗ 1.079∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
5-10 years 1.197∗∗∗ 1.214∗∗∗ 1.193∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
10-15 years 1.298∗∗∗ 1.320∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
>15 years 1.353∗∗∗ 1.370∗∗∗ 1.347∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
constant 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
s (shape) 1.345∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 17166070 17166070 17166070
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Hazard ratio relative to
age difference < 2 years. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. s is
the estimated shape parameter of the respective parametric distribu-
tion. Source: Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Län-
der and the Federal State, Marriage and Divorce Registers, 1991/1995-
2013, own calculations.
homogeneous in terms of education.150 To control for age differences, we classify couples
as follows: the baseline group has an age difference of less than two years. Further, we
group couples with more than two and up to five years, more than five and up to ten, more
than ten and up to fifteen, and more than fifteen years of age difference. We estimate
a semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model as well as two parametric regressions,
assuming Weibull and exponential distributions.
The estimated hazard ratios in Table 3.1 are precisely estimated and very close across
specifications. Unanimously, we find that the hazard ratio is increasing in the age differ-
150This is calculated for couples with a maximum age difference of 11 years, representing more than
95% of couples in our data.
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ence relative to the base category of less than two years. Couples with an age difference
between two and five years have a 7.4% higher hazard rate compared to the baseline. For
the remaining age-difference groups the hazard ratio relative to the baseline increases by
21.4%, 32%, and finally 37% for couples with the largest age differences of more than 15
years. We interpret these hazard ratios as strong evidence that—on average—the likeli-
hood of a quick divorce increases when couples are very different in terms of age. Put
differently, homogeneous couples have a higher probability of staying together for a long
time.
Summary
We find an abundance of evidence for positive assortative matching on age, education,
and employment status on the German marriage market. Only income was – probably
due to the incentives caused by joint income taxation – negatively correlated before 2007
and became positively correlated after 2009. Still, homophily is prevalent and increasing.
Particularly for education, however, we see that the tendency to sort is not uniform
across groups. Sorting is increasing for the highly educated, rather constant for the
middle group and even decreasing for men and women with low education. Additionally,
increased sorting appears not just to be about matching with the right partner in the
first place. The fact that hazard ratios increase in the age difference indicates that
heterogeneous (i.e. non-sorted) couples, at least in terms of age, are on average more
likely to divorce.
In the light of these empirical findings, the question remains why heterogeneous cou-
ples divorce more quickly. We suspect that the reasons for splitting up, economic and
non-economic, must differ across couple types. This is where our structural model comes
into play. It allows us to investigate this hypothesis by decomposing the flow of divorces
into separations caused by idiosyncratic shocks and by economic reasons like a transition
from employment to unemployment of one spouse. For this reason, we now turn to the
labor market.
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3.3.2 Wage Distributions
Following Goussé et al. (2017), we interpret individual labor productivity as the empiri-
cal counterpart of the heterogeneity of men and women in the model. We construct our
measure of labor productivity from wage information in the SIAB data. We estimate
the wage densities of men and women on the same domain in order to use them as the
underlying type distributions when solving the structural model. In order to remove
transitory components from wages and use both observable and unobservable determi-
nants of individual labor productivity, we run a Mincerian wage regression including a
person-fixed effect. Following Card et al. (2013), we regress log wages on a person-fixed
effect, an unrestricted set of year dummies, and quadratic and cubic terms in age fully
interacted with educational attainment:
lnwit = x′itγ + φi + rit. (3.1)
lnwit denotes the log real daily wage of a worker i in year t, x′it includes the time-
varying observable characteristics, φi is a worker-fixed effect, and rit is the residual . The
explanatory power of this wage regression (adjusted R2 of 72%) is high, albeit below the
Card et al. (2013) benchmark (about 90%). There are two reasons for this difference:
we include men and women from both East and West Germany, whereas Card et al.
(2013) focus on men in West Germany in a smaller age bracket. Additionally, using the
universe of social security records, they can include firm-fixed effects. We are unable to
consistently estimate firm-fixed effects using the SIAB sample.151 Wage differences across
firms, however, are not the subject of our study.
Based on the estimated contributions of both observable and unobservable character-
istics we predict individual wages as follows:
ŵit = exp(x′itγ̂ + φ̂i). (3.2)
We effectively remove the estimated residuals. The standard deviations of predicted wages
is 0.615 for men and 0.611 for women, so male wages are somewhat more dispersed.
151See Andrews et al. (2008, 2012) on this topic.
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Figure 3.3: Wage Distributions of Men and Women
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Note: Kernel densities of wages based on SIAB data (left Panel, kernel: Epanechnikov, bandwidth: 5) and individual
income based on MC data (right Panel, kernel: Gaussian, bandwidth: 100). MC data source: Research Data Center of
the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own calculations. SIAB source:
Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research, SIAB SUF
7514, 1993-2013, own calculations.
Next, we run kernel density estimations for both men and women using all wage
observations between the 1st and the 99th percentile. Figure 3.3 depicts the resulting
distributions of the predicted wage for men and women on a common domain. We com-
pare the densities estimated from SIAB data to kernel density estimations of individual
income from MC data (for both married and single individuals). The distributions share
the same qualitative features, even though the wage and income information in the two
data sets are very different.152 Nevertheless, both male wage distributions have a fatter
tail, male mean and median wages/income (see blue lines) lie to the right of the female
ones (see red lines).
3.3.3 Labor Market Transitions
Our final set of empirical results concerns the job-finding and separation rates of men
and women conditional on education. In our structural model, these rates are an impor-
tant element because we suspect that labor market transitions trigger a sizable share of
divorces.
152The MC contains only categorical information on individual and household income, which we make
comparable across waves.
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Table 3.2: Labor Market Transition Rates (%) by Gender and Education
Job-Finding Separation
Gender Education rate (UE) rate (EU)
Mean STD Mean STD
All - 4.579 0.158 0.639 0.083
Men All 5.160 0.126 0.711 0.094
Low 5.122 0.128 0.759 0.102
Medium 5.689 0.328 0.453 0.033
High 4.366 0.960 0.312 0.029
Women All 3.880 0.260 0.552 0.067
Low 3.654 0.272 0.565 0.069
Medium 6.043 0.367 0.445 0.034
High 5.773 1.019 0.450 0.048
Note: Mean and standard deviations of seasonally adjusted (X-13-
ARIMA-SEATS) and HP-filtered (λ = 900, 000) job-finding and sepa-
ration rates by gender and education category. Rounded to three dec-
imal places. SIAB source: Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal
Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research, SIAB
SUF 7514, 1993-2013, own calculations.
We estimate monthly transition rates between different labor market states following
Jung and Kuhn (2014), additionally conditioning on gender and education. After data
cleaning and wage/education imputations (as described above), we subdivide the spells
in our data into periods of employment, unemployment, and inactivity. These data are
then transformed into monthly slices. To get the transition rates, one simply has to
count, for instance, how many employed individuals in a given month were unemployed
in the previous month and divide this by the overall number of unemployed from the
previous month. We compute the transition rates for unemployment to employment
(UE) and employment to unemployment (EU) for the period of 1991-2014 and trim the
series to 1993-2013. For one, to have a time frame similar to the MC data. Also, this
allows for a burn-in of 24 months when computing flows. The resulting time series of
labor market flows are highly seasonal and exhibit cyclical patterns. As we are seeking to
126
Marriage and Divorce
connect an equilibrium search model to the data, we are (for now) not interested in the
cyclical properties. We first apply the X-13-ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment routine
of the U.S. Census Bureau.153 Afterwards, we use a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a penalty
parameter of λ = 900, 000 to remove the cyclical component from our monthly data. The
statistics reported in the following are computed for the seasonally adjusted and filtered
time series. For our analysis we take the yearly average of the monthly transition rates
in order to make the data compatible with the MC-data.
Table 3.2 presents the means of the transition rate over the years 1993-2013. In the
average month, 4.6% of unemployed workers find a job. The average job-finding rate
is higher for men (5.2%) and lower for women (3.9%). There are sizable differences
across education groups. Whereas low education women have the hardest time finding a
job overall, medium and highly-educated women have higher job-finding rates than the
corresponding men. Regarding separations, we note that on average men are more likely
to separate in a given month (0.7%) than women (0.5%). This is not true, however, for
all education groups. For both sexes, the overall level of the separation rate is mainly
driven by low education individuals, who are still a sizable share of the German labor
force (considering all age groups). Separation rates of better educated workers are lower
and almost similar for men and women with medium education. Interestingly, however,
highly-educated women have a 44% higher separation rate than similar men.
The monthly time series of job-finding and separation rates for men and women in all
education groups are shown in Appendix Figure A2.3. One insight from the transition
rates’ changes over time is worth keeping in mind for our structural empirical analysis in
Section 3.5: women with high and medium education have the highest job-finding rates
overall and they have increased significantly since the first half of the 2000s.
3.4 The Model
We extend the frictional marriage and divorce model by Goussé et al. (2017), which itself
is based on Shimer and Smith (2000) and Jacquemet and Robin (2013), by incorporating
that single and married men and women change their labor market status l. For simplicity
153We use the R package “seasonal” developed by Sax (2017).
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and compatibility with our data sources, we consider only employment (indexed by e)
and voluntary or involuntary unemployment (indexed by u), i.e., l ∈ {e, u}. Besides the
time varying labor market status, individuals differ in their level of education and the
associated wages (or wage distributions). We capture the time-invariant heterogeneity
of men and women by the indices i for men and j for women. We will be more specific
when the model is taken to the data.
3.4.1 Preferences and Home Production
Individual utility depends on private consumption c, leisure h, and the public good q. The
public good of a married couple depends on the time inputs of the spouses (di, dj). We
assume that these inputs are complements. The public good also depends on the types ij
and on an idiosyncratic bliss shock z drawn from the cumulative probability distribution
G, i.e., q = zF 1ij (di, dj). A bliss shock arrives at the type specific rate δij. The public
good of a single is solely a function of the time input di, i.e., q = F 0i (di). Employment
and unemployment enter the production of the public good indirectly by changing the
time available for the production of the public good. The total time available for an
individual is given by T > 1. We assume fixed working hours normalized to 1 for an
employed worker. Thus, the time remaining for leisure h and household production d is
given by,
di + hi = T li =

T − 1 for l = e,
T for l = u.
Working individuals will receive a wage wi depending on their type. Unemployed indi-
viduals receive a replacement income bwi if they are unemployed. Since working time
cannot be adjusted at the intensive margin, private consumption of a single is given by
ci = Rli =

wi for l = e,
bwi for l = u.
Following Goussé et al. (2017) we assume that households are subject to living cost Cij,
which is a function of the exogenous types ij. This fixed living cost is paid by the
spouses through transfers, i.e., ti + tj = Cij, which are determined by Nash-Bargaining.
128
Marriage and Divorce
The respective private consumption of a spouse is given by
ci = Rli − ti =

wi − ti for l = e,
bwi − ti for l = u.
The flow utility of a single individual depends on the public good F 0i (di), consumption
(equal income) ci = Rli, and leisure hi = T li − di, i.e.,
uli (di) = F 0i (di)
[
Rli + T li − di
]
. (3.3)
The bliss variable z for singles is normalized to unity. The flow utility of a married
individual depend on her own labor market status l ∈ {e, u} and the labor market status
of the partner −l ∈ {e, u}. It is assumed to have the following form,
ul,−li (ti, di, dj|z) = zF 1ij (di, dj)
[
Rli +
ι
2
(
R−lj −Rli
)2
− ti + T li − di
]
. (3.4)
The term ι2
(
R−lj −Rli
)2
takes into account the net income gain from joint taxation of
couples. The utility depends on the time (di, dj) devoted to public good production, the
contribution ti to the fixed cost of living, and the own and the partners labor market
status l and −l (via Rli, R−lj and T li ). Given the labor market status the time inputs
to public good production {di, dj} are chosen to maximize joint surplus of the match
and the transfers {ti, tj} to ensure that each individual gets its respective fraction of the
surplus.
3.4.2 Marriage Formation and Renegotiations
The present values of a marriage for a female (and the male respectively) depend on her
own labor market status l ∈ {e, u} and the labor market status of the partner −l ∈ {e, u}.
We denote the flow utility of the married female for the optimal choices of {di, dj, ti, tj}
by ul,−lj , where (l,−l) ∈ {(u, u) , (u, e) , (e, u) , (e, e)}. The following Bellman equation,
rV l,−lj = u
l,−l
j + δij
∫ [
max
[
V lj , V
l,−l
j (z′)
]
− V l,−lj
]
dG (z′) (3.5)
+τj (l)
[
max
[
V l
′
j , V
l′,−l
j
]
− V l,−lj
]
+ τi (−l)
[
max
[
V lj , V
l,−l′
j
]
− V l,−lj
]
,
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describes the present values of marriage. τj (l) denotes the exogenous transition rate
from the current labor market status l ∈ {e, u} into the labor market status l′ 6= l for an
individual of type j. The last term in the Bellman equations describes the labor market
transition of the partner of type i. Individuals do not make long-run commitments.
If a labor market transition or a bliss shock occurs, both partners renegotiate their
contributions (di, dj) to the public good and the transfers (ti, tj) to finance the fixed
living costs Cij. If the outside option is higher than the surplus from remaining married,
then the couple divorces. In the renegotiations {di, dj, ti, tj} are chosen such that the
Nash-Product, [
V l,−lj − V lj
]1−β [
V l,−li − V li
]β
, (3.6)
is maximized subject to the feasibility constraint ti + tj = Cij and the participation
constraint,
V l,−lj − V lj ≥ 0, and V
l,−l
i − V li ≥ 0,
where V li (V lj ) is the outside option of the single male (female) individual. The present
value of being a single female satisfies the Bellman equation,
rV lj = ulj + λij
∫∫∫ [
V l,−l
′
j (z′)− V lj
]
W llij (z′) dG (z′) s (i, l′) didl′+ τj (l)
[
V l
′
j − V lj
]
. (3.7)
The maximized flow utility of a single is denoted by ulj = maxdi uli (di). λij denotes the
type specific meeting rate of a potential partner. A meeting only results in a marriage if
the joint surplus is positive. The respective willingness to marry (or stay in the marriage)
is denoted by the indexW llij (z). If a pair is willing to marry (stay together) thenW llij (z) =
1, and zero otherwise. The willingness to marry depends on the types and the labor
market status (the first l corresponds to the male’s labor market status, the second
to the female’s) as well as the bliss shock z. We denote by αllij the probability that
W llij (z) = 1.
The marriage surplus is defined as the gain from marriage for the female and the male
of type ij and labor market status ll, where the first l corresponds to the male’s labor
market status, the second to the female’s, i.e.,
Sllij ≡
[
V l,−li − V li
]
+
[
V l,−lj − V lj
]
. (3.8)
130
Marriage and Divorce
Using the first order conditions for the transfers and the time devoted to public goods
production {di, dj, ti, tj} – derived in Appendix A.2 – the surplus for any type ij and
employment status ll is given by,
(r + δij + τi (l) + τj (l′))Sll
′
ij (z) (3.9)
= ull′ij (z) + δij
∫
max
[
Sll
′
ij (z′) , 0
]
dG (z′)
+τi (l) max
[
Sl
′l′
ij (z) , 0
]
+ τj (l′) max
[
Sllij (z) , 0
]
−λij (1− β)
∫∫∫
max
[
Sll
′′
ij (z′) , 0
]
dG (z′) s (j, l′′) djdl′′
−λijβ
∫∫∫
max
[
Sl
′′l′
ij (z′) , 0
]
dG (z′) s (i, l′′) didl′′,
where ullij (z) denotes the maximized joint flow surplus of both partners, i.e.,
ull
′
ij (z) ≡ u
l,−l′
i + u
l′,−l
j − uli − ul
′
j (3.10)
= zκij
[
Wij + ψll
′
ij
]κ
− κi
[
wi + ψli
]
− κj
[
wj + ψl
′
j
]
with
κ = 1 +K1f +K1m, κij = ZijK, κi =
(
K0i
)K0i
, κj =
(
K0j
)K0j
,
ψll
′
ij = −Cij + T li −D1i + T l
′
j −D1j , ψi = T li −D0i −K0i , ψj = T l
′
j −D0j −K0j ,
Wij = wi + wj + ι (wi − wj)2 .
The maximized joint flow surplus ull′ij (z) is strictly increasing in z. This ensures that
also the surplus functions are strictly increasing in z. The cutoff bliss values zll′ji for
ll′ ∈ {ee, ue, eu, uu} are defined such that the surplus is equal to zero, i.e., Sll′ji
(
zll
′
ji
)
= 0.
Since ull′ji (z) is increasing in z it follows that Sll
′
ji (z) > 0 for z > zll
′
ji . This allows us to
write the probability αll′ij that a couple of type ij and labor market status ll′ is willing to
marry upon meeting as,
αll
′
ij =
(
1−G
(
zll
′
ij
))
. (3.11)
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3.4.3 Steady State Flows and Measures
We denote by m (i, j, l, l) the number of married couples of type ij and labor market
status ll. The number of single males (females) of type i (j) and labor market status
l is denoted by s (i, l) (s (j, l)). The number of married couples of type ij and labor
market status ll divorce, if a bliss shock reduces the bliss value below zllij, or change into
another labor market status ll if one partner changes her/his employment status (at rate
τi (l) + τj (l)). The inflow, i.e., the number of new marriages of type ij and labor market
status ll formed, is given by λijαllijs (i, l) s (j, l), where αllij denotes the probability that
a couple of type ij and labor market status ll is willing to marry upon meeting. There
are additional inflows into the group m (i, j, l, l) from couples of labor market status
m (i, j, l′, l) and m (i, j, l, l′). The probability that a couple stays together after a change
of the labor market status from l′l to ll is equal to 1 if zllij ≤ zl
′l
ij and equal to αllij/αl
′l
ij < 1
if zllij > zl
′l
ij , i.e., equal to min
[(
αllij/α
l′l
ij
)
, 1
]
. We therefore get,
[
δij
(
1− αllij
)
+ (τi (l) + τj (l))
]
m (i, j, l, l) (3.12)
= λijαllijs (i, l) s (j, l)
+τi (l′) min
[(
αllij/α
l′l
ij
)
, 1
]
m (i, j, l′, l)
+τj (l′) min
[(
αllij/α
ll′
ij
)
, 1
]
m (i, j, l, l′) .
Let us now consider the flow equations for the respective single groups. The outflow
of a single male of type i with labor market status l is given by the rate at which the
individual marries with single female of type j with labor market status l′′, i.e., the
rate λijαll
′′
ij s (j, l′′), plus the rate at which the single male changes her/his labor market
status, i.e., the rate τi (l). The inflow is given by the rate at which the single males with
the opposite labor market status l′ change their status (at rate τi (l′)) plus the rate at
which the respective marriages break up. This happens when a bliss shock occurs (at rate
δij
(
1− αll′′ij
)
m (i, j, l, l′′)) or when the married male of type i or the married female of type
j changes the labor market status (at rates τ̃i (l′) max
[
1−
(
αll
′′
ij /α
l′l′′
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃ (i, j, l′, l′′) or
132
Marriage and Divorce
τ̃j (l′′) max
[
1−
(
αll
′
ij /α
ll′′
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃ (i, j, l, l′′)). Formally,
[∫∫
λijα
ll′′
ij s (j, l′′) djdl′′ + τi (l)
]
s (i, l) (3.13)
= τi (l′) s (i, l′) +
∫∫
δij
(
1− αll′′ij
)
m (i, j, l, l′′) djdl′′
+
∫∫
τ̃i (l′) max
[
1−
(
αll
′′
ij /α
l′l′′
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃ (i, j, l′, l′′) djdl′′
+
∫∫
τ̃j (l′′) max
[
1−
(
αll
′
ij /α
ll′′
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃ (i, j, l, l′′) djdl′′,
because max
[
1−
(
αll
′′
ij /α
l′l′′
ij
)
, 0
]
= 1−min
[(
αll
′′
ij /α
l′l′′
ij
)
, 1
]
. To get number of singles of
a certain type and labor market status we can use the aggregate labor market transitions,
e.g.,
τi(l)s(i, l) + τi(l)
∫∫
m (i, j, l, l′′) djdl′′ = τi(l′)s(i, l′) + τi(l′)
∫∫
m (i, j, l′, l′′) djdl′′,
and the market clearing conditions for the different types of males and females, e.g.,
n (i) = s (i, l′) + s (i, l) +
∫∫∫
m (i, j, l, l′′) djdl′′dl,
n (j) = s (j, l′) + s (j, l) +
∫∫∫
m (i, j, l, l′′) didl′′dl.
Substituting and rearranging then implies the following formula for singles of type i and
labor market status l,
s (i, l) = τi(l
′)
τi(l) + τi(l′)
n (i)−
∫∫∫ τi(l)
τi(l) + τi(l′)
m (i, j, l, l′′) djdl′′dl. (3.14)
3.4.4 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is characterized by a set of surplus functions Sllij (z), cutoff bliss values
zllij, and joint distributions of married couples m (i, j, l, l) for each type ij and labor
market status ll. We compute the equilibrium in the following way: Given a set of
initial conditions, the cutoff bliss values zllij determine αllij ≡
(
1−G
(
zllij
))
. Given αllij we
can use equations (3.12) and (3.14), i.e., a set of four equations for m (i, j, l, l) for each
ll ∈ {ee, ue, eu, uu} and a set of two equations determining s (i, l) and s (j, l) for each
l ∈ {e, u}, respectively, to compute s (i, l) and s (j, l). The number of singles s (i, l) and
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s (j, l) of type i (j) and labor market status l (l) determine the surplus functions Sllij (z)
given by equation (3.9) for all types ij and labor market status ll. The bliss values zllij for
all types ij and labor market status combinations ll are then pinned-down at a value such
that the respective surplus is zero, i.e., Sllij
(
zllij
)
= 0. The problem involves alternating
between solving the two fixed-point systems of Sllij (z) and zllij until convergence. Appendix
A.2 describes in detail how the fixed point systems are solved numerically.
3.4.5 Model Solution
Figure 3.4: z Cutoffs
(a) zeeij
Men2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Women
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
(b) zueij
Men2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Women
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5
10
15
20
25
30
(c) zeuij
Men2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Women
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5
10
15
20
25
30
(d) zuuij
Men2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Women
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
We solve the model on a Chebyshev grid with 50 × 50 nodes. We use the empirical
wage distribution functions estimated for men and women in Section 3.3.2 to set up the
underlying distributions of men and women, n(i) and n(j). Given a first parametrization
(see Appendix A.2), the model’s stationary equilibrium exhibits a number of interest-
ing properties. Here, we focus on the distribution of married couples across type and
employment status combinations because this is what we see in our data.
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Figure 3.5: Marriage Probabilities αllij
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Figure 3.4 shows the minimum realizations of the bliss shock a couple needs to draw
upon meeting in order to form a marriage. This value is highest for the lowest types
of men and women. The higher the types of the man and woman who are meeting the
lower is the z they need to draw in order to have a positive marriage surplus. This
pattern holds across all employment status combinations, the levels, however, are very
different. The outside option of continued search in the marriage market is higher for
employed individuals, hence the necessity to draw higher z values in order to compensate
both parties. Meetings between unemployed men and women need the lowest z overall to
result in wedlock. The model-generated marriage probabilities αllij are the mirror image
of the z values. They are depicted in Figure 3.5. Again, the general pattern is the same
across all employment status combinations, the marriage probability increased in both
partners’ types. Our structural estimation in the next Section will enable us to compare
the model generated marriage probabilities to their empirical counterparts.
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3.5 Decomposition of Marriage and Divorce
We now take our structural model of the marriage market to the data. This connection
allows us to go beyond the descriptive analysis in Section 3.3. We use our model to
uncover the different contributing factors to matching and separation decisions at the
individual level from the data. This allows us to decompose and explain the observed
aggregate dynamics of marriage and divorce. We first highlight the relevant matching
mechanisms in our model and then describe how to identify their relative importance
from the data.
According to our model, matching in the marriage market has two components: The
meeting rate, λij, determines the likelihood of meeting a certain type of partner in the
frictional marriage market. The ij dependence resembles the idea that individuals, de-
pending on their type, have different probabilities to meet with heterogeneous members
of the other sex. This is likely to occur, since many couples meet at education institutions
or at the workplace. The second component of matching decisions are the acceptance
probabilities, αij. Conditional on meeting, they capture the likelihood of wedlock. It
differs across ij combinations because, according to our model, the option value of con-
tinued search for another partner may dominate forming the marriage. The willingness
to marry αij and the meeting rate λij may also differ across labor market statuses.
Regarding divorce, two things can happen: First, a negative update of the match-
specific bliss shock z occurs, decreasing home production and flow utilities. This may
drive the marriage surplus below zero and lead to a divorce. Second, as we have empha-
sized throughout, labor market transitions may trigger divorces. These “labor market
divorces” may happen for two reasons: First, an employed spouse becomes unemployed.
Depending on the combination of types in the couple, the drop in household income
may outweigh the increase in home production (via the time input) and, hence, decrease
utility flows and lead to divorce. Second, a previously unemployed spouse may find it
optimal to divorce after finding a new job. Theoretically, the outside option of starting
over in the marriage market as an employed person can dominate the option value of
staying in the current match.
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Looking at the data through the lens of our model, we now let the data decide
which channels drive marriage and divorce in Germany and analyze how their respective
contributions have evolved over time.
3.5.1 Meetings & Marriages
Using our three sources of micro data (MC, SIAB, MDR), we estimate the simultaneous
flow equation system from our model, summarized in Equation (3.13), using variation
across time and single/couple types. The details of our estimation procedure are in-
cluded in Appendix A.3. In short, we construct the empirical counterparts of the (joint)
distributions of singles and married couples from MC data and define them as follows:
s̃lit = s (i, l) and m̃llijt = m (i, j, l, l). The observed labor market transition rates τ̃ lit = τi (l)
are the second data input. Due to the nature of our aggregate data, variation is limited
and we need to discipline the estimation. We derive a large set of equality, inequality,
and non-linear constraints from our model and impose them on the parameters to be
estimated. In particular, our constraints guarantee that all estimated values of α̂llij, the
estimated matching probabilities, lie in the unit interval. Given the flow equations and the
constraints, we estimate a set of composite parameters using a non-linear least squares
method.154 It is then possible to back out the model parameters from the estimated
composite parameters.
Table 3.3 shows our estimates of the four αllij matrices, one for each combination
of the spouses’ labor market status (ll ∈ {ee, ue, eu, uu}). Our descriptive analysis of
education-based sorting in Section 3.3.1 has revealed that the tendency to sort is not
uniform across education groups. Based on our model, we can now refine this statement
by additionally taking into account the estimated matching probabilities across types and
labor market statuses of the spouses.
In each Panel, the horizontal dimension of the table represents the female education
types (j) and the vertical dimension the male types (i). In many cases, the restrictions
we impose on the data are binding; we get matching probabilities of one. Meetings of two
employed singles (Panel 3.3a) have the overall highest probabilities of ending in wedlock.
These couples also contribute to marriage market sorting. Estimated probabilities are
154We rely on the excellent lmfit package for Python by Newville et al. (2014).
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Table 3.3: Estimates of Matching Probability αllij
(a)
j
α̂eeij low medium high
low 0.96 0.62 0.53
i medium 0.99 0.72 1.00
high 0.53 1.00 0.78
(b)
j
α̂euij low medium high
low 0.01 0.79 0.89
i medium 0.88 1.00 1.00
high 0.89 0.01 1.00
(c)
j
α̂ueij low medium high
low 0.45 0.14 0.05
i medium 0.20 1.00 1.00
high 0.05 1.00 0.24
(d)
j
α̂uuij low medium high
low 0.00 0.05 0.45
i medium 0.06 1.00 0.07
high 0.45 0.00 1.00
Note: Estimated marriage probabilities as derived from our model for men and women with three education categories
(low, medium, high) and two employment categories (employed, unemployed). Source: Research Data Center of the
Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own calculations. SIAB source: Research
Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for Employment Research, SIAB, 1993-2013, own
calculations.
high on the main diagonal and low for the low/high and high/low combinations. Proba-
bilities are one for medium/high and high/medium couples. Panel 3.3b contains marriage
probabilities of employed men and unemployed women of all types. The matching proba-
bility of two low education individuals with this employment status combination is almost
zero, the other two values on the main diagonal, however, are one. Hence, these com-
binations also sort positively. Interestingly, the combination of a high-type man and a
medium-type woman has a very low estimated matching probability while in the inverse
case, high-type women (unemployed) and medium-type men (employed) are very likely
to match. Panel 3.3c shows the case of an unemployed man and an employed woman.
For two highly-educated individuals, this labor market status combination is not likely
to lead to marriage (24%). Marriage is ensured conditional on meeting, however, for the
medium/medium, high/medium and medium/high type combinations, what is in line
with positive sorting. Unions involving low type individuals have matching probabilities
which are monotonically decreasing in the partner’s education type. Finally, we show in
Panel 3.3d that two unemployed singles who meet are ensured to mate if both partners
have medium or high education. All other probabilities are very low, with the exception
of the two high-low combinations. Both in Panels 3.3b and 3.3d the high matching prob-
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abilities for the high-low combinations can be rationalized with the prevalence of joint
taxation in Germany, which creates incentives for negative sorting.
While the overall picture of a tendency to sort positively is confirmed across the alphas,
our prior from the descriptive analysis can be updated. It is true that the tendency to sort
varies across education types but there is also interesting variation across employment
status combinations. While two employed individuals will get married with a very high
probability in all education categories, dating couples with an unemployed man are very
unlikely to match if one of the potential partners has low education. Unemployment of
the woman, however, seems to matter much less, matching probabilities are high almost
everywhere.
Two unemployed individuals are least likely to get married overall but they still con-
tribute to positive sorting, the upper two main diagonal elements are one. Note also that
the solution of our model depicted in Section 3.4.5 can match the overall picture in the
data of higher matching probabilities for higher education types but it cannot reproduce
the heterogeneity across education cells. More work is needed to calibrate the model and
to map the finer wage grid on which the theoretical model is solved into the education
categories we have as a proxy in our data.
Given the estimates for αllij and our constraints, we can go one step further and
calculate the estimated number of meetings per month across partner types. The number
of meetings per month for a given education-pair ij with labor market status combination
ll is given by multiplying the mean of the respective single shares, s̄li and s̄lj, with the
estimated λ̂ij parameter. Comparing the number of meetings across education groups
and labor market status allows us to analyze whether search in the marriage market is
random or directed.
Table 3.4 presents the estimated number of meetings per month again across all mar-
riage and labor market type combinations. We note that for employed singles (Panel 3.4a)
the number of meetings are highest for medium and high type individuals, with the sur-
prising exception that high type singles have a rather low number of meetings. One has
to take into account, however, that both male and female singles with high education are
rare in the marriage market. Panel 3.4b reveals that unemployed low type women have
a high number of meetings with all types of employed men. The ranking of matching
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Table 3.4: Estimates of Meeting Rates λllij
(a)
j
λ̂eeij s̄
e
i s̄
e
j low medium high
low 1.33e-04 5.50e-05 4.19e-04
i medium 8.51e-04 2.80e-03 1.90e-01
high 5.46e-04 3.38e-02 8.24e-04
(b)
j
λ̂euij s̄
e
i s̄
u
j low medium high
low 2.45e-02 2.44e-05 1.39e-04
i medium 1.01e-03 7.73e-04 9.55e-03
high 1.59e-03 1.00e-04 7.29e-05
(c)
j
λ̂ueij s̄
u
i s̄
e
j low medium high
low 1.56e-04 6.44e-05 4.91e-04
i medium 4.58e-04 1.51e-03 2.83e-03
high 2.53e-04 5.42e-04 3.84e-04
(d)
j
λ̂uuij s̄
u
i s̄
u
j low medium high
low 2.88e-02 2.86e-05 1.63e-04
i medium 5.42e-04 1.31e-04 5.19e-03
high 7.37e-04 4.65e-05 5.94e-06
Note: Estimated meeting rates for men and women with three education categories (low, medium, high) and two
employment categories (employed, unemployed), multiply by the respective share of single in the population. Source:
Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own
calculations. SIAB source: Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency at the Institute for
Employment Research, SIAB, 1993-2013, own calculations.
probabilities for the same cells, however, was opposite (recall Table 3.3). There are a lot
of meetings between low-type men and low type women in the (eu) category but only
a small fraction of them ends in marriage. Between low type women and medium/high
type men, the number of meetings are lower by a factor of 10 but, conditional on meeting,
marriage is very likely. This pattern seems to be consistent with random search of low
type individuals in the marriage market, that is, search is not directed towards partner
types with a high likelihood of marriage. For the high/medium type combinations, how-
ever, search appears to be directed as high values of α̂euij coincide with a high number of
meetings λ̂euij s̄ei s̄uj . This pattern of random search of low type individuals and directed
search of medium and high type individuals is repeated in Panel 3.4c. It seems to be a
consistent feature of the German marriage market. Panel 3.4d, however, is a special case.
For two unemployed individuals, the highest number of meetings (low/low) essentially
never leads to marriage. Conversely unemployed high type singles are very unlikely to
meet but very likely to marry.
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Figure 3.6: Divorce Rate and Share of Idiosyncratic Divorces
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Note: MC data source: Research Data Center of the Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus,
1993-2013, own calculations. SIAB source: Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency at the
Institute for Employment Research, SIAB SUF 7514, 1993-2013, own calculations.
3.5.2 Divorces
Our model implies that the aggregate flow of divorces must be consistent with the fol-
lowing aggregated flow equation:
∆̃t = δ
∫∫∫∫ (
1− αl′′lij
)
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl (3.15)
+
∫∫∫∫
τ̃ l
′′
it max
[
1−
(
αl
′l
ij /α
l′′l
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl
+
∫∫∫∫
τ̃ ljt max
[
1−
(
αl
′′l′
ij /α
l′′l
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl.
∆̃t is the aggregate number of divorces in the data. By plugging in our estimated α̂llij
matrices on the RHS of equation (3.15) we can decompose the divorce flow into the shares
of divorces caused by idiosyncratic shocks (first term on the RHS), the share caused by
male labor market transitions (second term on the RHS), and the share caused by female
labor market transitions (third term on the RHS).
We are interested in the share of divorces induced by labor market transitions, that
is, one spouse transferring from employment to unemployment or vice versa. For suc-
cinctness, we refer to them as “labor market divorces”. We can further differentiate these
divorces for our four types of couples by labor market status combination before the
transition and the underlying heterogeneity of types (education).
As a first step, we look at the aggregate divorce rate, see the left Panel of Figure 3.6.
The overall number of divorces has declined significantly during our period of observation,
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it fell from 7% to below 5%. The right Panel shows the share of labor market divorces
in all separations. The majority of divorces is not triggered by labor market shocks.
According to our theory, the “residual”, between about 92% and 94% of all divorces, are
triggered by an update of the bliss shock z. Remarkably, however, the share of labor
market divorces has increased over time, against the overall trend of a declining divorce
rate. The share was quite stable at around 6% until 2004 and started increasing rapidly
thereafter, with a small correction in 2011, reaching almost 7.5% in 2013.
To understand which couple types contributed to the increasing share of labor market
divorces, we now further differentiate it according to our gender-education-marriage-type
cells. We look at married men and women in marriages with all four employment status
combinations and across all 9 education types. The data for all cells can be found in
Appendix A.1.
For males affected by a job loss, the share of separations has most drastically increased
for couples in which both spouses are highly educated and employed. It increased from
0.12% to 0.25% of all divorces. This corresponds to roughly 10% of the overall increase
we measure. Interestingly, this education combination never divorces upon job loss of the
man when the woman is already unemployed. Conversely, a sizable number of divorces
occur for similar couples with the only difference being that the husband has a lower
education type (medium) than the woman (high). Male education seems to matter a
lot for the survival probability of marriages. Other important contributions to divorces
triggered by male job loss come from employed couples with low education males and
low or medium educated females, respectively. This is true irrespectively of the female
employment status. The share has not increased in the second half of our sample, however.
Rather, it decreased towards the end.
We find that a male finding a job, so a transition from unemployment to employment,
almost never triggers a divorce. The only exception: when both partners have medium
education and the wife is already employed, the husband’s new job leads to 0.33% of
divorces in the beginning of our period and to 0.74% in the end. This is roughly a third
of the overall increase of labor market divorces.
Let us now turn to female labor market transitions. Overall, the likelihood of a divorce
is much lower when women lose their job as compared to men. Two groups of couples
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have sizable propensities to divorce upon female job loss, however: employed couples
with two low education spouses and employed couples with a high education husband
and a medium education wife. For the latter group, the share of divorces has increased
from 0.19% to 0.30%, about 10% of the overall effect. The share of the low-education
employed couple is also more than 0.10% but it has not increased over time.
Finally, we look at married females who exit from unemployment. There are four
striking cases which, in combination, make up most of the time dynamics of labor mar-
ket divorces we observe. First, highly-educated couples in which both spouses were
unemployed before the woman finds a job are responsible for 2.10% of the overall number
of divorces in 2013. This share has almost quintupled over time and alone accounts for
most of the observed aggregate increase of labor market divorces. Second, the divorce
share of unemployed couples with a low education husband and a highly educated wife
has also increased significantly over time, it grew by almost 50%. Conversely, the share
of the opposite couple type, high education man and low education woman who are both
unemployed and divorce when the woman starts working is also sizable (0.32% in 2013)
but decreasing over time. Third, now looking at couples where the man is already em-
ployed and the woman starts working, the share of divorces between, again, two highly
educated spouses has almost doubled to 0.45% in 2013. Fourth, the share of the biggest
contributor to labor market divorces in the beginning of our sample (almost 2%) has
decreased significantly. Couples who share medium education and the woman joins the
labor market in addition to a working husband, however, are still responsible for 1.31%
of all divorces in 2013.
The analysis of the shares of labor market divorces reveals an interesting general
picture: it is mostly the group of couples with two high or medium education spouses that
drives labor market divorces, so the sorted couples. Some combinations of low education
couples are also affected by labor market uncertainty but their share of divorces has
decreased significantly over time.
Strikingly, in many cases these sorted high education couples divorce when the woman
starts working. The increasing share of this kind of divorces can be connected to an earlier
observation we made based on the labor market flow data. The job-finding rate of high
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and medium education women has increased significantly in the second half of our sample,
much more strongly than the respective transition rates of males.
Finally, recall Figure 3.1. We have observed that formerly increasing educational
sorting has leveled off in the second half of the 2000s. Our structural decomposition of
divorce flows has enabled us to make sense of this observation. If sorted couples show the
tendency to react more strongly to both job-finding and separation shocks it would be
natural to expect that the correlation between education values will not surpass a certain
point.
3.6 Conclusions
This piece of research has connected the two-sided marriage market model of Goussé
et al. (2017) to the labor market. The uncertainty that singles and married couples
face regarding their labor market status is, as we show theoretically and empirically, an
important driving force of matching decisions in the marriage market. Using three sources
of German micro data, we document that the German marriage market is coined by
positive sorting of in the marriage market based on education, income, and employment
status. The trend towards more educational sorting, however, has stalled in recent years.
We perform a structural empirical analysis that allows us to back out key elements
of our marriage market model from the data, specifically meeting rates and matching
probabilities. We find that search patterns in the marriage market appear to be directed
for highly educated individuals while single with low education search randomly. Based
on our data and the estimated model parameters, we decompose the aggregate flow of
divorces into the share induced by labor market transitions and by match-specific shocks.
Transitions from employment to unemployment or vice versa make up only a minor
fraction of all divorces. This fraction, however, shows interesting dynamics. The share of
labor market divorces has grown by more than 20% since the mid 2000s and most of the
additional divorcées are highly educated and were married to highly educated individuals.
Most of these marriages break up when a previously unemployed woman starts working,
especially if the husband stays unemployed. In 2013, 5.3% of all divorces happened when
a previously unemployed woman started to work. This percentage share equals 27,968
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divorces. The case that the literature has previously analyzed, divorce upon male job
loss, accounts only for a shrinking fraction of all divorces in Germany.
One possible explanation for the differential changes of different couple types in the
overall number of labor market divorce relates to the booming German labor market
in the second half of the 2000s. Many low education couples divorce for reasons of
economic hardship and related stress in the relationship when they become unemployed.
This divorce hazard may have been mitigated by the shrinking unemployment rate in
Germany and the good general macroeconomic environment. High education couples
who are the source of assortative matching in the marriage market, however, seem to
divorce for other reasons. When a high education women starts working, for instance,
this might change the balance of power and the resource sharing in a household. Due
to favorable outside options of two employed persons, the option value of searching for a
new partner in the marriage market might become dominant.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A.1 Additional Results
MC Data
Figure A2.1: Education by Gender
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Note: Population shares are weighted and scaled using the MC sample weights. 100% on the y-axis corresponds to the
full population, including married and unmarried individuals of both sexes. MC source: Research Data Center of the
Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own calculations.
Figure A2.2: Education and Marital status by Gender
(a) Men
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(b) Women
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Note: Population shares are weighted and scaled using the MC sample weights. 100% on the y-axis corresponds to the
full population, including married and unmarried individuals of both sexes. MC source: Research Data Center of the
Statistical Offices of the Länder and the Federal State, Microcensus, 1993-2013, own calculations.
Figure A2.1 depicts the respective population shares of men and women in each of
three education categories: Panel (a) shows that for men the education distribution has
not changed much between 1991 and 2013. The share of highly educated men increased
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somewhat and surpassed 15% in 2009. For women in Panel (b), the share of women with
high education has increased much stronger, from 7.2% in 1991 to almost 12% in 2013.
The share of low education women has decreased accordingly. For both men and women
the share with medium education is roughly constant over time. Figure A2.2 further
breaks down the three education shares into married and single individuals.
SIAB Data
Figure A2.3: Job-Finding and Separation Rates
(a) Job-finding of men
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(b) Job-finding of women
(1993, 1) (1997, 3) (2001, 5) (2005, 7) (2009, 9) (2013, 11)
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(c) Separations of men
(1993, 1) (1997, 3) (2001, 5) (2005, 7) (2009, 9) (2013, 11)
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(d) Separations of women
(1993, 1) (1997, 3) (2001, 5) (2005, 7) (2009, 9) (2013, 11)
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Note: seasonally adjusted (X-13-ARIMA-SEATS) and HP-filtered (λ = 900, 000) monthly job-finding and separation
rates by gender and education category. SIAB source: Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the Federal Employment Agency
at the Institute for Employment Research, SIAB SUF 7514, 1993-2013, own calculations.
Shares Labor Market Transitions in Divorce Flows
The following four tables show the decomposition of the aggregate number of divorces
into shares for all gender-education-marriage cells, using equation (3.15).
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A.2 Theoretical Appendix
Surplus function
To obtain the surplus function, consider first the gain from marriage for a female of type
j with labor market status l. i.e.,
(r + δij + τj (l) + τi (−l))
[
V l,−lj − V lj
]
(3.16)
= ul,−lj + δij
∫
max
[
V l,−lj (z′)− V lj , 0
]
dG (z′)
+τj (l) max
[
V l
′,−l
j − V l
′
j , 0
]
+ τi (−l) max
[
V l,−l
′
j − V lj , 0
]
−rV lj + τj (l)
[
V l
′
j − V lj
]
= ul,−lj + δij
∫
max
[
V l,−lj (z′)− V lj , 0
]
dG (z′)
+τj (l) max
[
V l
′,−l
j − V l
′
j , 0
]
+ τi (−l) max
[
V l,−l
′
j − V lj , 0
]
−ulj − λij
∫∫∫ [
V l,−l
′
j (z′)− V lj
]
W llij (z′) dG (z′) s (i, l′) didl′,
where the second equality follows from substituting rV lj using equation (3.7). The gain
from marriage for the male partner is defined similarly. Take the per period utility
function uli (ti, di, dj|z) for couples as defined in equation (3.4)
ul,−li (ti, di, dj|z) = zF 1ij (di, dj)
[
Rli +
ι
2
(
R−lj −Rli
)2
− ti + T li − di
]
,
ul,−lj (tj, dj, di|z) = zF 1ij (di, dj)
[
Rlj +
ι
2
(
Rlj −R−li
)2
− Cij + ti + T lj − dj
]
,
where we used ti + tj = Cij to substitute tj. Maximizing the Nash-Product (3.6) with
respect to ti impies,
1− β
V l,−lj − V lj
∂ulj (tj, dj, di|z)
∂ti
= β
V l,−li − V li
∂uli (ti, di, dj|z)
∂ti
,
(1− β)
[
V l,−li − V li
]
= β
[
V l,−lj − V lj
]
.
Using the definition of the surplus in equation (3.8) allows us to write
[
V l,−li − V li
]
= βSllij
and
[
V l,−lj − V lj
]
= (1− β)Sllij. Using the gain from marriage for a female of type j in
equation (3.16) and the respective equation for a male of type i allows us to write the
surplus for any employment status ll as stated in equation (3.9).
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The optimal time input into the public good’s production follows from differentiating
the Nash-Product (3.6), i.e.,
1− β
V llf − V lj
∂ulj (tj, dj, di|z)
∂di
= − β
V llm − V li
∂ulj (tj, dj, di|z)
∂di
z
∂F 1ij (di, dj)
∂di
[
Rli +Rlj + ι
(
Rlj −Rli
)2
− Cij + T li − di + T lj − dj
]
= zF 1ij (di, dj)
where the second line follows from taking into account that (1− β)
[
V llm − V li
]
= β
[
V llf − V lj
]
.
Under the assumption that the public good production functions are Stone-Geary, i.e.,
F 1ij (di, dj) = Zij
(
di −D1i
)Ki (
dj −D1j
)Kj
,
with 0 < Ki +Kj < 1, we get,
∂F 1ij (di, dj)
∂di
= Ki
di −D1i
F 1ij (di, dj) .
The optimal time inputs for the female and the male are given by,
(di −Di) =
Ki
1 +Kj +Ki
[
Rli +Rlj + ι
(
Rlj −Rli
)2
− Cij + T li −D1i + T lj −D1j
]
,
(dj −Dj) =
Kj
1 +Kj +Ki
[
Rli +Rlj + ι
(
Rlj −Rli
)2
− Cij + T li −D1i + T lj −D1j
]
.
In equilibrium the public good is therefore given by,
F 1ij (di, dj) = Zij (1 +Kj +Ki)K
[
Rli +Rlj + ι
(
Rlj −Rli
)2
− Cij + T li −D1i + T lj −D1j
]Kj+Ki
where K = (Ki)
Ki (Kj)Kj
(1 +Kj +Ki)1+Kj+Ki
.
Maximized joint flow utility in a marriage is hence given by,
ul,−li + u
l,−l
j = zZijK
[
Rli +Rlj + ι
(
Rlj −Rli
)2
− Cij + T li −D1i + T lj −D1j
]1+Kj+Ki
.
Given the flow utility function for singles in equation (3.3), and the public good produc-
tion function F 0i (di) = (di −D0i )
K0i the optimal time input for the public good is hence
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given by di −D0i = K0i and the maximized flow utility for a single male of type i by
uli =
(
K0i
)K0i [
Rli + T li −D0i −K0i
]
.
The maximized joint flow utility in a marriage ul,−li +u
l,−l
j and the maximized flow utility
for the respective singles uli and ulj give the maximized joint flow surplus of both partners
in equation (3.10).
Computation of the fixed point
The first step to determine the surplus functions Sllij (z) and the cutoff values zllij is to
compute integrated surpluses Sl
′l
zllij
, where the subindex zllij indicates the support over
which the surplus is integrated, i.e.,
S
l′l
zllij
≡
∫ ∞
zllij
Sl
′l
ij (z′′) dG (z′′) .
Integrating the surplus functions (3.9) for the different labor market status combinations
{ll, l′l, ll′, l′l′} over the support under consideration, i.e., support
[
zllij,∞
]
if the considered
cutoff value is zllij, gives the following fixed-point equation for each labor market status
combinations {ll, l′l, ll′, l′l′} given zllij, i.e.,
(r + δij + τi (l) + τj (l))S
ll
zllij
= κij
[
Wij + ψllij
]κ
Φ
(
σ2 − ln zllij
σ
)
e
1
2σ
2
+
(
δijS
ll
zllij
− Θ̂llij
) [
1− Φ
(
ln zllij
σ
)]
+τi (l) η(ll,l
′l)
ij S
l′l
zllij
+ τi (l)
(
1− η(ll,l
′l)
ij
)
S
l′l
zl
′l
ij
+τj (l) η(ll,ll
′)
ij S
ll′
zllij
+ τj (l)
(
1− η(ll,ll
′)
ij
)
S
ll′
zll
′
ij
,
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(r + δij + τi (l′) + τj (l))S
l′l
zllij
= κij
[
Wij + ψl
′l
ij
]κ
Φ
(
σ2 − ln zllij
σ
)
e
1
2σ
2
+
(
δijS
l′l
zl
′l
ij
− Θ̂l′lij
) [
1− Φ
(
ln zllij
σ
)]
+τi (l′)S
ll
zllij
+τj (l) η(ll,l
′l′)
ij S
l′l′
zllij
+ τj (l)
(
1− η(ll,l
′l′)
ij
)
S
l′l′
zl
′l′
ij
,
(r + δij + τi (l) + τj (l′))S
ll′
zllij
= κij
[
Wij + ψll
′
ij
]κ
Φ
(
σ2 − ln zllij
σ
)
e
1
2σ
2
+
(
δijS
ll′
zll
′
ij
− Θ̂ll′ij
) [
1− Φ
(
ln zllij
σ
)]
+τi (l) η(ll,l
′l′)
ij S
l′l′
zllij
+ τi (l)
(
1− η(ll,l
′l′)
ij
)
S
l′l′
zl
′l′
ij
+τj (l′)S
ll
zllij
,
(r + δij + τi (l′) + τj (l′))S
l′l′
zllij
= κij
[
Wij + ψl
′l′
ij
]κ
Φ
(
σ2 − ln zllij
σ
)
e
1
2σ
2
+
(
δijS
l′l′
zl
′l′
ij
− Θ̂l′l′ij
) [
1− Φ
(
ln zllij
σ
)]
+τi (l′) η(ll,ll
′)
ij S
ll′
zllij
+ τi (l′)
(
1− η(ll,ll
′)
ij
)
S
ll′
zll
′
ij
+τj (l′) η(ll,l
′l)
ij S
l′l
zllij
+ τj (l′)
(
1− η(ll,l
′l)
ij
)
S
l′l
zl
′l
ij
,
where
η
(ll,l′l)
ij =

0 if zllij ≤ zl
′l
ij ,
1 if zllij > zl
′l
ij ,
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and
Θ̂llij = κi
[
wi + ψli
]
+ κj
[
wj + ψlj
]
+ λij (1− β)
∫∫
S
ll′′
zll
′′
ij
s (j, l′′) djdl′′ + λijβ
∫∫
S
l′′l
zl
′′l
ij
s (i, l′′) didl′′,
Θ̂l′lij = κi
[
wi + ψl
′
i
]
+ κj
[
wj + ψlj
]
+ λij (1− β)
∫∫
S
l′l′′
zl
′l′′
ij
s (j, l′′) djdl′′ + λijβ
∫∫
S
l′′l
zl
′′l
ij
s (i, l′′) didl′′,
Θ̂ll′ij = κi
[
wi + ψli
]
+ κj
[
wj + ψl
′
j
]
+ λij (1− β)
∫∫
S
ll′′
zll
′′
ij
s (j, l′′) djdl′′ + λijβ
∫∫
S
l′′l′
zl
′′l′
ij
s (i, l′′) didl′′,
Θ̂l′l′ij = κi
[
wi + ψl
′
i
]
+ κj
[
wj + ψl
′
j
]
+ λij (1− β)
∫∫
S
l′l′′
zl
′l′′
ij
s (j, l′′) djdl′′ + λijβ
∫∫
S
l′′l′
zl
′′l′
ij
s (i, l′′) didl′′.
These equations have to be solved simultaneously given a set of (initial) cutoff values{
zeeij , z
ue
ij , z
eu
ij , z
uu
ij
}
. The values Sl
′l
zllij
, S
ll′
zllij
, and Sl
′l′
zllij
for each zllij ∈
{
zeeij , z
ue
ij , z
eu
ij , z
uu
ij
}
are
not needed for further analysis. They are only required to find the fixed-points Sllzllij for
each labor market status ll ∈ {ee, eu, ue, uu}. Given the fixed-points Sllzllij for each labor
market status ll, we can use the following equation system based on the surplus function
given in equation (3.9) to find the zllij associated with each labor market status ll, i.e.,
0 = zllijκij
[
Wij + ψllij
]κ
+ δijS
ll
zllij
− Θ̂llij
+τi (l) max
[
Sl
′l
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
+τj (l) max
[
Sll
′
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
,
(r + δij + τi (l′) + τj (l))Sl
′l
ij
(
zllij
)
= zllijκij
[
Wij + ψl
′l
ij
]κ
+ δijS
l′l
zl
′l
ij
− Θ̂l′lij
+τj (l) max
[
Sl
′l′
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
,
(r + δij + τi (l) + τj (l′))Sll
′
ij
(
zllij
)
= zllijκij
[
Wij + ψll
′
ij
]κ
+ δijS
ll′
zll
′
ij
− Θ̂ll′ij
+τi (l) max
[
Sl
′l′
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
,
(r + δij + τi (l′) + τj (l′))Sl
′l′
ij
(
zllij
)
= zllijκij
[
Wij + ψl
′l′
ij
]κ
+ δijS
l′l′
zl
′l′
ij
− Θ̂l′l′ij
+τi (l′) max
[
Sll
′
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
+τj (l′) max
[
Sl
′l
ij
(
zllij
)
, 0
]
,
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where the zero in the first equation follows from Sllij
(
zllij
)
= 0. Again the values Sl′lij
(
zllij
)
,
Sll
′
ij
(
zllij
)
, and Sl′l′ij
(
zllij
)
for each zllij ∈
{
zeeij , z
ue
ij , z
eu
ij , z
uu
ij
}
are not needed for further anal-
ysis. Iterating between the two equation systems while updating the (joint) distributions
of married individuals as well as singles in every iteration using Equations (3.12) and
(3.14) determines the fixed-point of the system for Sllzllij and z
ll
ij and each combination of
labor market statuses ll ∈ {ee, eu, ue, uu}. In practice, a Python implementation of the
model converges pretty fast, in less than one minute on a Chebyshev grid with 50 × 50
nodes.
Calibration
Table A2.5: Calibration of the Marriage Market Model
Parameter Symbol Value Source
Discount rate r 0.05 -
Women’s bargaining power β 0.7 -
Value of nonmarket activity b 0.8 -
Joint taxation ι 0.1 -
Meeting rate λ 8.5 -
Bliss shock updates δ 0.1 -
Mean of z distribution µ(z) 1.65. -
Standard deviation of z distribution σ(z) 4.67. -
Male job-finding rate τi(u) 5.16 SIAB data
Female job-finding rate τj(u) 3.88 SIAB data
Male separation rate τi(e) 0.71 SIAB data
Female separation rate τj(u) 0.60 SIAB data
Home production, single K0f 0.02 Goussé et al. (2017)
Home production, single K0m 0.00 Goussé et al. (2017)
Home production, married K1f 0.02 Mean of Goussé et al. (2017)
Home production, married K1m 0.01 Mean of Goussé et al. (2017)
Home production, married D1f 0.06 Mean of Goussé et al. (2017)
Home production, married D1m 0.06 Mean of Goussé et al. (2017)
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A.3 Structural Estimation
The probabilities αll′ij that a meeting of a type i male and type j female with labor market
status l and l′ leads to a marriage is estimated with a constrained linear equation system
using the flow equations of m (i, j, l, l′) in equation (3.12). To simplify the notation below
we define the data of period t as follows, τ̃ lit = τi (l), m̃llijt = m (i, j, l, l) and s̃lit = s (i, l).
The system of four equations, one for each labor market status ll′ ∈ {ee, eu, ue, uu} can
be written in the following matrix notation, yijt = Zijtbij + εijt. Given the data on labor
market transition rates for males and females, τ̃ lit and τ̃ ljt, and the number of singles and
married couples, s̃lit,s̃ljt and m̃llijt, the LHS of the equation system is given by the vector,
yijt =

y1ijt
y2ijt
y3ijt
y4ijt

=

(
τ̃ eit + τ̃ ejt
)
m̃eeijt(
τ̃uit + τ̃ ejt
)
m̃ueijt(
τ̃ eit + τ̃ujt
)
m̃euijt(
τ̃uit + τ̃ujt
)
m̃uuijt

.
The RHS is given by
Zijt =

Z1ijt 0 0 0
0 Z2ijt 0 0
0 0 Z3ijt 0
0 0 0 Z4ijt

with
Z1ijt =
(
z11ijt z
12
ijt z
13
ijt z
14
ijt
)
=
(
τ̃uitm̃
ue
ijt τ̃
u
jtm̃
eu
ijt s̃
e
its̃
e
jt m̃
ee
ijt
)
Z2ijt =
(
z21ijt z
22
ijt z
23
ijt z
24
ijt
)
=
(
τ̃ eitm̃
ee
ijt τ̃
u
jtm̃
uu
ijt s̃
u
its̃
e
jt m̃
ue
ijt
)
Z3ijt =
(
z31ijt z
32
ijt z
33
ijt z
34
ijt
)
=
(
τ̃uitm̃
uu
ijt τ̃
e
jtm̃
ee
ijt s̃
e
its̃
u
jt m̃
eu
ijt
)
Z4ijt =
(
z21ijt z
22
ijt z
23
ijt z
24
ijt
)
=
(
τ̃ eitm̃
eu
ijt τ̃
e
jtm̃
ue
ijt s̃
u
its̃
u
jt m̃
uu
ijt
)
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and the coefficient vector,
bij =

β1ij
′
β2ij
′
β3ij
′
β4ij
′

with
β1ij =
(
β11ij β
12
ij β
13
ij β
14
ij
)
=
(
min
[(
αeeij /α
ue
ij
)
, 1
]
min
[(
αeeij /α
eu
ij
)
, 1
]
λijα
ee
ij −δij
(
1− αeeij
) )
β2ij =
(
β21ij β
22
ij β
23
ij β
24
ij
)
=
(
min
[(
αueij /α
ee
ij
)
, 1
]
min
[(
αueij /α
uu
ij
)
, 1
]
λijα
ue
ij −δij
(
1− αueij
) )
β3ij =
(
β31ij β
32
ij β
33
ij β
34
ij
)
=
(
min
[(
αeuij /α
uu
ij
)
, 1
]
min
[(
αeuij /α
ee
ij
)
, 1
]
λijα
eu
ij −δij
(
1− αeuij
) )
β4ij =
(
β41ij β
42
ij β
43
ij β
44
ij
)
=
(
min
[(
αuuij /α
eu
ij
)
, 1
]
min
[(
αuuij /α
ue
ij
)
, 1
]
λijα
uu
ij −δij
(
1− αuuij
) )
The coefficient matrix implies the following sets of constraints- which ensure αllij ≤ 1,
1 ≥ β11ij > 0, 1 ≥ β12ij > 0, β13ij > 0, β14ij < 0,
1 ≥ β21ij > 0, 1 ≥ β22ij > 0, β23ij > 0, β24ij < 0,
1 ≥ β31ij > 0, 1 ≥ β32ij > 0, β33ij > 0, β34ij < 0,
1 ≥ β41ij > 0, 1 ≥ β42ij > 0, β43ij > 0, β44ij < 0,
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β11ij =
β13ij
β23ij
if
β14ij
β24ij
> 1 and β11ij = 1 otherwise,
β21ij =
β23ij
β13ij
if
β24ij
β14ij
> 1 and β21ij = 1 otherwise,
β31ij =
β33ij
β43ij
if
β34ij
β44ij
> 1 and β31ij = 1 otherwise,
β41ij =
β43ij
β33ij
if
β44ij
β34ij
> 1 and β41ij = 1 otherwise,
β12ij =
β13ij
β33ij
if
β14ij
β34ij
> 1 and β12ij = 1 otherwise,
β22ij =
β23ij
β43ij
if
β24ij
β44ij
> 1 and β22ij = 1 otherwise,
β32ij =
β33ij
β13ij
if
β34ij
β14ij
> 1 and β32ij = 1 otherwise,
β42ij =
β43ij
β23ij
if
β44ij
β24ij
> 1 and β42ij = 1 otherwise,
β14ij is free,
β24ij is free,
β34ij =
β14ij β
23
ij − β24ij β13ij
β23ij − β13ij
−
β24ij − β14ij
β23ij − β13ij
β33ij ,
β44ij =
β14ij β
23
ij − β24ij β13ij
β23ij − β13ij
−
β24ij − β14ij
β23ij − β13ij
β43ij .
λij =
β14ij β
23
ij − β24ij β13ij
β24ij − β14ij
−δij =
β14ij β
23
ij − β24ij β13ij
β23ij − β13ij
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Or alternatively,
β24ij is free,
β34ij is free,
β14ij =
β24ij β
33
ij − β34ij β23ij
β33ij − β23ij
−
β24ij − β34ij
β33ij − β23ij
β13ij ,
β44ij =
β24ij β
33
ij − β34ij β23ij
β33ij − β23ij
−
β24ij − β34ij
β33ij − β23ij
β43ij ,
λij =
β24ij β
33
ij − β34ij β23ij
β24ij − β34ij
,
−δij =
β24ij β
33
ij − β34ij β23ij
β33ij − β23ij
,
or
β34ij is free,
β44ij is free,
β14ij =
β34ij β
43
ij − β44ij β33ij
β43ij − β33ij
−
β34ij − β44ij
β43ij − β33ij
β13ij
β24ij =
β34ij β
43
ij − β44ij β33ij
β43ij − β33ij
−
β34ij − β44ij
β43ij − β33ij
β23ij
λij =
β34ij β
43
ij − β44ij β33ij
β34ij − β44ij
−δij =
β34ij β
43
ij − β44ij β33ij
β43ij − β33ij
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The αllij are obtained by the following equations,
αeeij =
β24ij − β14ij
β24ij − β14ij β21ij
if β11ij = 1 and β11ij
β14ij − β24ij
β14ij − β24ij β11ij
otherwise,
αueij =
β14ij − β24ij
β14ij − β24ij β11ij
if β21ij = 1 and β21ij
β24ij − β14ij
β24ij − β14ij β21ij
otherwise,
αeuij =
β44ij − β34ij
β44ij − β34ij β41ij
if β31ij = 1 and β31ij
β34ij − β44ij
β34ij − β44ij β31ij
otherwise,
αuuij =
β34ij − β44ij
β34ij − β44ij β31ij
if β41ij = 1 and β41ij
β44ij − β34ij
β44ij − β34ij β41ij
otherwise.
Given αllij one can obtain the λij and δij from the third and fourth row.
The aggregate number of marriages is according to our theory (compare the outflow
from singlehood in equation (3.13)) given by,
Λ̃t = ξ (s̃mt)−
1
2 (s̃ft)−
1
2
∫∫∫∫
αl
′′l
ij s̃
l′′
it s̃
l
jtdidjdl
′′dl,
the aggregate number of divorces (compare the inflow into singlehood in equation (3.13))
by
∆̃t = δ
∫∫∫∫ (
1− αl′′lij
)
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl
+
∫∫∫∫
τ̃ l
′′
it max
[
1−
(
αl
′l
ij /α
l′′l
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl
+
∫∫∫∫
τ̃ ljt max
[
1−
(
αl
′′l′
ij /α
l′′l
ij
)
, 0
]
m̃l
′′l
ijtdidjdl
′′dl.
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